Why Hafiz Saeed and his L-e-T’’s links with ISI are unbreakable

Islam,Terrorism and Jihad

05 Jun 2009, NewAgeIslam.Com

Why Hafiz Saeed and his L-e-T''s links with ISI are unbreakable

In the early 1980s, Hafiz Saeed joined the mujahidin war in Afghanistan which also brought him into close contact with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Their 'dedication to jihad' inspired him immensely. 'Osama was a man of extraordinary qualities,' he recalled. (10) Azzam, a Palestinian who had worked as a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at the University of Jordan in Amman had a huge influence on Hafiz Saeed. … Azzam helped Hafiz Saeed establish Markaz Dawal al-Irshad (MDI), an organization for Islamic preaching and guidance which was ideologically affiliated with wahabi Ahle Hadith. …    Hafiz Saeed founded LeT in 1990, soon after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, as a military wing of the MDI to wage jihad against the Indian authorities in Kashmir. The LeT announced its arrival on the Kashmir jihad scene on 5 February 1993 with a ferocious attack on an Indian military force in Poonch district that killed at least two soldiers. Two of the guerrillas were also killed. Since then the outfit has been responsible for hundreds of guerrilla raids in the disputed territory. Within a short span, LeT emerged as the fiercest militant organization—it possessed not only thousands of well trained and highly motivated fighters, but also a huge propaganda network. Its main publications in different languages had a circulation of hundreds of thousands. Its main publication, Al-Dawat, had more than 80,000 copies printed and sold at major bookshops across the country. (13). LeT had worked in close coordination with the ISI, which also provided support to launch the militants across the border.      LeT's main stress was on jihad against Hindus, who it regarded as the worst polytheists, and against Jews who it claimed were 'singled out by the Qur'an as the enemies of Islam'. LeT leaders maintained that Hindus and Jews were their main targets because they were 'the enemies of Islam and Pakistan'. (26) A party document, 'Why are we waging jihad', argued that jihad was the only way to avenge history and re-establish the lost glory of Islam. It vowed to take back Spain, where Muslims had ruled for 800 years, and to re-establish Muslim rule in India. It said that LeT was fighting to liberate not just Kashmir, but the whole of India. It was one of the reasons why LeT's attacks against Hindus had been so savage. In many cases the victim were beheaded. In December 2000 LeT extended its jihad from Kashmir to mainland India. -- renowned Pakistani journalist and author Zahid Husain  URL of this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1443 --------------------------------     INSIDE JIHAD: ARMY OF THE PURE Zahid Husain   On 12 January 2002, Musharraf made another about-turn when he declared that no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion. In a televised speech lasting well over an hour, he unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism, including those carried out in the name of freeing Kashmir's Muslim majority from Indian rule.    He banned five Islamic extremist groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the two most powerful jihadist organizations. 'No party in future will be allowed to be identified with words like Jaish, Lashkar or Sipah,' he warned. (1) This declaration was acclaimed as an ipso facto renunciation of jihad as a state policy. From a western perspective, Musharraf's landmark speech positioned him as the kind of leader in the Muslim world the West had been desperately seeking.    The speech marked a departure from the policy of supporting pan-Islamism and the process of Islamization. Musharraf strongly asserted that the state should exercise a monopoly over external policy and it should be determined, not by Islamic solidarity, but by the country's national interests. He vowed to suppress Islamic extremist groups challenging the authority of the state and rein in radical madrasas.    For Musharraf, the 12 January declaration was more important than his decision to support the US war on Afghanistan. 'This sets a direction for the country, that was a response to a terrorist attack,' the General told me a week after his decision that brought him into direct conflict with the militant groups once sponsored by his intelligence agencies. (2) But he found it hard to root out a deeply entrenched jihadist culture nurtured by the state for more than two decades.    The first Pakistani jihadist group emerged in 1980 when thousands of volunteers, mainly students from religious seminaries, joined the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. By 2002, Pakistan had become home to 24 militant groups. (3) Highly disciplined paramilitary organizations operated in every neighbourhood, pursuing their own internal and external agenda. The largest among them were LeT, JeM, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat-al-Hihad-al-Islami (HJI). All these paramilitary groups, originally from the same source, had similar motivations and goals, and recruited from the same kind of people (often unemployed youth from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province). The only difference was in patronage; HuM and HJI were both strongly linked with the Taliban, whilst LeT had strong links with Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia.    These militant organizations were not clandestine nor had they sprouted surreptitiously. Their growth, if not actually sponsored, had certainly been looked upon with favour by the state.(4) Their activities were not secret, and found expression in graffiti, wall posters and pamphlets all over the country, inviting Muslims to join forces with them. They also carried addresses and telephone numbers to contact for training. 'Jihad is the shortest route to paradise,' declared one of the many exhortations. 'A martyr ensures salvation for the entire family.' Every jihadist organization had funds to help families of 'martyrs'. Although money was not the primary motivation of jihadists, it was essential to sustain the culture of jihad. (5) The state's patronage helped the jihadists to raise funds at public places. The militant groups had developed a powerful propaganda machinery. Their publication had gained a large readership and their messages were also available on video and audiotapes.    During the 1980s and 1990s, the objective of jihadist movements in Pakistan was not, like that of Arab Salafists such as bin Laden, the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. Their objectives were more in line with the regional strategy of the Pakistani military establishment: the liberation of Kashmir from India and the installation of a Pashtun Islamist government in Afghanistan. Almost all the Islamic militant groups served as instruments of Pakistan's regional policy. The army needed them as much as they needed the army. After 9/11, Pakistan's support for the American-led war on terror pitted it against its former clients. Although as the following chapter shows, this did not mean that support for them in the state security apparatus was completely withdrawn.    The Wahabi-inspired LeT, the most radical face of jihad in Pakistan, was also more amenable to the ISI than any other militant outfits. After the 2002 ban, it reduced its public visibility. Instead of challenging Musharraf's military led government, it agreed to work within new parameters and restrict its activities to a 'controlled jihad' in Kashmir while keeping a low profile inside Pakistan. However, this tactical truce was a strained one. Islamist groups, even government-friendly ones like LeT, were becoming radicalized by the ideological currents of the region. Increasingly, their ambitions exceeded the goals of the ISI. Even in 2000, the founder of LeT, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed told me that he saw the struggle in Kashmir as 'the gateway to the liberation of Indian Muslims'. He went on: 'We believe in a clash of civilizations and our jihad will continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion.'(6)    A former university professor, Hafiz Saeed is not a charismatic man; he comes across as shy and self-effacing, not the ingredients that militant leaders are generally made of short and chubby, his long beard dyed with henna, when I met him in January 2001 he was always surrounded by his young followers. For him, killing infidels and destroying the forces of 'evil and disbelief is the obligation of every pious Muslim'.(7) The horrors of the partition of India in 1947, which uprooted his family from their home in Simla, left a huge imprint on Hafiz Saeed's personality. Millions of people were massacred in the communal violence that followed the creation of the new Muslim state. Thirty-six members of his family were killed while migrating to Pakistan. There his family settled in the central Punjab district of Sargodha. (8)    Farm land allotted by the government, and hard work, brought prosperity to the family. Hafiz Saeed's parents were very religious. His mother taught the Qur'an to her seven sons. Five of them were still alive. Hafiz Saeed received his primary education in the village. After graduating from the University of Punjab he joined the King Abdul Aziz Islamic University in Riyadh where he also taught for many years. During his stay in Saudi Arabia he developed close links with Wahabi clerics. After returning to Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed took up a teaching job at the Department of Islamic Studies at the Lahore University of Engineering and Technology. His two brothers lived in America. One was head of an Islamic centre and the other pursued an academic career. Hafiz Saeed himself had never travelled to the USA or any other western country. (9)    In the early 1980s, Hafiz Saeed joined the mujahidin war in Afghanistan which also brought him into close contact with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Their 'dedication to jihad' inspired him immensely. 'Osama was a man of extraordinary qualities,' he recalled. (10) Azzam, a Palestinian who had worked as a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at the University of Jordan in Amman had a huge influence on Hafiz Saeed. The Palestinian scholar arrived in Pakistan soon after the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces and took up a teaching position at the Islamic University of Islamabad. But his stint was short. He shifted to Peshawar and emerged as the main jihadist ideologue. With Saudi finance he recruited volunteers for the Afghan jihad from all over the Arab world. He was assassinated in a bomb attack in Peshawar in 1989.    Azzam helped Hafiz Saeed establish Markaz Dawal al-Irshad (MDI), an organization for Islamic preaching and guidance which was ideologically affiliated with wahabi Ahle Hadith. In the tradition of the reformist Sunni movements, the MDI sought to purify society and Islam of 'outside influences'. Its sprawling headquarters in Muridke on the outskirts of Lahore housed a university, a farm, a clothing factory and a carpentry workshop. The objective was to create a model Islamic environment removed from any state interference.(11) In 1994, the movement set up a network of schools across the country with the objectives of promoting the Wahabi version of Islam and preparing the students for jihad. The MDI observed a strict educational philosophy that was directed towards developing a jihadist culture and to produce a reformed individual, who would be well versed not only in Islamic moral principles, but also in science and technology. The teaching was aimed at producing an alternative model of governance and development.(12) These schools, located in the poorer urban and rural neighbourhoods, attracted children of families who could not afford a better education. The organization encouraged its supporters to have large families, so that more volunteers were available for jihad.    Hafiz Saeed founded LeT in 1990, soon after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, as a military wing of the MDI to wage jihad against the Indian authorities in Kashmir. The LeT announced its arrival on the Kashmir jihad scene on 5 February 1993 with a ferocious attack on an Indian military force in Poonch district that killed at least two soldiers. Two of the guerrillas were also killed. Since then the outfit has been responsible for hundreds of guerrilla raids in the disputed territory. Within a short span, LeT emerged as the fiercest militant organization—it possessed not only thousands of well trained and highly motivated fighters, but also a huge propaganda network. Its main publications in different languages had a circulation of hundreds of thousands. Its main publication, Al-Dawat, had more than 80,000 copies printed and sold at major bookshops across the country. (13). LeT had worked in close coordination with the ISI, which also provided support to launch the militants across the border.    LeT was an extremely secretive organization. Except for the top leadership, the identity of its members was not disclosed. Since its inception in 1990, it has produced thousands of highly trained fighters, who have given a new dimension to the guerrilla war in Kashmir. The earliest fighters were trained in various camps in Afghanistan. But after 1992 the camps were shifted to remote regions of Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) and the mountainous tribal regions of the North West Frontier Province close to the border with Afghanistan.    The procedure was simple. Any jihadist aspirant could enroll himself for training at one of hundreds of LeT centres operating openly across the country. The volunteers, most of them in their teens, were then taken to various camps for military training, conducted in two stages. At the initial level they were given basic weapons training for three weeks. The second stage of rigorous guerrilla training was restricted to those who were fully committed to jihad and were practicing Muslims.(14)    At the camp, volunteers began their day with the call to morning prayers. They were then kept busy in gruelling physical and military exercise until dusk. Part of the training, included religious instruction, Qur'anic lessons and adherence to prayers. The trainees learned to transform their lives in line with the teaching of Islam. To be in the ranks of the 'soldiers of Allah', growing a beard was mandatory, shalwar (loose trousers) had to be hiked above the ankle, and watching television and listening to music were banned. Individualism was curbed, beginning with the sharing of food and drinks from the same utensils.(15)    After the initial training, the would-be mujahid was sent back, usually to his home town, and kept under observation by senior LeT officials for a couple of months. His conduct was closely watched as the performed routine organizational duties. He was supposed to collect funds, organize propaganda meetings and practice the preaching of Islam in his home and neighbourhood. Only a select number of volunteers were chosen for the extended programme. They returned home completely transformed after the course. They kept their hair long and stopped cutting their beards. They were identified by new names, mostly the surnames of companions of the Prophet Mohammed or of the earliest Islamic heroes. (16) Between 10,000 and 30,000 young men were trained at LeT camps.    The extended training, however, did not ensure that a volunteer would be sent for combat operations. Thousands of trained guerrillas anxiously awaited their turn to cross into Kashmir, but not everyone was given the chance. 'I pray to Allah that my turn [to go to Kashmir] comes soon, 'said Abu Mohammed, a young college student who had already completed the second level training. Hafiz Saeed often said that he would not put a weapon in the hands of any young recruit who was not secure in his faith. To be a combatant one had to be a pious person. (17)    LeT, unlike some of the other jihadist groups, drew its recruits from universities and colleges as well as form among unemployed youth. The traditional Islamic madrasas provided only ten per cent of the volunteers. (18) Influenced by radical Islamic literature, many university and college students joined the group. 'Those coming from educational institutions are much more motivated and conscious of what they are doing,' said Naveed Qamar, a LeT activist and graduate of the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore. The top leadership of the group, including Hafiz Saeed, had been on the faculty of that university. A large number of LeT activists also came from the working class or were school drop-outs. In the countryside, LeT recruits were largely from families which were influenced by Wahhabi Islam. (19)    The majority of LeT recruits came from Punjab, particularly from Lahore, Gujranwala and Multan where Ahle Hadith had its strongholds. In some central Punjab district villages LeT had considerable influence because of support for the Kashmir jihad. Gondlawala, a small dusty village, is now called Pind Shaheedan (the village of martyrs) because at least one person from every family had fought or died in the Kashmir jihad, mainly as an LeT fighter. The group's increasing influence was indicated by the fact the villagers would accept its arbitration in local and even in domestic disputes. (20) In recent years, LeT had started attracting an increasing number of volunteers from Pakistan's southern provinces of Sindh and Balochistan where Wahhabi influence had increased. Muslims from other countries, including Britain, had also joined LeT when he was killed in Badgam district in Kashmir in May 1995 in an encounter with Indian security forces. (21) Several foreign militants were believed to have received training at LeT camps in Pakistan. Among them were Guantanamo Bay inmates David Hicks and French terrorist suspect Willie Brigitte, who were accused of planning attacks in Australia. (22)    LeT gave a new and more violent dimension to the Kashmiri struggle by launching Fidayin raids against Indian forces and military installations. The term 'Fidayin attack' was used by the LeT leadership for target operations well inside the Indian military bases. (23) 'A Fidayin is one who must complete his mission even in the worst circumstances,' explained Abdullah Muntazir, an LeT spokesman. He insisted that the concept of Fidayin was different from that of a suicide bomber, who blew himself up to kill others. 'We consider suicide attacks un-Islamic. Many Fidayin come back alive after completion of their missions,' said Muntazir. The Fidayin attacks had brought an unprecedented ferocity to the Kashmir jihad.    A Fidayin is chosen from among the best and most courageous fighters and not every guerrilla meets the tough criteria. An other-worldly level of devotion to the cause is required, as I discovered when I met a Fidayin recently returned from his mission. His thin frame, gentle eyes and polite manners gave not the slightest indication of his being a guerrilla fighter. The young bearded militant, who used the nom de guerre of Abu Ukrema, had just returned from Kashmir when I met him at the LeT headquarters in Lahore in January 2001. Abu Ukrema walked with a limp because of a bullet wound, received during and encounter with the Indian troops. 'I will return to the fighting as soon as the bullet is removed and the wounds are healed,' he told me. 'It is my desire to become a martyr.' His face lit up as he narrated how he and his fellow guerrillas had destroyed and Indian army post after a fierce gun battle which lasted several hours and left many soldiers dead.    Martyrdom is not mourned as it is considered to be the sole guarantee of entry to paradise. LeT local officials visit the house of the martyr to offer congratulations to the family. Sweets are distributed to celebrate the death. The occasion is also used to solicit new recruits. Emotional speeches are delivered and then the martyr's testament, which often exhorts their kin to strictly observer the Islamic tenets and be prepared to give their lives in the way of Allah, is read in public. The men are implored neither to listen to music nor to watch films. They are asked to destroy their television sets because they 'spread the Hindu culture of singing and dancing'. (24) LeT's sectarian tilt and ultra-orthodox ideology distinguish it from other Pakistani radical Islamists. Some other militant groups even accuse it of undermining the Kashmiri jihad by promoting sectarian division. (25)    LeT's main stress was on jihad against Hindus, who it regarded as the worst polytheists, and against Jews who it claimed were 'singled out by the Qur'an as the enemies of Islam'. LeT leaders maintained that Hindus and Jews were their main targets because they were 'the enemies of Islam and Pakistan'. (26) A party document, 'Why are we waging jihad', argued that jihad was the only way to avenge history and re-establish the lost glory of Islam. It vowed to take back Spain, where Muslims had ruled for 800 years, and to re-establish Muslim rule in India. It said that LeT was fighting to liberate not just Kashmir, but the whole of India. It was one of the reasons why LeT's attacks against Hindus had been so savage. In many cases the victim were beheaded. In December 2000 LeT extended its jihad from Kashmir to mainland India.    It was just before dark on 3 December 2000 when two of LeT's gun-men sneaked inside Delhi's Red Fort, which housed an Indian military unit and high-security interrogation cell used both by the Central Bureau of interrogation and the army. (27) The fort, built by Mughal Emperor Shahjahan in the seventeenth century, sits on the edge of the Indian capital's old town and has a huge symbolic value for India. Traditionally, the Prime Minister hoisted the national flag here on Independence Day, and part of this historic landmark was opened to tourists in the daytime. A fierce firelight broke out after armed intruders stormed the security barracks, killing three guards. LeT claimed responsibility the next day, declaring that the guerrilla who were involved in the deadly attack were safe at an undisclosed location.    The audacious raid on the Red Fort was the first operation against an Indian military installation inside India by an Islamic militant group involved in the Kashmiri struggle. 'The action indicates that we have extended the jihad to India,' Hafiz Saeed declared when I met him a month after the incident. The attack on the Red Fort signalled a new and more aggressive phase in jihadist activities.    It was incidents such as this which brought LeT to the US state Department's attention and, in 2002, it was placed on the USA's list of terrorist organizations. Musharraf, having declared his support for the war on terror, had little choice but to ban it. But the ban had little effect on LeT's power. Before it was even announced, the LeT leadership had shifted their base to Indian-controlled Kashmir. This relieved some of the political pressure from Musharraf as it made it more difficult to claim that the Pakistani government was behind the Fidayin attacks. While an entirely new Kashmiri leadership was appointed to run the military wing, in Pakistan the outfit started working under the banner of its political wing, Jamaat-ud Da'awa, with Hafiz Saeed as its head. The new organization ostensibly restricted its role to preaching, education and social welfare. But in reality in never ceased working in support of the Kashmiri jihad. (28)    Let leaders admit that the proscription slowed down their operation in Kashmir, but it certainly didn't stop it; a large number of its militants were still based in its camps in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. After initial restraint, LeT was back recruiting volunteers and its donation boxes had re-emerged at public places and mosques. In a speech on March 2004, Hafiz Saeed had declared that more than 7,000 new volunteers had received military training at LeT camps in the previous six months. The first congregation of Jamaat-ud Da'awa held in November 2002, after the government's action against LeT, attracted more than 100,000 people.     It was apparent that Jamaat-ud Da'awa was just a cover to avoid international scrutiny. Neither its militant infrastructure nor its propaganda machinery had stopped functioning. The group continued to publish several magazines and run a website. Interestingly, no LeT activist was arrested in the government's crackdown on Islamic extremists. After being detained for a few months, Hafiz Saeed was freed by a High Court order in December 2002 and then moved freely around the country, mobilizing Muslims for jihad. 'For us jihad is sacred like praying and fasting that cannot be forsaken under any condition,' he declared at the end of his detention. 'Ours is not such a cowardly party as to bow down before the US pressure for halting support to jihad.(29) The Pakistan government placed Jamaat-ud Da'awa on the 'terror watch list' in 2003, but the action did not affect its activities, which included running a huge network of hospitals and schools.    While continuing the struggle in Kashmir, LeT had its own reason not to take on the government. 'Our main objective is to wage jihad against non-Muslims, 'explained Yahya Mujahid, a spokesman for the group.(30) Indeed, unlike other militant groups such as JeM and HuM, LeT has never used its military skills within Pakistan nor did it involve itself with any sectarian or ethnic organizations. The case of LeT was indicative of Islamabad's continuing flexibility towards those organizations which had restricted their activities to Kashmir and did not indulge in terrorism at home. Pakistani authorities defended their stance saying that LeT did not present any threat to the country's internal security, so there was no need to crackdown on it. According to them the organization strictly controlled its carders and none of its members had ever indulged in any act of terrorism inside the country.    Contrary to this claim, there is strong evidence of LeT activists providing shelter to al-Qaeda fighters fleeing from Afghanistan. Abu Zubaydah, a close associate of bin Laden, was captured in 2002 in a house in the Pakistani central city of Faisalabad rented by a LeT member. But its leaders deny any association with the terrorist network. They maintained there was fundamental difference between them and bin Laden's views on 'jihad'. 'We do not agree with his call to overthrow the rulers of Muslims,' said Yahya Mujahid.    As well as the desire to avoid unnecessary confrontations, Islamabad's attitude towards LeT also reflected the desire to keep militancy alive until India agreed to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Despite an improvement in relations between India and Pakistan as a result of the peace process launched in January 2004, there has not been any substantive move on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Islamabad believed that a complete cessation of militancy in Kashmir would remove pressure on India to make any concessions.    Though its main concentration has been in Kashmir, LeT has expanded its network to several other countries. Its members were active in India, Burma, Chechnya, and Bosnia and according to some reports have also been fighting against the American forces in Iraq. In April 2004, coalition forces reportedly arrested a Pakistani Islamic fighter who was identified as Danish Ahmed. A former LeT commander in Kashmir, he was captured by British forces in Basra and later handed over to the American intelligence authorities. Ahmed is believed to be among hundreds of Pakistani volunteers involved in the Iraq war. Most of them came from religious schools run by MDI. Virulently anti-American, the party has declared that it was mandatory for Muslim to join the mujahidin fighting against the American forces in Iraq. 'Islam is in grave danger and the Iraqi mujahidin are fighting for the return of its glory. They are fighting the forces of evil in an extremely difficult situation,' Hafiz Saeed declared in his sermon at Lahore mosque in June 2004. (31)    Though LeT refrained from indulging in terrorist activities inside Pakistan, its leaders became increasingly critical of Musharraf's pro-American policies and move to reform the madrasas. 'Most of our leaders are lapdogs of Americans,' declared Majjalutul Dawa, a publication of Jamaat-ud Da'awa.    Despite being seen as a 'tame', controllable force, LeT is more powerful than ever, and looks set for confrontation with the government on issues which go beyond Kashmir. Simply by carrying out its recruiting, fundraising and military activities, it contributes to the radicalization of Pakistani society. Nonetheless, for as long as the Kashmiri issue remains unresolved, the government seems prepared to embrace it.    Zahid Husain is the Pakistan correspondent for The Times (London), The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek.   Excerpts from: Chapter 3 inside Jihad, Army of the Pure, Frontline Pakistan by Zahid Husain, Penguin Books   Copyright : Zahid Hussain, 2007, 2008   URL of this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1443