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Sunday, June 27, 2010


War on Terror
26 Jun 2010, NewAgeIslam.Com
Lengthening shadows in Afghanistan

What about the Taliban? What is their thinking? President Karzai is banking heavily on the possibility that the Taliban, accepting him as a genuine interlocutor, will respond to his overtures. These are early stages, with everything up in the air, different possibilities being floated but nothing definite on the table as a genuine starting point.
For Pakistan the danger is obvious. We are caught in a bind. The more our American friends flounder, the greater will be their frustration, and the greater their readiness to take out their anger on us by accusing us of a double-faced policy: hunting with them but also in touch with the Taliban. Every failure begets the need for scapegoats and we shouldn't be surprised if we are blamed for the US's own failures of judgment and resolve. -- Ayaz Amir



Lengthening shadows in Afghanistan
By Ayaz Amir
 June 25, 2010
Central to Pakistan's present international standing is America's war in Afghanistan. The attention showered on us, the incessant American visits to which we are subjected -- some of which we could well do without -- the obsession in the American media about the sources of extremism in Pakistan, all flow from this conflict.
When American forces pull out from Afghanistan, as they will one day, the regional landscape will become considerably less interesting. The number of international visits will decline. Our pleas for economic help will fall on less receptive ears. The world will move on. And probably the air will fill once again with cries of betrayal.
The so-called American 'surge' in Afghanistan, accompanied by talk of reversing the Taliban tide and negotiating from a position of strength, is akin to a gambler's last throw of the dice. This is the last reinforcement of the American war effort. If it works and produces some dividends, fine. Even then the goal will be not a fresh re-conquest but a decent exit. If it doesn't work, as much of the current evidence suggests it won't, calls for getting out of Afghanistan will get louder.
Thus, whichever way one looks at it, and whether it takes a year or some more, this is the end-run of the Afghan war. The winding down may be extended, but it will be a winding down all the same. The American frustration is almost palpable. Gen Stanley McChrystal's sacking on account of his unguarded comments only adds to the impression of a war effort on the skids.
(It is hard, however, not to sympathise with some of his salty remarks especially regarding Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, a frequent visitor, alas, to Islamabad. When one of his visits is due the official reaction, virtually across the board, is to wince at the prospect.)
Close of play, or at least the impression that the curtains are about to fall, calls for adjustments, of being prepared for the denouement. The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, for all his glaring faults, has been quick to fall in line with this emerging reality. Even while staying on the best of terms with Gen McChrystal (which explains his unhappiness at his departure) he has tried to carve out an independent position for himself, calling for the release of prisoners held by the Americans and making peace overtures to the Taliban.
The recent peace jirga in Kabul with its calls for 'national reconciliation' (code for talking to the Taliban) was meant to burnish his leadership credentials. His internal position stands strengthened with the departure from office of the interior minister Hanif Atmar and the intelligence chief Amr Saleh, both of whom were opposed to him.
Karzai thus has come a long way from the time when he was derided as an American puppet. The epithet, Mayor of Kabul, once used to describe him is heard less often these days. He has also moved closer to Pakistan, not out of any other consideration but the dictates of geography and realism. The Pakistan ambassador in Kabul, Muhammad Sadiq, has ready access to the Afghan president. In recent months the ISI chief, Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, has been a frequent visitor to Kabul. From Pakistan's point of view, this is all for the good.
Afghanistan has a long border with Pakistan, not India. Pakistan is fighting the Taliban and there is nothing sham about this war. But, despite everything, it is Pakistan which is in a position to activate channels of communication with the Taliban should this need arise in the future. This is not evidence of Pakistani duplicity or double standards, just the way things are.
The Taliban remain an enemy but an enemy which even after nine years of American-driven conflict has not been defeated. When the mountain will not come to the prophet, the prophet must go to the mountain. Even the Americans now are talking about good and bad Taliban (a charge hitherto reserved for Pakistan) and about co-opting the better elements (from their point of view) in any power-sharing arrangement in Kabul. This is just the beginning. Soon, under the pressure of necessity, even this distinction will disappear.
Towards the close of the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger perforce had to negotiate with Le Duc Tho, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator. We haven't arrived at that stage in Afghanistan yet but the next 18 months are going to be crucial, as everyone concerned realises.
Several knots remain to be untied. Will the Afghan Taliban, beginning with Mullah Omar, ever come to the point where they ditch Al Qaeda? To state the obvious, for the US there can be no negotiated deal involving Al Qaeda. Many people assume that the Taliban will not risk everything for Al Qaeda's sake. But this assumption remains to be tested.
The US still hopes to turn the tide in southern Afghanistan: Helmand, etc. This will be the challenge facing Gen David Petraeus as he steps into McChrystal's shoes as ISAF commander. He looked sombre and thoughtful as he stood next to President Obama when the latter was announcing the change of guard in Afghanistan. Winning the Afghan war is a daunting task and would weigh heavily on anyone's mind.
What about the Taliban? What is their thinking? President Karzai is banking heavily on the possibility that the Taliban, accepting him as a genuine interlocutor, will respond to his overtures. These are early stages, with everything up in the air, different possibilities being floated but nothing definite on the table as a genuine starting point.
For Pakistan the danger is obvious. We are caught in a bind. The more our American friends flounder, the greater will be their frustration, and the greater their readiness to take out their anger on us by accusing us of a double-faced policy: hunting with them but also in touch with the Taliban. Every failure begets the need for scapegoats and we shouldn't be surprised if we are blamed for the US's own failures of judgment and resolve.
Between now and next year we will also come under greater pressure to launch further offensives in FATA. The army high command is already under pressure to go into North Waziristan. We have to show patience and steadiness of purpose and we must not allow ourselves to be persuaded into operations which go against our better judgment. If the end-run has begun we must also position ourselves near the exits.
The limits of military action must also be recognised. Our army has done a better job in Swat and South Waziristan than anything ISAF has been able to do in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But even with us, the Taliban have been put on the defensive. They have suffered dislocation; they haven't been defeated. From one safe haven they have gone to another. And they have demonstrated the ability to strike at targets elsewhere in Pakistan. This is a curse we have brought on ourselves, 30 years of unmitigated folly bringing us to this pass. There is no overnight cure for this disease.
The American presence in Afghanistan was meant to cleanse Afghanistan. Far from doing anything of the sort it has made the Taliban stronger, by allowing them to don the robes of national liberation.
The Americans would be doing everyone a favour, first of all themselves, when they hasten out of the region. That this should be on honourable terms goes without saying. But this will depend a lot upon whether the Taliban have imbibed any lessons from their experience of the last nine years. If they remain victims of obduracy, as they were in their earlier incarnation, everyone will be the loser.
The good thing in Pakistan is that even though the political government is distracted by other things, and consumed by questions of survival, the foreign office is beginning to make its voice heard. The leading national think tank, however, remains General Headquarters. But it is incumbent on all of us to be thinking critically of Afghanistan because what happens there will impinge directly upon our fortunes.
http://thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=247110

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