No quick fix for Afghanistan

War on Terror

24 Jul 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com

No quick fix for Afghanistan

By S. Nihal Singh   Even as Barack Obama has been burnishing his credentials for his candidacy in the US presidential election race by visiting Afghanistan, the state of political and military play in that troubled country has come into sharper focus. It is conventional wisdom that in his hubris President George W. Bush chose to invade Iraq while taking his eyes off Afghanistan, with consequences that are evident every day. The recent attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul was a rude demonstration of their militant capability. The Republican presidential candidate John McCain is in a minority in suggesting that America could "win" in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The question is not of "winning" in Iraq but how, and how soon, to extricate American troops from there at minimal cost to US interests. Afghanistan presents another kind of problem because it lies at the heart of seriously dealing with what is mistakenly called a war on terror.   Apart from America fighting a resurgent Taliban in the South and East, Nato has been given charge of conducting the overall operation. It was a first for Nato in its new role as something of a world policeman, having travelled a long way from its founding purpose of fighting Communism and the Soviet Union. There are national caveats on the use of troops, tardiness in providing adequate infrastructure, particularly in air transportation, and faulty co-ordination of economic activity with military operations.   The situation has been further hampered by Pakistan's own preoccupation with a troubled transition to democracy, with a fragile coalition still to take full charge while a diminished Pervez Musharraf occupies the presidential office, and the Army under a new chief is seeking to be more professional than has been its wont. The coalition government has been torn between seeking peace with elements of Pakistani Taliban and mounting punitive exercises to please the American allies. The intelligence agency ISI has traditionally enjoyed much leeway and has been blamed by Afghanistan and India for helping organise the daring raid on the Indian embassy.   For India, the situation presents two kinds of problems. On the one hand, New Delhi has major infrastructure and other projects, which would help provide landlocked Afghanistan another route to do commerce with the outside world and open up Central Asia to India, via Iran. On the other hand, Nato's incursion into India's immediate neighbourhood, unwelcome in principle, is a necessary evil.   In a sense, Pakistan resents India's closeness to Afghanistan because it reduces Kabul's dependence on Islamabad. Security experts have interpreted the attack on the embassy as a warning against an expanding role for India in a country Islamabad has traditionally viewed as giving it strategic depth against New Delhi. But as a string of attacks on Pakistani Army, among other targets, indicate, the Taliban, with elements of Al Qaeda, are proving to be a double-edged sword. While they can be directed against Afghanistan and India, they also have their domestic agenda.   Both Obama and his Republican rival McCain are seeking more US and Nato troops to shore up their position. More US troops are dying in Afghanistan than in Iraq. But incidents of "friendly fire" leading to civilian deaths are a deterrent to the proverbial winning of hearts and minds. And the Western forces' inability to dovetail military and economic activities has dented the efficacy of aid. Besides, the US and Nato have reconciled themselves to letting the lucrative poppy cultivation flourish.   There is no simple alternative to providing alternative livelihood, and the drug network running from Afghanistan through Pakistan is too powerful and well connected to yield a ready solution. In immediate terms, there is the all-important question of not antagonising the local population further, coping as Western forces often are with unintended deaths of participants in marriage parties and local warlords.   The level of anti-Americanism in Pakistan is an accepted fact, as is the inevitability of any ruling establishment in Islamabad working with the US, dependent as it is upon American largesse. But the outlook has become murkier because unlike General Musharraf in his power days, the civilian coalition must perforce express the contradictions that underlie popular ambivalence towards Washington. America's pro-Israeli policies are anathema to most Pakistanis, as is the implicit, if not explicit, anti-Muslim slant of President Bush's "war on terror". And the waning months of the Bush presidency do not help.   The world hopes that McCain will not persevere in the folly of "winning" in Iraq, were he to be elected President; Obama's approach is more sensible. Assuming that the US is reluctantly forced to wind down its Iraq misadventure, Afghanistan's future would be more hopeful. In addition to more troops and better military infrastructure, Afghanistan requires an overarching political vision less partial to American concepts of democracy and more attuned to customary Afghan practices.   To an extent, the West remains a victim of the traditional guerrilla tactics of hit and run raids while often reclaiming parts of the countryside after dusk. It is a well-accepted axiom that military means alone cannot resolve deep-seated political and national problems. The question is of finding the right mix in applying this precept to Afghanistan.   For one thing, an augmented force must first blunt the new resurgence of the Taliban even as further efforts should be made to stem the flow of the Taliban across the porous border with Pakistan. Even if Islamabad were to display greater determination to check cross-border infiltration, the nature and length of the border make it a difficult exercise. Given the nature of Pakistan's tribal areas, the task becomes even more difficult. For nationalist reasons, Islamabad is prickly about cross-border raids by American forces unless they are undertaken discreetly.   There are no quick fixes for bringing peace to Afghanistan, but following practical and sensible policies would yield results over time. A lot is riding for Nato on Afghanistan. It has no alternative to completing the task it has undertaken. A realistic estimate would be to look at the horizon of a decade. As far as India is concerned, for geopolitical reasons, it must continue to pursue its economic and infrastructure assistance, which helps to make the lives of Afghans less unbearable.   Source: http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/op-ed/no-quick-fix-for-afghanistan.aspx