One individual who was a deputy minister under the former Taliban
regime and who frequently liaises with the Taliban, said that three to seven ISI
officials attend the Quetta Shura as observers. He believes that the ISI has
responsibility for organising the meetings and that it exerts pressure on
individual participants beforehand, especially if major decisions are to be
taken. As one commander put it: “We heard that the ISI were on the Quetta Shura,
but we don’t follow their orders. They are observers, not making decisions.” An
Afghan conflict analyst, with years of experience in southern Afghanistan and
contacts with the Taliban, concurred, pointing out that the ISI, “use people who
have the same appearance, language, behaviour, and habits as Afghans. They
wouldn’t be strange to the Talibs, who seem to them to be Muslims, also fighting
infidels.” In fact, both he and other interviewees suggested that the ISI
observers could be Afghans, possibly even Taliban leaders who are working
closely with, or for, the ISI. -- Matt Waldmann
By Matt Waldmann
18 June, 2010
The ISI shares a symbiotic relationship with the Afghan Taliban.
Kashmir is a reciprocal issue to both entities
Through providing sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban, and
arresting those who step out of line, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
appears to be able to exert significant influence on Taliban strategy. As a
Kandahari political figure summarised: “The ISI have some control (over the
Taliban). They have influence in strategic decision-making. Sure, they have
dominated the Taliban movement, but they (the Taliban) have some independence.”
Likewise, a political analyst in Kandahar said: “The Taliban is obliged to
accept Pakistan’s demands — it needs their support, but is not their
puppet.”
The Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on mutual benefit. The
Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical support to
sustain their insurgency; the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied
force in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and “strategic depth” in
their rivalry with India. As a former Taliban minister put it: “The ISI are
helping the Taliban a lot, but they only give for their own gain. There is a
reciprocal issue: Kashmir. The root of the problem in Afghanistan is the
Pakistan-India competition.”
Pakistan’s fundamental strategic calculus does not appear to have
altered significantly since the 1970s. According to Steve Coll (The New Yorker,
May 24, 2010) earlier this year Pakistan submitted a briefing to the US on its
national interests in the Afghan conflict, which reportedly, “reflects one
overriding concern: India.” Indeed, in February 2010, the US Director of
National Intelligence confirmed: “Islamabad’s conviction that militant groups
are an important part of its strategic arsenal to counter India’s military and
economic advantages.” As Steve Coll explains (The New Yorker, March 1, 2010):
“Pakistan’s generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and
distasteful Islamist militias such as the Taliban may be, they could yet be
useful proxies to ward off a perceived existential threat from India. In the
Army’s view, at least, that threat has not receded.”
Many in the Pakistan establishment believe that India has
significant, and increasing, economic and political influence in Afghanistan.
India enjoys close relations with the Karzai administration, has four regional
consulates, and is providing substantial reconstruction assistance, including
rebuilding the Afghan parliament, and construction projects on the Pakistan
border (Tellis and Mukharji 2010; Sullivan 2010). Senior Pakistani officials
also believe the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, scheduled to commence
from July 2011, could open up a power struggle from which India could benefit
(Tellis 2010) — a major incentive for Pakistan to maintain, or even strengthen,
its Afghan allies (Wilkens 2010).
Pakistan’s support to the Afghan insurgency is reinforced by its
aspiration for influence among the Pashtuns that are divided by the disputed
‘Durand Line’, which separates Afghanistan and Pakistan. It thus seeks to subdue
the ‘Pashtunistan’ cause and quiescent Afghan claims to territory in north-west
Pakistan, including in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.
But how is Pakistan’s strategic influence manifested in practice? As
noted above, analysts dispute whether ISI support to the insurgency is
officially sanctioned, and whether it is carried out by serving or former
officers. Some analysts speak of the “collaboration of elements within the ISI”
with the Taliban (Johnson and Mason 2008). Antonio Giustozzi argues there is
evidence of the involvement in the insurgency of “advisors with long-standing
experience of Afghanistan, such as current or former ISI operatives” (Giustozzi
2007).
Seth Jones has argued: “There is some indication that individuals
within the Pakistan Government — for example, within the Frontier Corps and the
ISI — were involved in assisting insurgent groups” (Jones 2008). He has also
reported that by mid-2008, “the United States collected fairly solid evidence of
senior-level complicity (in ISI support to the insurgents).” (Jones 2010) In an
organisation up to ten thousand strong (Bajoria 2009), with cross-service
membership (Cohen 2004:100), and extensive partitioning of operational
responsibilities, there is inevitably the possibility of recalcitrant elements.
However, interviews strongly suggest that support to the Afghan insurgency is
official ISI policy. It appears to be carried out by both serving and former
officers, who have considerable operational autonomy.
The supreme council of the Afghan Taliban is properly known as the
‘Rabari’ or ‘Markazi Shura’ (leadership or central council). However, most of
the insurgents interviewed for this research referred to it as the ‘Quetta
Shura’. (They distinguished it from another Quetta Shura, which is the military
command council for Taliban operations in southern Afghanistan.) Therefore,
unless otherwise stated, references to the Quetta Shura in this paper are
intended to mean the leadership or central council.
It is not clear to what extent the membership and activities of the
Quetta Shura are regimented or formalised. However, it is widely believed to
comprise around a dozen or so members who meet several times a year; while
certain members and sub-committees may meet more frequently. Interviews strongly
suggest that the ISI has representatives on the Shura, either as participants or
observers, and the agency is thus involved at the highest level of the movement.
Significantly, even a limited ISI presence on the Shura would allow the agency
to monitor the Shura’s decisions and take steps against members who are not
perceived to be acting in Pakistan’s interests.
One individual who was a deputy minister under the former Taliban
regime and who frequently liaises with the Taliban, said that three to seven ISI
officials attend the Quetta Shura as observers. He believes that the ISI has
responsibility for organising the meetings and that it exerts pressure on
individual participants beforehand, especially if major decisions are to be
taken. As one commander put it: “We heard that the ISI were on the Quetta Shura,
but we don’t follow their orders. They are observers, not making decisions.” An
Afghan conflict analyst, with years of experience in southern Afghanistan and
contacts with the Taliban, concurred, pointing out that the ISI, “use people who
have the same appearance, language, behaviour, and habits as Afghans. They
wouldn’t be strange to the Talibs, who seem to them to be Muslims, also fighting
infidels.” In fact, both he and other interviewees suggested that the ISI
observers could be Afghans, possibly even Taliban leaders who are working
closely with, or for, the ISI.
Almost all the Taliban commanders interviewed believe the ISI are
represented on the Quetta Shura. One senior southern commander said: “Every
group commander knows the reality — which is obvious to all of us — that the ISI
is behind the Taliban, they formed and are supporting the Taliban.” He also
explained why it was not widely known: “Every commander knows about the
involvement of the ISI in the leadership but we do not discuss it because we do
not trust each other, and they are much stronger than us. They are afraid that
if they say anything against the Taliban or ISI it would be reported to the
higher ranks — and they may be removed or assassinated ... Everyone sees the sun
in the sky but cannot say it is the sun.”
An ISI presence on the Shura is consistent with the agency’s heavy
involvement in the movement’s inception and augmentation, as noted above.
Indeed, a detailed assessment of the history and composition of the Quetta Shura
indicates that the ISI, “maintains a hand in controlling its operations” (Tribal
Analysis Center 2009:6).
In addition, the ISI may be able to exert influence by exploiting
tribal fractures within the Shura. It has limited representation of Zirak
Durrani tribes, members of which tend to occupy senior positions in the Afghan
government (the Karzai family, for instance, is from the Popalzai Zirak Durrani
tribe). Instead, it comprises mainly Ghilzai Pashtuns (the Zirak Durranis’
historic rivals) and, increasingly, members of the Panjpai branch of the Durrani
tribe (that are smaller, more disbursed and tend to have less government power
than Zirak Durrani tribes).
Reportedly, two members of the Quetta Shura (Mohammad Hassan Rahmani
and Abdul Razaq) are from the Achakzai tribe, a Zirak Durrani sub-tribe, which
has been internally divided, manipulated by other groups or tribes, and, unlike
other Zirak Durrani sub-tribes, excluded from political power. It is also
principally located in Pakistan. Thus, as the Tribal Analysis Center argue: “It
is entirely possible that ISI has some positive influence, if not actual
control, over one or both of the Achakzai members of the Quetta Shura” (Tribal
Analysis Center 2009).
The ISI may also be able to exert influence through exploiting other
fissures, and significant levels of mistrust, in the Taliban leadership. Indeed,
interviews suggest that there is currently a rivalry or latent power-struggle
between, on the one hand, the newly-empowered Qayyum Zakir, military commander
of the movement, his deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour, and his close
associate, now believed to be head of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Abdul Raouf
Khadem, and, on the other hand, the old guard figures of Amir Khan Muttaqi,
Mullah Mohammad Hassan and Mullah Gul Agha. Although the extent of this
dissension is not clear, it may well have generated opportunities for
manipulation.
Excerpted from The Sun In The Sky: The Relationship Between
Pakistan’s Isi And Afghan Insurgents. Carr Center for Human Rights Policy
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University / Development Studies
Institute, London School of Economics)
5:39 AM
Sultan Shahin
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