What about the Taliban? What is
their thinking? President Karzai is banking heavily on the possibility that the
Taliban, accepting him as a genuine interlocutor, will respond to his overtures.
These are early stages, with everything up in the air, different possibilities
being floated but nothing definite on the table as a genuine starting point.
For
Pakistan the danger is obvious. We are caught in a bind. The more our American
friends flounder, the greater will be their frustration, and the greater their
readiness to take out their anger on us by accusing us of a double-faced policy:
hunting with them but also in touch with the Taliban. Every failure begets the
need for scapegoats and we shouldn't be surprised if we are blamed for the US's
own failures of judgment and resolve. -- Ayaz Amir
By Ayaz Amir
June 25, 2010
Central
to Pakistan's present international standing is America's war in Afghanistan.
The attention showered on us, the incessant American visits to which we are
subjected -- some of which we could well do without -- the obsession in the
American media about the sources of extremism in Pakistan, all flow from this
conflict.
When
American forces pull out from Afghanistan, as they will one day, the regional
landscape will become considerably less interesting. The number of international
visits will decline. Our pleas for economic help will fall on less receptive
ears. The world will move on. And probably the air will fill once again with
cries of betrayal.
The
so-called American 'surge' in Afghanistan, accompanied by talk of reversing the
Taliban tide and negotiating from a position of strength, is akin to a gambler's
last throw of the dice. This is the last reinforcement of the American war
effort. If it works and produces some dividends, fine. Even then the goal will
be not a fresh re-conquest but a decent exit. If it doesn't work, as much of the
current evidence suggests it won't, calls for getting out of Afghanistan will
get louder.
Thus,
whichever way one looks at it, and whether it takes a year or some more, this is
the end-run of the Afghan war. The winding down may be extended, but it will be
a winding down all the same. The American frustration is almost palpable. Gen
Stanley McChrystal's sacking on account of his unguarded comments only adds to
the impression of a war effort on the skids.
(It is
hard, however, not to sympathise with some of his salty remarks especially
regarding Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, a frequent visitor, alas, to
Islamabad. When one of his visits is due the official reaction, virtually across
the board, is to wince at the prospect.)
Close of
play, or at least the impression that the curtains are about to fall, calls for
adjustments, of being prepared for the denouement. The Afghan president, Hamid
Karzai, for all his glaring faults, has been quick to fall in line with this
emerging reality. Even while staying on the best of terms with Gen McChrystal
(which explains his unhappiness at his departure) he has tried to carve out an
independent position for himself, calling for the release of prisoners held by
the Americans and making peace overtures to the Taliban.
The
recent peace jirga in Kabul with its calls for 'national reconciliation' (code
for talking to the Taliban) was meant to burnish his leadership credentials. His
internal position stands strengthened with the departure from office of the
interior minister Hanif Atmar and the intelligence chief Amr Saleh, both of whom
were opposed to him.
Karzai
thus has come a long way from the time when he was derided as an American
puppet. The epithet, Mayor of Kabul, once used to describe him is heard less
often these days. He has also moved closer to Pakistan, not out of any other
consideration but the dictates of geography and realism. The Pakistan ambassador
in Kabul, Muhammad Sadiq, has ready access to the Afghan president. In recent
months the ISI chief, Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, has been a frequent visitor to
Kabul. From Pakistan's point of view, this is all for the good.
Afghanistan has a long border with Pakistan, not India. Pakistan is
fighting the Taliban and there is nothing sham about this war. But, despite
everything, it is Pakistan which is in a position to activate channels of
communication with the Taliban should this need arise in the future. This is not
evidence of Pakistani duplicity or double standards, just the way things are.
The
Taliban remain an enemy but an enemy which even after nine years of
American-driven conflict has not been defeated. When the mountain will not come
to the prophet, the prophet must go to the mountain. Even the Americans now are
talking about good and bad Taliban (a charge hitherto reserved for Pakistan) and
about co-opting the better elements (from their point of view) in any
power-sharing arrangement in Kabul. This is just the beginning. Soon, under the
pressure of necessity, even this distinction will disappear.
Towards
the close of the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger perforce had to negotiate with Le
Duc Tho, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator. We haven't arrived at that stage
in Afghanistan yet but the next 18 months are going to be crucial, as everyone
concerned realises.
Several
knots remain to be untied. Will the Afghan Taliban, beginning with Mullah Omar,
ever come to the point where they ditch Al Qaeda? To state the obvious, for the
US there can be no negotiated deal involving Al Qaeda. Many people assume that
the Taliban will not risk everything for Al Qaeda's sake. But this assumption
remains to be tested.
The US
still hopes to turn the tide in southern Afghanistan: Helmand, etc. This will be
the challenge facing Gen David Petraeus as he steps into McChrystal's shoes as
ISAF commander. He looked sombre and thoughtful as he stood next to President
Obama when the latter was announcing the change of guard in Afghanistan. Winning
the Afghan war is a daunting task and would weigh heavily on anyone's mind.
What
about the Taliban? What is their thinking? President Karzai is banking heavily
on the possibility that the Taliban, accepting him as a genuine interlocutor,
will respond to his overtures. These are early stages, with everything up in the
air, different possibilities being floated but nothing definite on the table as
a genuine starting point.
For
Pakistan the danger is obvious. We are caught in a bind. The more our American
friends flounder, the greater will be their frustration, and the greater their
readiness to take out their anger on us by accusing us of a double-faced policy:
hunting with them but also in touch with the Taliban. Every failure begets the
need for scapegoats and we shouldn't be surprised if we are blamed for the US's
own failures of judgment and resolve.
Between
now and next year we will also come under greater pressure to launch further
offensives in FATA. The army high command is already under pressure to go into
North Waziristan. We have to show patience and steadiness of purpose and we must
not allow ourselves to be persuaded into operations which go against our better
judgment. If the end-run has begun we must also position ourselves near the
exits.
The
limits of military action must also be recognised. Our army has done a better
job in Swat and South Waziristan than anything ISAF has been able to do in
southern and eastern Afghanistan. But even with us, the Taliban have been put on
the defensive. They have suffered dislocation; they haven't been defeated. From
one safe haven they have gone to another. And they have demonstrated the ability
to strike at targets elsewhere in Pakistan. This is a curse we have brought on
ourselves, 30 years of unmitigated folly bringing us to this pass. There is no
overnight cure for this disease.
The
American presence in Afghanistan was meant to cleanse Afghanistan. Far from
doing anything of the sort it has made the Taliban stronger, by allowing them to
don the robes of national liberation.
The
Americans would be doing everyone a favour, first of all themselves, when they
hasten out of the region. That this should be on honourable terms goes without
saying. But this will depend a lot upon whether the Taliban have imbibed any
lessons from their experience of the last nine years. If they remain victims of
obduracy, as they were in their earlier incarnation, everyone will be the loser.
The good
thing in Pakistan is that even though the political government is distracted by
other things, and consumed by questions of survival, the foreign office is
beginning to make its voice heard. The leading national think tank, however,
remains General Headquarters. But it is incumbent on all of us to be thinking
critically of Afghanistan because what happens there will impinge directly upon
our fortunes.
http://thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=247110
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Sultan Shahin
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