Lonely in the region
To expect the US to ensure that Pakistan would not resort to terrorist attacks against Indian targets would be unrealistic. It has not happened all these years....The Pakistan government has pre-empted a military takeover by General Kayani by giving him a three-year extension and thereby conceding indirectly that the army and Kayani in particular will guide and direct the government in Pakistan. A former ISI chief who continues to employ people like ex-ISI chief Hameed Gul could not be expected to think in terms of any peaceful settlement with India on pending issues. India should, therefore, be prepared for all eventualities and set its own house in order. The Kashmir issue should be sorted out after purposeful talks with the Kashmiri people, the National Conference, the PDP, the Hurriyat and others. A solution is not difficult to arrive at if sincere efforts are made at all levels. And as for terrorist attacks from across the border, India has to anticipate them and be prepared and alert. -- T.V. RajeswarBy T.V. Rajeswar
30July 2010
The numerous documents put out by WikiLeaks, extending over a period of six years and now available to the world at large, have posed several crucial lessons. These lessons are for India as well as the United States.
That terrorism has been practiced as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan over the years is known to India all along. It started with General Zia-ul Haq in 1979 and has gone on unabated. We have had several serious instances such as the Kargil military misadventure in 1999, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai attack in November 2008. The man responsible for planning the Kargil war, General Pervez Musharraf had started preparing for the Kargil attack even as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was visiting Lahore in early 1999 for peace talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. After Musharraf subsequently took power in Pakistan after a military coup, India was magnanimous enough to invite him for parleys at Agra in the summer of 2001. His arrogance was evident during his surprise press conference where, inter alia, he referred to India’s intervention in East Pakistan resulting in the birth of Bangladesh. The Agra talks failed, as they were bound to.
The subsequent efforts to hold constructive dialogue with Pakistan at places like Sharm el-Sheikh and the recent efforts by the foreign secretaries, home ministers and foreign ministers of both the countries were bound to fail for the simple reason that Pakistan was not prepared to take any constructive steps to end terrorism, much less punish those involved in terrorism. The WikiLeaks disclosures have proved that the ruling force of Pakistan, which is the army led by General Ashfaq Kayani and its dominant wing, the ISI, are only interested in promoting conflicts against India, Afghanistan and even the American-led coalition.
David Headley’s disclosures are far more important from the Indian point of view than all the WikiLeaks documents put together. Though formally affiliated to the Lashkar-e-Toiba, he was in fact being handled by the ISI, the Pakistan army and the navy. Senior army officers as well as retired ones from the ISI were guiding the potential Mumbai attackers in a thoroughly professional manner. Money was given by the ISI and the Pakistan navy also trained them. The numerous trips that Headley made and the targets he mapped were meant for a large-scale unofficial war. While India and Pakistan were negotiating through various back channels and also holding formal talks, Headley’s mission went on undisturbed.
The most important aspect of Headley’s disclosures is that they were subsequently made available to Pakistan and India by the US. The dossier given to the Pakistan home minister by his Indian counterpart was possibly redundant. The reference made by the Pakistan foreign minister to these disclosures by the Indian home secretary was possibly meant to mislead the Pakistanis. India need not have reacted to it at all at any level.
A thought may occur to someone analysing Headley’s disclosures and his antecedents in Pakistan and the US, whether his activities and the project he was entrusted with by the LeT were not known to his original handlers, who were none other than the FBI and the CIA? In short, did these agencies have a hint, if not full awareness of the planned attack on Mumbai in November 2007? Deniability is an easy instrument available to intelligence agencies all over the world and presumably they would deny any such knowledge. India should realise that at the end of the day it has to depend upon its own resources and strength. To expect the US to ensure that Pakistan would not resort to terrorist attacks against Indian targets would be unrealistic. It has not happened all these years. A simple example will explain this: the US knows all about the numerous training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for training jihadis to infiltrate Kashmir and possibly other parts of India. The satellite maps and ground intelligence reports were all with them, and yet the US had never spoken about them openly, nor had it ever announced that it would hold Pakistan responsible if any terrorist activities were mounted from these camps against India.
After specific intelligence was available regarding the ISI’s role in planning the attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009, there was no report of the US sternly warning Pakistan to desist from such activities. The sad fact is that whatever Pakistan had done, or is doing against India covertly or overtly, the US would ignore and only express sympathy and support to India. Even after the WikiLeaks documents, the American national security advisor has talked about having close cooperation with the Pakistan army. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton handed over a cheque for $500 million for developmental activities in Pakistan and at the same time, held that some people in the Pakistan army knew about the exact location of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, but would not do anything to help nab them.
The Pakistan government has pre-empted a military takeover by General Kayani by giving him a three-year extension and thereby conceding indirectly that the army and Kayani in particular will guide and direct the government in Pakistan. A former ISI chief who continues to employ people like ex-ISI chief Hameed Gul could not be expected to think in terms of any peaceful settlement with India on pending issues.
India should, therefore, be prepared for all eventualities and set its own house in order. The Kashmir issue should be sorted out after purposeful talks with the Kashmiri people, the National Conference, the PDP, the Hurriyat and others. A solution is not difficult to arrive at if sincere efforts are made at all levels. And as for terrorist attacks from across the border, India has to anticipate them and be prepared and alert.
The writer is former director of the Intelligence Bureau and governor of Sikkim, West Bengal and UP.
Source: The Indian Express, New Delhi
10:17 PM
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