Radical Islamism & Jihad | |
24 Sep 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com | |
In the political circus of Pakistan the Taliban Insurgency is being ignored | |
By Ayesha Saeed
In the midst of the political circus of Pakistan, the war in our backyard continues to be ignored. Violence has been raging in the tribal areas and Swat valley. Violence that is not just related to the war on terror and the Taliban, but adding to the delectable mix is renewed sectarian strife in Kurram Agency. And when the state and the militants battle it out, the ultimate sufferers are ordinary people - whether they are victims of fateful suicide bombs or refugees in their own country. The recent military offensive in Bajur created over 400,000 IDPs. The state moved in to provide relief and support to the dispossessed only as an afterthought. It is from amongst theses IDPs that the Taliban find their potential recruits. Basic Truths And how is the Pakistani government dealing with the situation? It is not. The Pakistani state doesn't have a cohesive policy on the issue and that is taking its toll. Let's reassess some basic truths of the situation before we move on. T#1: The ultimate demands of the Taliban and their ilk cannot be met by the state of Pakistan. The Taliban rally around two major causes: one, their objectives are intrinsically linked to the removal of NATO and ISAF troops from Afghanistan and end of any active support by the Pakistan state to the what is viewed as an occupying force; and two: they demand the enforcement of a regressive socio-political system under the guise of Shriah that ultimately looks to replace the modern state. The state of Pakistan cannot address the first demand simply because it is outside their control – as long as war is waged by America and its allies in Afghanistan, resistance by these elements will continue. The state of Pakistan state here is just a resource being used by the Americans in this war which has no foreseeable end. Furthermore, Pakistan does not have the option of withdrawing its support from this war either. So negotiating with the militants on this count is futile. Moving on to the second objective, the Pakistani state can but would not want to yield on it as it would amount to a defacto surrender of state sovereignty. And as the failed peace deal in Swat valley has shown, it does not eliminate the original problem. T#2: Military action of the nature adopted so far is not decisive. It leads to too much collateral damage - in the form of innocent deaths, internal displacements and destruction of infrastructure – and it creates massive amount of ill will against the military and the state not just in the affected area, but across the country. Furthermore, this war is taking place in an area where tribal culture implies that honour and revenge are essential codes of life. So when the state reneges on its promise not to cause harm to the people of an area, they create mortal enemies. Enemies who feed into militant propaganda and the destructive portal created by the war on terror and are driven by a primal desire to avenge the loss of honour and life. If anything conventional military action has succeeded in creating greater space for the militants to maneuver in. T#3: The Pakistani state has adopted a very one-track policy towards the Taliban insurgency so far. Their options have been very limited: military action or negotiations. Neither would succeed in the treacherous environment of our tribal areas. The Pakistan state has failed to create a cohesive policy that will seek to eliminate the influence of the militants in the area. The key here is this: the Pakistani state is not in a position to "win" this war against the militants for the reasons elaborated above. This war cannot be won by crushing the militants, but only by snuffing them out. Therefore, the best option is to ensure that the impact of this war on the socio-politic fabric of the country is minimized. This calls for a comprehensive strategy approach that not only neutralizes the enemy but also finds the state allies. T#4: The last truth of the situation is this: Pakistan cannot address the structural problems that drive men into the arms of the militants as long as foreign troops are present across the border. The reason is simple: while unemployment, illiteracy, militant propaganda and religious extremism are contributing factors they are not the real catalysts. If they were so, the state in Pakistan would have been challenged long ago. The real catalyst is the presence of foreign troops and the global of war on terror. As long as these facts are unchanged, addressing the structural problems in the area will not have the desired outcome. The atmosphere created by the global war on terror is too charged and too coloured by absolute claims that it masks the actual causes and objectives. The Implications
To conclude, the Taliban insurgency cannot be wished away. Neither can we bomb them out. To win this battle with them, we need to use our brains and develop a comprehensive strategy that isolates the militants and not the state. For this to succeed, it is imperative that the political leadership wakes up and realizes that a conscious and planned effort is needed to deal with this threat and to protect the fragile socio-political fabric of Pakistan. Posted on 27 August, 2008, 8:41 am Ayesha Saeed is currently a graduate student at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame. She completed her undergraduate degree from Lahore University of Management Sciences with a degree in Computer Science but drifted off to International Relations and eventually to Peace Studies.
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