30 Sep 2010, NewAgeIslam.Com
Maulvis and Madrasas, Terrorism and the Taliban in Pakistan – Part 2
Maulana Zahid ur-Rashidi is a leading Pakistani Deobandi scholar. He teaches at the Madrasa Anwar ul-Uloom and the Madrasa Nusrat ul-Ulum in Gujranwala, and the edits the influential Urdu Al-Shariah magazine, one of the few journals brought out by Pakistani ulema groups that seriously discusses issues of vital contemporary concern. He is a senior leader of the Jamiat-i Ulama-i Islam Pakistan, a leading Pakistani Deobandi political party. For several years he served as assistant to Mufti Mahmud, top leader of this party. He is a prolific writer, and has regular columns in leading Pakistani Urdu newspapers. In this interview with Yoginder Sikand, exclusive to New Age Islam, the Maulana talks on a range of issues: the Taliban in Afghanistan, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan, the demand for the enforcement of the shariah, the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in his country and more
Maulana Zahid ur-Rashidi is a leading Pakistani Deobandi scholar. He teaches at the Madrasa Anwar ul-Uloom and the Madrasa Nusrat ul-Ulum in Gujranwala, and the edits the influential Urdu Al-Shariah magazine, one of the few journals brought out by Pakistani ulema groups that seriously discusses issues of vital contemporary concern. He is a senior leader of the Jamiat-i Ulama-i Islam Pakistan, a leading Pakistani Deobandi political party. For several years he served as assistant to Mufti Mahmud, top leader of this party. He is a prolific writer, and has regular columns in leading Pakistani Urdu newspapers. In this interview with Yoginder Sikand, exclusive to New Age Islam, the Maulana talks on a range of issues: the Taliban in Afghanistan, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan, the demand for the enforcement of the shariah, the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in his country and more
Q: Many madrasas have been accused of emerging as training grounds for violent extremists in Pakistan. Do you agree with this charge?
A: Madrasas have no role in the formation and training of extremist groups. Madrasas focus on providing Islamic education, protecting Islamic identity, helping mould society on Islamic lines, and encouraging the enforcement of Islamic laws and rules. Because various armed extremist groups claim to have precisely the same agenda, it is commonly, though erroneously, believed that they are a product of the madrasas. The fact of the matter is that there are scores of organisations across Pakistan working peacefully for the same goals through political and democratic struggles and efforts, and most of these are led by people who have been educated in madrasas. So, too, are the tens of thousands of ulema, madrasa teachers and imams of mosques across Pakistan who are serving the cause of religion and working entirely peacefully. Many such people, trained in Pakistani madrasas, are also working abroad, engaged in teaching and preaching work. Compared to all these people, those elements who have taken to the violent path are extremely small in number. That is why it is incorrect to say that the madrasas are complicit in the emergence of militant groups, especially in the case of the various mujahidin groups that were formed during the Afghan jihad with the protection of the Pakistani intelligence wing, the ISI, which is a phenomenon that still continues even today. The military training of these mujahidin groups was not imparted by or in madrasas. Rather, the organisations that launched them provided entirely for this training. In this regard, it must be kept in mind that the vast majority of activists of Al-Qaeda consist of college- and university-educated people. Yet, despite this, no one has branded colleges and universities as the epicentre of terrorism. Likewise, if a few men who have studied in madrasas are engaged in violent extremism, it is not proper to place the blame for this on the madrasas themselves.
The roots of the present system of independent madrasas in South Asia go back to the immediate aftermath of the Revolt of 1857, and so they have a long history of over 150 years. On the other hand, the phenomenon of extremist groups of the sort we face today is not more than 25 years old. It is thus wholly improper to ignore the peaceful history of around 150 years of the madrasas and to blame them for forming and promoting extremist and violent outfits.
Q: It is said that madrasas, especially but not only in Pakistan, foment hatred towards other religions and even other Muslim sects. What do you feel about this? What impact does this sort of hatred have on the minds of madrasa students? Does it not promote conflict and, in certain circumstances, even terrorism? What suggestions would you make to address this problem?
A: All madrasas are based on one or the other maslak or Islamic sectarian affiliation, and are geared to defending that particular tradition. That is why intolerance undoubtedly does exist in the madrasas for other Muslim maslaks and other religions. This is not at all appropriate. It is also an immense hurdle in promoting unity among Islamic forces and factions. But has this phenomenon given rise to terrorism? This is a question that needs to be properly investigated. It is a fact that hatred is actively promoted against the Qadianis in the madrasas, but, yet, the teachers and students of madrasas, by and large, have not engaged in any violence against them. Rather, they have generally expressed their hatred for the Qadianis in a peaceful way, and have also appealed to the Government, using peaceful means of protest, to acknowledge their demands vis-a-vis the Qadianis. Likewise, conflicts between Deobandis and Barelvis, Hanafis and the Ahl-e Hadith, and Shias and Sunnis are rife within the madrasas, but these, till recently, have rarely taken violent forms. The causes for violence in the name of sectarianism must also be located outside the madrasas themselves. To consider the madrasas as entirely responsible for this is wrong.
In this regard, it must be conceded that there is now increasing co-ordination and interaction between the federations of madrasas belonging to the different sects, as well as several joint efforts and policies. This has had the effect of lessening, somewhat, the intolerance for each other that characterises them. As a result of this, students from different sects can be sometimes found working together for common causes. But, still, I feel that the federations of madrasas of the different sects can be more pro-active in promoting inter-sectarian dialogue and joint programmes, particularly at the local level and involving madrasa teachers and students.
Q: In the discourse of the maulvis of the madrasas—and this is something that is not restricted just to them—one discerns a marked tendency to blame all the ills that Muslims face on alleged conspiracies hatched by non-Muslims, who are collectively branded as ‘enemies of Islam’. Does this tendency not discourage introspection and acknowledgement of Muslims’ own weaknesses and also hamper the urgent task of internal reform in Muslim societies? In other words, is this tendency not counter-productive from the Muslim point of view?
A: I don’t agree with your proposition that most madrasa teachers and students and other Muslims think this way. On the contrary, every day across the world, in thousands of mosques and madrasas, the claim is made that our problems are a result of Muslims’ straying away from religion, for not acting in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnat, the practice of the Prophet. That is why madrasas and graduates of madrasas see as their principal mission the spread of religious teachings in society, appealing to Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnat. It is, however, an undeniable fact that one of the factors for the distancing of ‘ordinary’ Muslims from Islamic teachings is the role of some inimical non-Muslim forces and what can definitely be said to be their conspiracies. Such policies were actively adopted by imperial powers when they ruled Muslim colonies. They wanted Muslims to distance themselves from Islamic teachings. With the departure of the European colonialists from Muslim lands, their place has been taken by ‘Muslim’ governments, who are, in different ways, carrying on with their policies in this regard.
Besides this, it is also undeniable that the resources of Muslim lands are still largely held or controlled by foreign powers, and that the economies of Muslim countries are controlled by international organisations and agencies. Global powers continue to interfere in the internal politics of Muslim countries, and some of them are known to be inimical to the Muslims’ culture and identity, which they seek to replace with Western models. This is what is called ‘cultural imperialism’. Muslim groups and countries that seek to resist this hegemony are cruelly crushed. In such an environment, if many Muslims come to believe that one of the factors behind the multiple problems of the Muslim world are imperialist conspiracies, it is hardly surprising and is not untrue. However, it is also a fact that Muslim leaders are doing nothing effective at all to save Muslims from these conspiracies and from neo-imperialism that holds Muslim countries in its vice-like grip. This is very unfortunate indeed. What we urgently need in the face of all this today is an intellectual awakening among the people, the spread of knowledge, and the use of knowledge to come out present state of stagnation and subordination. We need to use our resources in the best possible manner, and learn to solve our own problems effectively.
Q: But to come back to my earlier question, do you not discern a tendency in the discourse of those associated with the madrasas (as well as many other Muslims) to consider and brand all non-Muslims as, by definition, ‘enemies’—of Islam and Muslims?
A: It is absolutely wrong to consider all non-Muslims as enemies of Islam. I don’t think mature, serious Islamic scholars think that way. In actual fact, only a relatively small number of non-Muslims are enemies of Islam and Muslims. Unfortunately, influential sections of the global media and political lobbies are controlled by precisely such elements, which have a vested interest in perpetuating negative images of Islam and Muslims among others. Otherwise, across the world many non-Muslims are eager to learn the truth about Islam and want that the many doubts that they entertain about certain Islamic laws and rules be addressed. It is the duty of Muslims to reach out to such people with understanding and kindness, and to the many others who know nothing at all about Islam.
Q: How, in your view, has terror in the name of Islam and the promotion of hatred against other religions by certain ‘Islamic’ groups and ideologues impacted on what practising Muslims believe is the most important responsibility that they must shoulder—that of da‘wah or inviting others to Islam?
A: Terror in the name of Islam and spreading hatred against other religions and their adherents have undoubtedly greatly undermined the task of da‘wah, which is a basic task and duty of Muslims. But this is not the only aspect of this problem. Other aspects must also be considered. For instance, while da‘wah is a basic Islamic duty, protecting and promoting Islamic beliefs and commandments, and saving Muslims from Western cultural invasion, too, are fundamental religious duties incumbent on Muslims. These duties, too, cannot be ignored. Da‘wah and communicating the message of Islam have their own demands, and so do the tasks of protecting and defending Muslims and Islamic teachings. Neither of these can be ignored or sacrificed for the other. The issue here is one of division of tasks. Both spheres need different sets of experts, just as a country needs a separate Internal Affairs Ministry and an External Affairs Ministry, or just as a country’s military headquarters and its foreign affairs department speak in different idioms and languages. Or, to give another analogy, it is just as a country’s military general and its ambassador speak in different styles. Similarly, here, too, such differences must be observed, between those engaged in da‘wah and others engaged in defending Muslims and Islamic teachings, although there should be mutual exchanges and co-ordination between them, and they should keep in mind the needs of the other while working for an overall common purpose.
By ‘defence’ I do not mean violent actions, but, rather, indentifying and keeping a watch on actions taken by certain forces against Islam and Muslims and taking appropriate steps to respond to them. Obviously, this task cannot be ignored simply if by engaging in this necessary defence problems are created in the path of da‘wah. In my view, the major hurdle in the path of da‘wah is the fact that Muslims themselves are weak in terms of practically embodying and living Islam, as a result of which few non-Muslims are impressed by Islam on seeing the behaviour of Muslims. This is quite in contrast to the early Muslim period, when Islam practically expressed by Muslims in their own lives was the single biggest factor for the spread of Islam.
Q: To what extent do you see ‘Islamic’ organisations, including madrasas, in Pakistan and elsewhere, as expressing not Islam per se, but, rather, sectarianism that is predicated on opposition to other Muslim sects and their adherents?
A: I think we need to understand properly what we mean by ‘sectarianism’. Lamentably, all sorts of differences are considered to be the basis of or the cause for sectarianism. It is a fact that, from the very beginning, there have been among Muslims considerable differences in understanding fiqh or juridical rules that are sought to be derived from the sources of the shariah. Likewise, from the earliest period on there has been diversity among Muslims as regard certain beliefs. It is natural for such differences and diversity to exist. One cannot deny that such differences are important and can, in some cases, even be beneficial as well. To deny these differences, to my mind, is tantamount to denying that Islam is a ‘natural religion’, since nature revels in diversity. That said, I feel differences have their limits, and they should not be deployed to create conflicts between the different Muslim sects. The different Muslim sects and schools of thought must accept the existence of each other, and, on that basis, respect their right to think differently. Yet, at the same time, they should work together for common aims and goals. In Pakistan we have had several instances of this, in the form of Islamic groups, representing divergent schools of thought, joining together for a common cause. Yet, I would admit that much more needs to be done to strengthen this tendency as well as to remain alert to those elements who seek to use the differences between the different sects and schools of thought to promote conflict in order to serve their own vested interests.
Q: In your view, what reforms do Pakistani madrasas need to consider in order to promote a more positive attitude towards other religions and their adherents?
A: The basic objectives of madrasas are to spread religious teachings and consciousness in society, protect the Muslims’ beliefs and culture, promote an environment conducive to the observance of Islamic laws and duties, and train a class of experts in the Islamic tradition. That is why there exists no scope in the present madrasa system and syllabus for any move or effort that would negatively impact on these basic objectives. At the same time, in order to make the madrasas more effective and to improve their performance I support several urgently-needed changes and reforms. I have been writing and speaking in public forums about this for several years now. For instance, along with the teaching of Islam, madrasas must also teach the basics of other faiths, their history, the culture and present conditions of their adherents. Our ulema need such understanding. Also, madrasas should make arrangements for their students to learn various important foreign languages and the use modern means of communications and new methods of, and idioms and styles for, conveying their views. Their students must be made aware of contemporary cultural and economic issues and problems. Arrangements should be made for the ulema and students of madrasas to interact with leaders and activists from other religions and schools of thought and to exchange views on contemporary problems and issues. It is crucial for our ulema and madrasa teachers to abandon the tradition of heated polemical debates with others, and, instead, to engage in dialogue, discussions, lobbying and reasoned debate. Finally, even with regard to the teaching of Islamic subjects, madrasas must turn their attention to improving their standards.
Q: How do you look at the ways in which Islamic groups, including madrasas and organisations associated with madrasas, in Pakistan relate to the issue of ‘enforcing’ the shariah, which is one of their major demands and preoccupations? Do you share the view that enforcing the shariah through state decree or forcibly is pointless because many Muslims themselves would find a state ruled by medieval conceptions of the shariah unacceptable? How can the ‘enforcement’ of the shariah happen in the face of continued opposition to medieval notions of the shariah on the part of many Pakistanis, particularly a large section of the country’s elite?
A: As a matter of principle, it is true that for enforcing the shariah as positive law in Pakistan, the best way is through creating and promoting mass awareness and support, including through the ballot box and other peaceful political means. But, given Pakistan’s particular context and conditions, these means are not adequate. This is because Pakistan’s ruling class has never been willing to respect the demands of a large section of the country’s inhabitants that the shariah be the law of the land, which was regarded as the very rationale of a separate Pakistan by many. The ruling class in this country will never surrender to this demand in the future. This class only understands the language of agitation and public pressure, and is willing to make concessions, if at all, only if forced or pressurised to do so. Whatever concessions have been made to shariah laws in Pakistan so far have been a result of street power and people’s demonstrations and agitations. And this is why even today demands for the enforcement of the shariah are forced to take the form of demonstrations and the exhibition of street power. There is simply no other way to make the Pakistani ruling class hear. At the same time, it is crucial for groups and movements voicing this demand to remain peaceful, to operate within the ambit of the law and the country’s Constitution, and to abstain from any form of violence. I believe it is impermissible and illegitimate to take up arms for any demand, to terrorise people and to spread lawlessness within Pakistan. I have always condemned this tendency.
As for the question of enforcing the shariah through state fiat, it should be noted that, right from the time of the Prophet Muhammad down to the Ottoman Caliphate, the state apparatus, through government orders, was an effective means of enforcing the shariah. This has been a long tradition among Muslims, and is also something mandated by the Quran and the Prophet’s practice. No order is considered a law unless it has state approval and backing in order to enforce it. The idea that shariah laws can be followed in society without state enforcement might sound appealing in theory, this is not practically possible. Marx also envisioned the withering away of the state in his communist utopia, but this was just a dream and was wholly impractical in the real world. His followers, stepping down from their commitment to communism and talking of socialism instead, used the state as the principal instrument to enforce their ideology.
Islam is not just a bundle of beliefs, moral teachings and methods of prayer. Rather, the Quran and the Sunnat contain numerous laws and injunctions relating to the family, society, and collective life that can be enforced only with the backing and power of the state or political authority. From this, the fuqaha or Muslim jurisprudents have argued that a political authority to enforce the shariah in the form of a Caliph is a necessity, and that working for the establishment of a Caliphate a duty binding on Muslims.
The ruling class in every society has its own interests, which it desperately seeks to protect. It constantly strives to ward off every challenge to these interests. This is linked to your question as to why some Muslims may not be enthusiastic about the possibility of a polity based on the shariah. Such a state would challenge what they regard as their interests. Two additional points need to be noted here. Firstly, if some people do not wish to live under a Constitution and legal system that they do not like, must that Constitution and system be necessarily done away with? Is it really true that the majority of today’s Muslims would prefer a secular polity, where religion and the state are clearly divided, to a state ruled in accordance with the shariah? The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of Muslims world-wide do not subscribe to the theory of a secular state.
Secondly, in order to interpret and elaborate a Constitution and its associated legal system one needs certain basic and well-defined principles. This is the case with the interpretation and elaboration of the Quran and Sunnat as well, for which Muslims have a long established tradition based on consensus. It is simply impermissible to ignore this tradition and arrogate the task of interpreting and elaborating the Quran and Sunnat to some stray individuals who will do so according to their own whims and desires.
There are two levels of laws and rules in the Quran and Sunnat. Firstly, those laws and rules that are clearly explained in the Quran and the Sunnat. As regards these, to engage in any sort of interpretation that deviates from their literal import is tantamount to negating the Quran and Sunnat. Secondly, rules related to matters that are derived through ijtihad and deduction. With regard to these, ijtihad and deduction can be engaged in constantly, but the product of that ijtihad or deduction can be accepted as positive law only if and when the generality of Muslims, or at least the particular Muslim society in whose context such ijtihad or deduction has been made, generally accepts it as valid. If it fails to meet with such acceptance, its status remains that of a mere opinion, one which can be freely adopted and propagated by individuals but which cannot be imposed on the whole society. In this regard, I would like to cite the case of an ijtihadic opinion of Allama Muhammad Iqbal, wherein he recommended that the Qadianis be treated like other non-Muslim minorities instead of being subject to the lopping off their heads for their deviant beliefs as recommended in the fiqh tradition. This was his personal ijtihadic view, which others had the right to disagree with and dissent from, but when this view was unanimously accepted by the ulema of the different Muslim schools of thought and the Pakistani Parliament as well, it was given the status of a shariah ruling and was made part of positive law in Pakistan.
In my view a certain very negative trend has emerged, which our ruling classes have actively promoted, and that is to seek to impose, through the force of the state, the particular interpretations of the Quran and Sunnat of some individuals and to bestow on these the status of state law. In the process, the crucial intermediate stage of examining whether these interpretations have the approval of Islamic scholars and of the general populace is left out completely, being wholly ignored. Because of this, such laws exist on paper that are not accepted and respected by the people at large. This creates a very troubling sort of confusion. For instance, take the case of the Family Laws devised when Ayub Khan was the President of Pakistan. These laws continue to exist in theory, but most Pakistani Muslims ignore these laws when it comes to such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, for which they prefer to consult a mufti for a fatwa. That is to say, generally speaking, Pakistani Muslims who want to decide such matters in accordance with Islamic teachings prefer to ignore the laws of the land and, instead, follow the fatwa of a mufti. This case illustrates my broader argument that instead of enforcing any new interpretation, based on ijithad or deduction, of the Quran and Sunnat that it favours as positive law, the state, or, more precisely, the rulers of the state, must wait for such an interpretation to gain acceptance in Islamic intellectual circles and in the society at large, if at all, as happened in the case with Muhammad Iqbal’s ijtihad with regard to the Qadianis.
Q: Speaking of contested notions of the shariah, what do you feel about the tendency, so marked even in madrasa circles, to equate or confuse the shariah with fiqh, which is a human and historical product? How has this confusion legitimised and further reinforced negative views about other religions and their adherents and further bolstered Muslim communalism and supremacist notions, such as in the case of some traditional fiqh rules related to jihad? How can the distinction between shariah and fiqh be further underscored in order to facilitate less regressive or socially more relevant understandings in today’s context?
A: If the shariah be taken to refer to Islamic commandments and laws, then fiqh, based on ijtihad, cannot be seen as separate from it. This is because a large portion of what are considered as Islamic laws is, in fact, based on ijtihad. It is thus inappropriate to see fiqh and shariah as mutually opposed to each other.
The clear commandments of the Quran and Sunnat are valid for all times and cannot be altered, while those that are not explicit are subject to interpretation and elaboration through deduction and ijtihad. As for rules that are not explicitly contained in these sources, they are devised in the light of these sources through ijtihad. This is why shariah and ijtihad are inextricably linked to each other. Just as the explicit commandments in the Quran and Sunnat are part of the shariah, so, too, are rules derived through deduction and ijtihad, the difference being that in the case of the latter change is always possible in accordance with changes in their underlying causes and in popular custom. This is a source of dynamism in Islamic law. In this context, I think it imperative for madrasa teachers and students to be familiar with exercises in ijtihad that are taking place in Islamic circles in different parts of the world today. For this, they must also have a proper understanding of the contemporary social, cultural and economic context—local, national and global. They must be aware of contemporary social issues, problems and demands, and other religions, ideologies, systems of law and governance, and in the light of all these develop their perspectives and engage in their intellectual work. Only then can they properly fulfil their intellectual and religious responsibilities. For this purpose, madrasas and other Islamic religious circles must develop appropriate courses and arrange for lectures and other such programmes. Imams of mosques and activists of religious organisations should also be involved in these activities.
As for your question about issues such as inter-faith relations and jihad, these have been discussed in immense detail in the books of fiqh. On their basis new rules can be developed to suit today’s conditions and context.
Q: I want to come back to my earlier question of Muslim supremacist understandings of fiqh that negatively impact on relations with people of other faiths. What do you have to say about the Taliban’s recent imposition of the jizyah tax on Sikhs living in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or North-West Frontier Province? Do you agree with the Taliban’s understanding of the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state?
A: If the Taliban have imposed jizyah on the Sikhs in the North-West Frontier, it is wrong. According to the Constitution of Pakistan, all non-Muslim minorities in the country have the status of ma‘ahid, that is to say people who, in accordance with a treaty or agreement (muahida), are part of the Pakistani people, and this agreement is the Constitution of the country. They will, or should, be treated exactly on the lines that the Pakistani Constitution says they should, and to deviate from this is not appropriate according to the shariah.
Yoginder Sikand works with the Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion at the National Law School, Bangalore
Copyright 2010: New Age Islam
URL: http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamInterview_1.aspx?ArticleID=3485
11:47 PM
Moderate Islamist here
