The Faza'il-i-'Amal, Maulana
Zakariyya's collection of stories that occupies such a central place in the TJ,
is, alleges Umri, full of
'fanciful tales' that far surpass the imagination and make a complete mockery of
the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions (ibid.:69—97). Ordinary Muslims are beguiled
into believing that it is a book of Prophetic traditions, whereas it is
actually only with great difficulty that one can find any authentic
traditions in it (ibid.; 103). Despite
this, he says, in the TJ the book is given a clear preference over the
Qur'an itself. In Tablighi gatherings only the Faza'il-i-'Amal is allowed
to be read out. According to Tablighi elders the Qur'an is meant for the
understanding of only the 'ulama. Ordinary Muslims who do not possess
the necessary skills in the Arabic language must rest content with just the Faza'il-i-'Amal or with merely
reciting the Qur'an without understanding its meaning (ibid.: 100), since
proper translation of the word of God into other languages is impossible. --
Yoginder
Sikand
The Tablighi Jamaat’s Contested Claims to Islamicity
By Yoginder
Sikand
In most existing studies Islamic movements tend
to be seen in isolation from other,
competing Islamic groups. The intra-Muslim debate over the 'Islamicity' of a given
Islamic movement has not been given the attention that it deserves.
Competing Islamic movements engage both in internal debate, contesting each
other's interpretations of Islam, as well as in external contestation,
reformulating relations and boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. It seems
that by ignoring this very crucial issue of the competing claims to 'Islamicity'
among various Islamic groups, scholars of Islam have tended to help perpetuate
the myth of a Muslim monolith and of Islam as a fixed, well-defined body of beliefs, principles
and practices and not something that is constantly in the process of
construction, negotiation, debate,
development and redefinition.
In the case of the TJ we are fortunate to have a
number of tracts and books on the movement, mainly in Urdu, written mostly by
Indian scholars representing various other Islamic groups, in particular the
defenders of the cults surrounding the shrines of the Sufis, the so-called
Barelwis,18 the Ahl-i-Hadith or the so-called Indian
Wahhabis19 and the Jama'at-i-Islami. Even though these groups are fiercely divided among
themselves, each considering itself to represent 'true' Islam, all of
them reject the TJ's own claims to true 'Islamicity'. Had not the Prophet
himself declared that following his demise his ummah would split into 73
quarrelling groups, out of which only one would be destined for heaven, the rest
to be marched off to hell (Hughes 1988:567)? Each of these many groups claims
that it alone is that one chosen jama'at and that all the rest are in
error. While this further compounds the problem of deciding what 'true' Islam
really is—and this is a question that can be answered on the basis of faith
alone—it is to these intra-Muslim wrangling that we owe much of what little
literature exists on the TJ, sharply polemical though much of it may be. These
angry outpourings can be seen as responses
to the growing threat which other Muslim groups have come to face with
the increasing popularity of the TJ in the post-1947 period in South Asia. This
corpus of literature by Indian scholars is an invaluable source of Muslim
critique of the TJ, bringing to the fore the often overlooked fact that, despite
its expansion over much of the globe, not all, or even, most Muslims would look
at the TJ with complete favour, even in purely 'Islamic' terms. For the purpose
of our analysis we shall select some of these texts to see how the TJ's claims
to 'Islamicity' have been challenged by other Islamic groups.
BARELWI CRITIQUES
In large parts of South Asia, and elsewhere where
significant numbers of Muslims of South Asian origin live, the TJ faces stiff
opposition from the 'ulama and followers of the so-called Barelwi
tradition centred on the intercessionary cults of Sufi saints. Given the
Tablighi belief, which is shared with other reformists such as the Deobandis,
that these cults border on heresy and shirk or associationism, it is not
surprising that as the TJ has expanded all over South Asia it has had to face
stern opposition from Barelwi quarters. It is not uncommon for Tablighi
activists to be physically assaulted if they attempt to preach in
Barelwi-dominated villages. Numerous tracts have been written by
Barelwi 'ulama vehemently denouncing the TJ. Their sheer number, as well
as the passion that informs their scathing critiques, are probably a reflection
of the growing success of the TJ among the Muslim masses. Barelwi wrath against
the TJ can possibly be seen as a response to the increasing threat to the Sufi
elite from the challenge of, in a sense, a more democratic form of Islam as
represented by the TJ. Tablighi assertion that it is the responsibility of all
Muslims to engage in tabligh and spiritual instruction is sharply at variance
with the beliefs of the hereditary custodians of Sufi shrines, who see this as
solely their privilege, being descendants of decreased Sufi saints from whom
they claim to have inherited special spiritual
powers.
Texts by Barelwis denouncing the TJ invariably
begin by alleging that the movement is but a thinly disguised front of the
Wahhabis, the followers of the Arabian puritan, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab
(1703-92). The Wahhabis, in turn, are portrayed as the most inveterate foes of
Islam for their fierce opposition to, among other things, the cults of the
shrines of the Sufis and their alleged disrespect to the Prophet and to the
imams of the schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Their repudiation of
the taqlid of the imams in the name of reopening the 'gate
of ijtihad' is said to be nothing but a conspiracy to set up 'the rule of
man' in place of 'the rule of Allah' (Rizvi 1994:12). But for the Barelwis what
is probably the most heinous of the alleged Wahhabi crimes against Islam is
their strident opposition to the adoration
of Muhammad that they brand as shirk
(associationism) and bid'a. For the Barelwis this is
consummate disbelief.
Arshad-ul Qadri, a well-known
Indian Barelwi scholar, cites references in numerous texts wherein Tablighi
leaders are quoted as having paid glowing tributes to certain Wahhabi teachings
and openly claiming allegiance to crusaders against popular South Asian Islamic
tradition. He argues that the TJ is actually
'a movement of
anti-Islamic conspirators' (Qadri n.d.:91-97). The TJ and the Deoband
movement to which its founder was affiliated, are, he alleges, actually agents
of the Wahhabis in their war against 'the friends of God'—the Sufi saints—and
the Prophet himself.20 While the Wahhabis openly preach against the cults
centred around the Prophet and the saints, the TJ and the Deobandis are said to
do so covertly (Qadri op. cit.:128—29). Voicing the same view, anotherIndian
Barelwi scholar, Turab-ul
Haq Rizvi, declares
that, like Wahhabism, both the
TJ as well as the Deoband movements were actually launched with just one aim in
mind, to 'destroy the love' that Muslims have for Muhammad (ishq-i-mustafa)
(Rizvi n.d.:7). Another
Barelwi scholar, Muhammad
Rizvi, makes the same point with equal force, adding that the TJ, like
the Deobandis, merely makes a pretence of being Sunni and of upholding taqlid,
while its actual motive
is 'simply ... [to capture] power
for the Wahhabis
by building up
a mass following for them'
(Rizvi 1994:60).
The
Wahhabis, Arshad-ul Qadri contends, are only the juniorpartners of what he sees as a global
anti-Islamic conspiracy. The TJ, he says, was actually propped up by
British imperialists in order to create dissensions in the ranks of the Muslims
and to blunt their spirit of radical jihad. In this regard he refers to a report
quoting a leading 'alim of Deoband, Maulana Hifzur Rahman, as having acknowledged that in the
initial stages of the TJ, Ilyas used to be paid a regular sum of money by
the British Indian authorities to carry out
his work (Qadri op. cit.: 99-102).21 Writing at the peak of
the cold war, Qadri says that the British have been replaced by the Americans as
masters of the TJ, who are now using it, through the Central Intelligence
Agency, in their global war against Communism. It is, he says, probably American dollars, in addition to Saudi
Wahhabi riyals, that keeps the massive global TJ machine working (Qadri
op. cit.: 111—12). Besides the Americans
and the Saudis, fiercely anti-Muslim Hindu groups in India, too, are, he
writes, actively promoting the 'other-worldly', 'world-renouncing' TJ so as
to turn Muslims away from challenging their
hegemony (Qadri op. cit.: 103-05). The TJ's aloofness from worldly affairs,
inparticular the struggle for
political power, is said to play straightinto the hands of these 'enemies of Islam'. Thus,
writes Muhammad Rizvi, TJ leaders insist that, 'the Muslims should not
even protest when Muslims are killed in Hindu riots [sic.]' and that 'there
should be no resistance to the Israelis' (Rizvi op. cit.:60). Similar views were voiced by
Mumbai-based Barelwi groups on the occasion of a large
Tablighi ijtima in the city in 1997. Reacting to the news that Bal
Thackeray—leader of the extreme right-wing
Shiv Sena, notorious for its bloody anti-Muslim pogroms in recent years
in which thousands have been killed—had
gone out of his way to make elaborate arrangements for the congregation, Muhammad Sayyed Nuri,
secretary general of the Raza
Academy, issued a statement urging Muslims to boycott the ijtima, alleging that TJ leaders were
'stooges of the government'. Maulana Quddus Kashmiri of the 'Ulama Council,
another Barelwi body, accused the TJ
of being 'agents of the Shiv Sena'.[1]
On
the basis of their own reading of statements made by variousTablighi
leaders, both Qadri as well as Turab-ul Haq Rizvi allegethat
far from having anything at all to do with Islam, the TJ isactually a completely new religion by itself
(Qadri op. cit.: 138;Rizvi
n.d.:26), with Ilyas being no less than a prophet in the eyes ofTablighi
activists (Qadri op. cit.:47-48). In concluding their essays both writers quote numerous prophetic
traditions that refer to the appearance towards the end of the
world of a jama'at of the Devil and the Anti-Christ against whom the
Prophet had exhorted Muslims to wage violent jihad, great heavenly reward being promised for their slaughter. They see
the jama'at portrayed in these traditions as bearing a striking
resemblance to none other than the TJ itself (Qadri op.
cit.:185-99).23
AHL-I-HADITH
CRITIQUES
If the Barelwis accuse the TJ of
being a hidden front of Wahhabism, many among the Indian counterparts of the
puritan Arabian Wahhabis, the Ahl-i-Hadith, contend precisely theopposite. Ahl-i-Hadith critiques of the TJ seem
to have come intoprominence only
after the death of Ilyas. In an incisive critique ofthe TJ published in 1988, the Indian Ahl-i-Hadith scholar
Habib-ur Rahman Salafi vehemently denies the claims of Tablighileaders as inheritors of the legacy of Shah
Waliullah, arguing instead that the
spread of traditional Sufism, and not Waliullahi reformism, forms the
core agenda of the TJ. Donning the mantle of Shah Waliullah, the TJ is, he alleges, actually
promoting the very same
degenerate Sufism,'consisting ofrenunciation ofthis world, personality worship, false miracles and customary, un-Islamic practices, that Shah Waliullah had devoted his
life to fighting. The TJ's complete silence on the munkar and its
refusal to openly denounce bid'a and shirk, he says,
show the hollowness of its claims to reformism. Such great stress is laid in TJ
circles on the utterances of the Tablighi elders, he adds, that they tend
to displace the Qur'an and the traditions as source of authority, which leads to
them becoming nothing less than a new shari'at, taking the place of
the shariat-i-muhammadi (Umri 1988:6-9).
In his critical and well-documented study,
another noted Indian Ahl-i-Hadith scholar, Abdur Rahman Umri, sets out the
Ahl-i-Hadith position on the TJ in an effort to prove not just that the TJ does not accord with the teachings
of Shah Waliullah but that, in fact, it is un-Islamic. He alleges that in
the name of propagating Islam, the TJ is
actually promoting a form of world-negating monasticism, something that the Prophet
is himself said to have sternly warned against. This only helps the 'foes of
Islam' in their all-out war against
the Muslims (ibid.: 13). He dismisses the stories of miracles attributed to Ilyas and
Yusuf as completely fabricated (ibid.: 11—12) as also the theory of
the intiqal-i-nisbat (the 'reallocation of attributes') through
which Ilyas is said to have transferred his authority to his son while on his
death-bed (ibid.:54-55). Ilyas' own claim of having learnt the method of tabligh
through kashf(illumination) or khwab (dream) is, he writes, a
flagrant denial of the Qur'an and the traditions. It is, in fact, a step in the
direction of claiming prophethood for himself and a negation of the finality of
the prophethood of Muhamad, for, only the prophets can get divine knowledge
directly from God. Ilyas' TJ then is quite plainly a new fitna, a source of dangerous chaos. It is working to
spread not Islam but, as Ilyas had himself confessed, the teaching of the
Deobandi'alim, Ashraf Ali Thanawi, another alleged 'imposter' who, like
Ilyas, is said to have moved in the direction of making claims to prophethood
for himself (ibid.: 15, 21).
The Faza'il-i-'Amal, Maulana
Zakariyya's collection of stories that occupies such a central place in the TJ,
is, alleges Umri, full of
'fanciful tales' that far surpass the imagination and make a complete mockery of
the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions (ibid.:69—97). Ordinary Muslims are beguiled
into believing that it is a book of Prophetic traditions, whereas it is
actually only with great difficulty that one can find any authentic
traditions in it (ibid.; 103). Despite
this, he says, in the TJ the book is given a clear preference over the
Qur'an itself. In Tablighi gatherings only the Faza'il-i-'Amal is allowed
to be read out. According to Tablighi elders the Qur'an is meant for the
understanding of only the 'ulama. Ordinary Muslims who do not possess
the necessary skills in the Arabic language must rest content with just the Faza'il-i-'Amal or with merely
reciting the Qur'an without understanding its meaning (ibid.: 100), since
proper translation of the word of God into other languages is
impossible.
All
this, writes Umri, conclusively proves that the TJ is by no means
the true Islamic movement that it claims to be. It is, in fact, an unambiguous bid'at-i-zalalat, a
grossly reprehensible innovation, God's punishment for which is burning
in the fires of Hell (ibid.:49).
JAMA'AT-I-ISLAMI
CRITIQUE
The
Jama'at-i-Islami, the South Asian Islamist political organisation
set up in 1941 by Sayyed Abul 'Ala Maududi, one of the most influential Muslim
thinkers of modern times, has, over the years, been forced to reconsider and
revise its attitude towards the TJ in response to what it sees as a marked
dilution in its Islamic character. In Ilyas' own time Maududi saw in the TJ
great potential for the spreading of Islamic consciousness at the popular level.
He even visited Mewat in 1939 in order to see for himself the TJ in action (Nasr
1996:39). On his return he wrote a lengthy article in his Tarjuman
al-Qur'an in fulsome praise of the movement, hailing it as a major milestone
in the onward march of Islamic revival.[2] Ilyas
is said to have later reciprocated this gesture by declaring that the 'real
work' of Islam was what Maududi was engaged in—establishing Islam as a complete
way of life in its all-embracing wholeness (iqamat-i-din), modestly
adding that his own efforts were just the 'initial work' (ibtida'i
kam) (Nadwi 1986:44). In a letter to a disciple, Zaheer-ul Hassan, Ilyas
sought to rebut those who thought that his movement was simply concerned with
ritual worship, stressing that the TJ was intended to revive Islam in its
entirety (quoted in Falahi op. cit.:309).
It
was after Ilyas' death that the Jama'at-i-Islami's differences with
the TJ started to become increasingly visible, culminating in the publishing of
Maulana Zakariyya's bitter attack on the former with the provocative title
of Fitna-i-Maududiyat ('The Divisiveness That is Maududism') (1979). As its
title suggests, the book sought to argue that what Maududi preached was not
Islam at all. Rather, it was a completely new ideology—what it branded as
‘Maududism’.
The
Jama'at-i-Islami's growing estrangement with the TJ seems to have, at least in
part, been
fuelled by what it saw as a gradual, though distinct, transformation of the TJ
itself under Ilyas' successor, Maulana Yusuf. There may, however, have been more
pressing political factors for the growing estrangement between the two Islamic
groups. For one thing, it seems that in independent India, and certainly in Pakistan, the growing popularity of
the TJ gradually began being viewed as a threat to the political fortunes
of the Jama'at-i-Islami. The TJ's politically quiescent brand of Islamwas increasingly seen as a major hurdle to the
Jama'at-i-lslami'scrusade for the setting-up of an Islamic state.
Authorities in Pakistan, in fact, seem to have noted this as well, and president
Ayub Khan reportedly sought to actively patronise the TJ in an effort to counter
the Jama'at-i-Islami's radical political appeal (M. Ahmad
1991:58).
According to one writer associated with the
Jama'at-i-Islami, in the years following Indian independence, Yusuf increasingly
began to see in the Jama'at-i-Islami a powerful rival to his own leadership over
the Muslims, which led him to ban TJ activists from reading literature written
by Maududi and other Jama'at-i- Islami leaders, afraid of a widespread desertion
in TJ ranks (Nadwi op. cit.:52—54). This growing hostility of the T]
leadership towards other Islamic
groups—which, it was said, made a mockery of their much-vaunted
commitment to their principle of 'respect
for all Muslims'—is alleged to have developed alongside another
significant transformation in the character of the movement—the re-definition,
or, what the Jama'at-i-Islami saw as the
complete distortion, of Islam itself.
A
standard Jama'at-i-Islami charge against the present-day TJ is
that it has taken what Ilyas himself saw as the 'initial work' (ibtida'i kam) to be the 'real
work' (asal kam), the 'establishment' of Islam in its
entirety (iqamat-i-din). The 'initial work' consists in instructing
Muslims in the 'six principles', obligatory rituals, moral behaviour and matters
related to personal behaviour or the realm of the personal law, says Qasmi
(1992:2-3). Taking this for 'real work' is
conflating the medium with the message itself. Instead of seeing the rituals as a means, albeit an
indispensable one, to the higher
goal of die 'establishment of Islam in its entirety', TJ leaders and activists after Ilyas, it is alleged, began
seeing them as ends in themselves,
ignoring the Islamic imperative of establishing Islam as a complete
system covering not just worship but social relations, the economy and the
polity (Nadwi op. cit.:55-56). This is seen as paralleling what some Isla mists term
'American Islam'. For the TJ, as the former head of the Jama'at-i-Islami
of Bangladesh, Ghulam Azam, alleged, the Prophet is seen not as the head of
the Medinese Islamic state but, 'wrongly',
as 'merely a religious leader' (R. Ahmed 1994:670-71). Consequently, it
now places matters that are not obligatory, such as the supererogatory prayers,
over such important religious duties as
the 'condemning of what is evil' (nahi an al-munkar) (Mahdi op.
cit.:22). A Muslim woman, in a letter to
the editor of the Bangalore-based Dalit Voice, expresses this
widespread view thus:
“It
[the TJ] is only a devotional movement with major emphasis on rigid ritualistic
observances. It prescribes very long and complicated rituals which Islam does
not permit. The Tablighi movement strongly discourages the masses from studying
Koran because the Tablighi leadership is afraid of its revolutionary message. It
brainwashes its followers with the medieval, monastic philosophy and stories of
fictitious and stupid saints not found in Islam. It is ever busy creating
unthinking idiots, lulling their minds to sleep with sweet stories, providing
opium and a route of escapism from
challenges.”[3]
While Ilyas may have found his own method
of tablighparticularly suited to
his missionary efforts among the Meos, thebelief in Tablighi circles
after his death that only this method should be used for tabligh and that
it alone is the prophetic method is, writes
a scholar affiliated to the Jama'at-i-Islami, itself a denial of the
Prophet's sunnat because Muhammad is himself said to have employed a number of different
methods for tabligh work (M.S. Qasmi op. cit.:13). Likewise, the
'six principles' that Ilyas laid down to
guide the work of activists in the initial stages of his movement have
now, this scholar alleges, been turned by his followers into the new 'pillars of the
faith', replacing the 'five pillars' of Islam (M.S. Qasmi op. cit.:4).
Furthermore, argues another Jama'at-i-Islami scholar, by restricting its
activities only to those who are Muslims by birth the TJ is ignoring the Islamic
duty of extending 'the invitation of the faith' to non-Muslims as well. Islam,
he says, 'is not the inheritance of Muslims alone' but is 'meant for the whole
world' (Falahi 1996:309).
The Faza'il-i-'Amal, which
today plays such a central role in the TJ, has come in for critical scrutiny in
the writings of a number of scholars associated with the Jama'at-i-Islami. One
of these, Tabish Mahdi (n.d.), devotes an entire book to an examination of its
contents, finding in it much that grossly violates 'true' Islamic
teachings,28 Mahdi (n.d.: 19) alleges that 'most of its stories are
incapable of being believed and are completely fabricated'. He observes that the
book contains many traditions that
are of doubtful veracity or are plainly concocted.[4]
He
cites several instances in this regard, including one which is, he suggests, not
just patently false but also profoundly derogatory
to Islam and the Prophet as well. This 'fabricated' tradition has it that, according to the Prophet,
for each obligatory prayer that a Muslim were to miss, he would have to
spend die period of one aqb, or, in
earthly terms, 28,800,000 years, in hell even if he were to make up for it later on. Mahdi
writes that it is common knowledge
mat the Prophet himself missed his obligatory prayers on at least two occasions—during the
Battle of Khandaq and on his return from the Battle of Khaybar—but
compensated for them later. Does this, then, mean, he asks, that the
Prophet shall also be consigned to hell
(Mahdi n.d.:53-55)?
A major charge that Mahdi levels against
the Faza'il-i-'Amal is that it tries to absolve Muslims of their duty to
wage jihad against oppressive unbelievers.
This, he says (op. cit.:87), it has sought to do by distorting the very
meaning of jihad, because now in TJ circles the primary jihad has come to be
understood as more or less synonymous with
going out on jama'at.30 Mahdi sees in this complete
watering down of the actual concept of jihad a 'Jewish hand' at work. The Jews, he
alleges, 'have always, in every age been plotting to destroy [Islam's]
spirit of jihad'. Earlier, he contends, they tried to do this, among other
means, by 'propping up' Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement, who fiercely
opposed the idea of jihad as actual physical war. The Mirza's subsequent
claims to prophethood, however, brought him into disrepute with the Muslims, and
so, following their failure to use him to destroy jihad, the Jews have now made
the Faza'il-i-'Amal the 'next focus
of their conspiracy'. The Faza'il-i-'Amal is said to fit the bill exactly as it claims to be a book of
Prophetic traditions, and,
therefore, of religious authority. According to the Faza'il-i-'Amal, one can earn the reward of engaging in jihad
by reciting some simple Arabic
verses. Consequently, many TJ supporters come to believe that there is no
need for them to actually fight against
their oppressors. This, says Mahdi, plays right into the hands of the
'Jewish mission' (op. cit.:56-57), helping 'the unbelievers' and 'the devil'
himself in their 'war against Islam' (op. cit.:79). In this regard, another
Jama'at-i-Islami scholar writes that it is instructive to note that
the Faza'il-i-'Amal contains no section on the 'rewards of jihad' (Qasmi
op. cit.:2-3). In a similar vein, ordinary Jama'at-i-Islami activists in India
often accuse the TJ of being in tacit alliance with forces inimical to the
Muslims, for it allegedly enjoins upon its followers that far from retaliating
against instigators of anti-Muslim violence
they should not even protest or lodge complaints with the authorities,
but must simply place their faith in God
and pray for His help (M. Ahmad 1991:520).
Citing
numerous references from the Faza'il-i-'Amal, Mahdicontends
that it, and the TJ more generally, actually promotes a soulless ritualism, focussing on the letter
rather than the spirit, promising all manners of heavenly rewards for the
performance of even the simplest of ritual acts. Thus, he writes,
the Faza'il-i-'Amalholds out the prospect of great reward for the
recitation of the Qur'an, but remains strangely silent on the teachings of the holy book itself and the
practical demands that it makes upon the lives of believers (Mahdi n.d.:85).
Likewise, another Jama'at-i-Islami
scholar writes that the Faza'il-i-'Amal promises an easy road to heaven for every sinner
by just mechanically reciting a few
Arabic supplications without even having to know what they mean. In this
way, he alleges, it is encouraging Muslims
to ignore their worldly Islamic responsibilities, thus helping the 'foes of
Islam'.[5]
Like Maulana Umri, the Ahl-i-Hadith scholar
referred to earlier, several
Jama'at-i-Islami activists are critical of the great importance that is
placed in the TJ on the narration of stories from
the Faza'il-i-'Amal, claiming that the book has assumed greater practical
importance for many involved in the TJ than the Qur'an itself, with little concern even for
the recitation of the holy scripture in Tablighi ta'lim sessions.
Mahdi (n.d.:15), for instance, alleges
that in mosques where earlier the Qur'an used to be recited, on coming under Tablighi control
this practice has been stopped, and
in its place die narration of stories from the Faza'il-i-'Amal has been
instituted. The Faza'il-i-'Amal, he claims, is now assuming the status that
rightfully belongs to the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet for
many of those who are involved in the TJ (Mahdi op. cit.:98). This, writes Shams
Pirzada (1992:9-11), a leading Indian Jama'at-i-Islami scholar, is patently
un-Islamic, denying 'the light of the Qur'an' to ordinary Muslims, drowning them in 'the worship
of the elders'.
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