If you look at the state of the Indian news media
today, it is hard to describe it as operating as a part of the public sphere or
belonging to the realm of rational discourse in society. This is true not only
of media coverage of religious or communal matters but of a variety of issues,
political, economic, and social. Since we are focusing on the question of
minorities in relation to communalism, I would like to draw on a study that I
did a couple of years ago[1] and look a
little bit at the history of the Indian print media, and how, unlike what Ben
Anderson and others have analysed as the role of ‘print capitalism’ in the
creation of a public sphere (or an ‘imagined community’ such as the nation), our
history has been a little different. -- Siddharth Varadarajan
By Siddharth Varadarajan
When we speak of ‘Minority Images in
the Indian Print Media’ there are two broad areas to be addressed. The first is
the coverage in print -- and images on television and the electronic media – of
minorities and how these images have contributed to a process that has
strengthened negative stereotypes of Indian Muslims, poisoning relations between
religious communities (particularly Hindus and Muslims), acted as a mechanism to
downgrade the level of political discourse in India, and helped political
parties evade responsibility in a democratic polity. The second area is that of
representation, or workplace diversity, that is, the presence of Muslims in the
media.
If you look at the state of the
Indian news media today, it is hard to describe it as operating as a part of the
public sphere or belonging to the realm of rational discourse in society. This
is true not only of media coverage of religious or communal matters but of a
variety of issues, political, economic, and social. Since we are focusing on the
question of minorities in relation to communalism, I would like to draw on a
study that I did a couple of years ago[1] and look a little bit at the history of
the Indian print media, and how, unlike what Ben Anderson and others have
analysed as the role of ‘print capitalism’ in the creation of a public sphere
(or an ‘imagined community’ such as the nation), our history has been a little
different.
In India , the print media was a
product of colonialism and was as implicated in the nation-destroying project of
colonialism as was active colonialism itself. In the early 19th century, one
finds the emergence of newspapers essentially as a vehicle for the articulation
of community-centric grievances or concerns, sometimes in a benign way—centred
on religious reform, for example—but often in a manner that posited communities
as antithetical, opposed to each other. Of course, there were moments when the
Indian print media tried to transcend the religious divide and strive for the
elaboration of an Indian identity. One such moment in the history of Indian
journalism arguably occurred in 1857, when Delhi had a very active Urdu press.
In the context of the insurgency, otherwise known as the First Indian War of
Independence, attempts were made to appeal to Indians as Indians, and for Hindus
and Muslims to sink their differences. A number of publications played a
prominent role at that time, including the Sayyed-ul Akhbar and Delhi
Urdu Akhbar. The latter published propagandist sheets and was edited by
Maulvi Muhammad Baqar, father of famous Urdu literary historian Muhammad Husain
Azad. Maulvi Muhmmad Baqar was finally shot dead by Hodson after Delhi was
recaptured. In the annals of Indian journalism, he was perhaps the first editor
who paid with his life for advocating a vision of an India that was based on the
unity of people, not simply on the elaboration of sectarian
interests.
From the 1880s onwards, with the
emergence of the Congress and of Muslim politics, and again from the early
twentieth century, the print media in north India got fully implicated in all
the different trends in operation at the political level and picked up (and
amplified) all the communal biases that were prevalent in the political
arena.
After Independence , the print media
in India continued to mirror the political biases of mainstream politics and
closely followed the imperatives of leading political parties. The attitude of
political parties toward minorities in the post-Independence period was
problematic. They relied primarily on the identification of so-called community
leaders—either at the local or the national level—and brought them into the main
political fold as representatives of their particular communities. More often
than not, these representatives were as backward in their approach to the
socio-economic problems of the country and of their community itself as were
their mainstream political mentors. What this led to was a kind of unhealthy,
unenlightened political culture, and the media itself faithfully reflected
this.
The mainstream media at that time
did not openly espouse communal ideologies or views. Instead, one had what I
call ‘low-intensity communalism’ —the neat identification of Muslims as a
community with particular leaders, so that every utterance of those leaders then
got transmitted as the belief of the ‘community’. Unfortunately, most Muslim
leaders in post-Partition India were either from the aristocratic elite of
yesteryears or were religious leaders. Both kinds of leadership—political and
religious—belonged to the Congress party and worked to further the part’s
interest. Some prominent religious organizations such as Jamiat-e Ulema-e-Hind
had been working virtually as Congress outfits. The maulavis, as
‘leaders’ of the Muslims, were of course backward-looking, and their backward
views were (mis)represented by the media as being the view of the Muslims as a
whole.
Of course, this ‘low-intensity
communalism’ in the media could easily get transformed into something more
virulent whenever a ruling party decided to indulge in openly communal tactics.
During the 1980s, communal killings were organised in Moradabad , Meerut ,
Hashimpura, Malliana and Bhagalpur , and especially agains the Sikhs in November
1984. These all were engineered by the Congress for different political
purposes. During these communal riots, one could see open biases on display in
the media, and especially in the vernacular press. In general, one could argue
that the same political parties that engineer the riots motivating the bias.
This type of influence is easier to apply at a local level but the national
media can also succumb to it. As a test case, let us look at the way in which
the Sikhs, as a minority community, were demonized by the Indian media in 1980s
in the context of the Punjab agitation. If you actually read some of the
writings of the newspapers and their identification of Sikhs with extremism and
terrorism, it is clear that provocative material was being written on the
community in 1984. Especially before and after Operation Bluestar, and in the
run-up to the Delhi massacres that happened after the assassination of Indira
Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards, the role of the print media was shameful. The
media was then reflecting the biases and the political imperatives of the
Congress, the party in power, which for reasons of its own was committed to
pursuing certain policies vis-à-vis Punjab and the Sikhs; the media reflected
this and was complicit in it.
Unfortunately, the media readily
tends to reflect whatever issue the big political parties project as the
dominant news agenda. Today every political party—particularly the BJP and the
Congress—has a well-structured media-briefing process in the form of party
spokespersons. The Congress is perhaps less aggressive, simply because its media
departments are less organized and lack conviction. But the BJP is extremely
particular about this, as its organization and propaganda brigade is well
organized almost everywhere, from small towns to villages. The RSS volunteers
are trained in sensational propaganda-mongering and it is they who help the BJP
in canvassing their agenda through the media. The end result of the RSS’s
organizational backing is that an agenda that the BJP sets in its evening news
conference and decides to float then generates a lot of news coverage precisely
due to the efficiency of this transmission mechanism.
The notion of Muslims as a so-called
‘appeased community’ is a product of this kind of concerted, effective
projection by the RSS in the 1980s. The Ram Janmabhumi issue was very skilfully
managed by the BJP through the use of media-friendly events that were also
structured to capture the electronics media’s need for visuals. The BJP
understood this well and was able to come up with and stage ‘media events’. They
were able to set the terms of debate with a set of issues that perhaps were not
the most important, nor the most relevant, as far as citizens were concerned.
Again, the media was happy to go along with them. Another example that one can
give in which the BJP was particularly successful was the issue of Bangladeshi
(read Muslim) immigration into India . Bengali Hindus who came from Bangladesh
were rehabilitated in West Bengal and Delhi quite gracefully in the same fashion
as Punjabi Hindus were settled after Partition. But the press describes as
‘infiltrators’ those Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh who come here to work.
This is a term that the BJP helped to popularize in the late 1980s. I had a
running battle with people in my newsroom, where, innocuously and without
thinking, a report could come from the Press Trust of India (PTI) or some other
news agency in which a Muslim Bangladeshi immigrant is referred to as an
infiltrator, suggesting that a person has come not for economic reasons but for
something sinister or nefarious. Needless to say, this label of ‘infiltrator’ is
applied when the immigrant concerned is a Muslim; a Bangladeshi Hindu migrant is
called a ‘refugee’. These terms have become current, and you will find
references such as these in everyday discourse, and people unthinkingly use
these terms without realizing their problems, meanings, and
significance.
Another recent example is in the
context of some of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in India . A
number of newspapers have, in their headlines and the body of their stories,
begun to speak about ‘illegal madrasas’ as being dens of terror, sabotage, and
subversion. L.K. Advani, as home minister, called for a debate on the role of
madrasas, saying that if General Musharraf could regulate these in his country,
surely India should also be looking in that direction. But nobody points out
that in an Islamic state such as Pakistan , the government has a right within
its constitutional framework to make all kinds of pronouncements for regulating
madrasas – specifying what they should and should not teach. In a society and
polity such as India , which is constitutionally secular, madrasas can exist to
impart religious education and are run by the community. The government should
not interfere as it cannot provide religious education at public expense. If
children turn to madrasas for another kind of education, then it is more of a
comment on the failure of the state educational system. Proper schools are not
available in areas with a concentration of Muslims, and, as Syed Shahabuddin
once said, the government is more willing to open a police post than a school in
the vicinity of Muslims. So in the absence of schools, every debate
onmadrasas and their modernization is a romantic notion tinged with minority
phobia and apathy.
Somehow the media has allowed itself
to become a theatre or a platform where this kind of issue is debated in an
insidious manner that has nothing to do with constitutional realities. If a
madrasa is involved in illegal activities, or if its funds are coming in an
unregulated fashion, you have the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) that
regulates conditions under which any charitable organization registered by the
government can receive money from abroad and what kind of use it can put to it.
Somehow, the problem of madrasas is never looked into seriously in order to
discuss all relevant dimensions. They are always viewed through the lens of
subversion, terrorism or, token academic activism. All these buzzwords keep
cropping up, and to a large extent this is a reflection of a very effective
manipulation and management of the electronic and print media by the BJP and its
allies.
I want to turn now to the question
of reporting on riots that sporadically break out in various parts of the
country. These are the most important moments when media biases come to the
fore. The damage that the media can inflict on community relations can have a
long-term effect. I want to draw upon a study I published four years ago, and
which might be quite helpful in terms of pointing out exactly what I
mean.
Those who have studied the Indian
press coverage of riots are aware of the rather quaint code of conduct that
newspapers follow, which generally prohibits the identification of the
communities involved in communal disturbances. For example, you can have a
cryptic report that in an incident in Rajasthan members of one community
attacked members of another community, leading to two deaths. At a certain
level, one can rationalize this: if you are not identifying the communities
involved then maybe you are not inciting people to react in a negative way. I
can see the logic as to why one might choose to be ‘coy’, but we need to study
how these kinds of ‘coy’ reports are actually decoded by an ordinary reader.
Often, the coyness is itself defeated by various kinds of insidious markers of
the community which are put into the news report. Consider an example that was
reported in the Delhi papers a few years ago. The headline was a harmless one:
‘Sacrilege at Place of Worship’. But the report read:
An incident took place at a place of
worship in Lajpatnagar, where pieces of flesh were found in an envelope along
with a letter threatening a particular community and their place of worship. The
priest, Maya Ram, reportedly told the police that he saw a young woman wearing a
‘shalwar qameez’ with a ‘chadar’ enter. Later, they found the
envelope containing the flesh pieces.’
Nowhere in this story are the two
communities named, yet it is clear from the naming of the priest and the
description of the young woman’s clothes that the reader is being encouraged to
assume that we are talking about Hindus and Muslims. In fact, reports of this
kind are particularly insidious. Whenever the victim of an outrage is a Hindu
and the perpetrator a Muslim, helpful clues such as names, dress, and type of
facial hair are often supplied, even if the fiction of not naming the
communities is maintained. But when a Muslim is the victim, more often than not
the news report will be terse and lacking in nomenclature or other
clues.
The media strategy of providing
selective markers leads to an extremely distorted picture of communal violence.
Even if majority of victims in riots tend to be Muslims, the fact that their
names are not reported, while the names of the few Hindu victims are, can create
a false and dangerous impression of Muslim aggressiveness and Hindu victimhood.
Let me cite another incident that occurred in Hapur a few years ago: ‘More than
a dozen shops were burnt in a night’s incident. According to the Police
Inspector of Hapur, the police have arrested a rioter called
Sikander.’
Despite overwhelming evidence that
Muslims are the main victims of communal violence, why is it that the standard
riot narrative as propounded by the bulk of the print media continues to revolve
around the alleged aggressiveness of the Muslims? Having worked in a newspaper
during incidents of communal violence, I can think of four broad reasons. The
first is the average newspaper’s over–reliance on the police for news and
information, given the communal bias of the police force. This is also well
documented in a dissertation, Communal Conflicts: Perceptions of Police
Neutrality during Hindu-Muslim Riots in India, by Vibhuti Narain Rai, a
senior IPS officer, who has studied the pervasiveness of communal biases in the
police force during riots. Given this bias, it is dangerous for a newspaper to
rely on police handouts for information on riots, or on the sequence of events,
when these kinds of incidents happen. Time and again, we see that during moments
of riots the police often become the main source of information. Given that
curfew is usually clamped, making movement difficult, it is tough for
journalists to find others sources of information. But, insofar as we tend to
rely excessively on the police, this is one place where this kind of bias creeps
in. Since, in the bulk of riots, the majority of people killed in police firing
tend to be Muslim civilians, the police narrative often tends to be aimed at
sanitizing the role of the police and painting a portrait of Muslims as
aggressors in order to justify whatever the police does.
The second reason why the standard
narrative in the media tends to get biased in this way is because of the high
financial and logistical costs of gathering news. Many newspapers, especially
the smaller ones, cannot afford to have news bureau all over the country, and
cannot afford to send reporters to reach a particular spot soon enough. Often,
they rely on a large roster of underpaid stringers. In mofussil towns,
the stringer who is a local representative of a daily paper is a very
prestigious person; while some of them are conscientious, others use the status
essentially to get close to local bigwigs. This means that the integrity of the
news gathering process at the local area could get compromised. In a situation
of a communal riot where, more often than not, it is the local bigwig who is
involved in the machinations behind the local riot, local stringers and local
underpaid staffers perhaps do not find it easy to send across the real story,
either because of blandishments by these forces or because of threats, or even
compliance.
The third reason why riot reporting can be
biased against Muslims is the prevalence of biases and unprofessionalism within
the news-desks of newspapers. Unfortunately this is not so infrequent. The
reporter may be biased, or the person at the news-desk who is actually editing
the story or putting it together may choose to highlight something on the basis
of his or her personal bias. This is also a major factor, to the extent of being
decisive. Finally, there is the pressure of space and deadlines—in other words,
the technique and the technology of news dissemination can also lead to communal
stereotyping. Mukul Sharma and Charu Gupta, in an important study on media and
communalism published a few years ago, observed that if both journalists and a
majority of readers associate Muslims with threats, then reporters and editors
pressured by deadlines and constrained by the little space available may simply
treat the news about riots in a way that conforms to this. In other words what
they are doing is to present unfamiliar events in familiar and easily digestible
fashion as quickly as possible. This leads to obvious distortion and also the
tendency to neglect background context. Riots are likely to appear as sudden,
dramatic and unexplained, or as having a direct or immediate cause. The
underlying state of affairs is ignored and easy assumptions and instinctive
associations are upheld.
Stanley Tambiah has also looked at
the problem of ethnic violence in South Asia . There are two terms that he
uses—‘focalization’ and ‘transvaluation’—as key processes in terms of the
development and ‘normalization’ of riots. What Tambiah calls ‘focalization’
occurs when local incidents, which could be a property dispute or a fight
between neighbours, get progressively denuded of their local context.
‘Transvaluation’ is a parallel process of assimilating particulars to a larger,
more enduring focus, and therefore beyond contextual causes or
interests.
Thus, local incidents and physical
disputes can be cumulatively built up to larger and larger clashes between
growing numbers of antagonists who are indirectly or peripherally involved in
the original disputes. Central to this process is propaganda that aims at
distorting and inflating the substantive nature of micro-events, stripping them
of their local context and translating them into countless and unchanging
principles of communal identity interests and entitlements.
It is this role that a substantial section of
the media in India attempts to play before, during, and after a given incident
of communal violence.
I cannot also help but think that the major
problem of media coverage of communal riots and stereotypes of Muslims has to do
with the very discourse on ‘communal riots’. The term ‘communal riots’ is an
infelicitous term to describe what is essentially organized and targeted
violence in which the law enforcement machinery is fully implicated, either
through omission or commission. Consider the riots in Delhi in 1984, in which
the Sikhs were targeted and in which the activists of the Congress were fully
involved. Some of the accused individuals who had been MPs and ministers in
Congress governments were exonerated as the victims of the riot could not follow
the long and tedious legal battle. In turn the police and the prosecution helped
the accused go free because of their political affiliations.
To what extent can you call the 1984
incidents ‘communal riots’? Was it a case of ordinary Hindus killing ordinary
Sikhs, or was it case of a political party using the state machinery to massacre
a section of citizens? Can we describe as a communal riot the Bombay riots of
1993, in which the Shiv Sena, the state apparatus, and different sections of the
ruling Congress party were involved? Was it a case of Hindus killing Muslims? Or
was it a case where the political parties were fully involved in the selective
targeting of a community? My contention is that the very discourse and notion of
the communal riot is problematic because it posits one community fighting
against another. And once you present a riot in that manner, with that language,
media reports are invariably going to be biased one way or the
other.
Typically the reports tend to be
biased, giving the impression that Muslims were killing Hindus. This is not to
say that if you have a narrative saying that Hindus are killing Muslims it would
be better or more accurate. With regard to the coyness in identifying
communities, a case can be made for identifying the victims because there is no
ambiguity as to the fact that the victim is targeted because of his or her
religion. I am very wary of saying that ‘Hindus’ were the ones who were killing
Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, because rather than ‘Hindus’ as a collectivity, it was
essentially the police and the ruling political party, the Congress (I), that
were involved. So the judgment I would make in the newsroom would be to always
name the victim community because the community has been victimized for
political reasons; but since the person or the group doing the killing is not
really a ‘community’ but invariably a political party or a faction or the
police, there is no point in blaming an entire community. The state machinery is
involved, and there is no need to get into the whole language of riots, saying
it is Hindus versus Muslims or the Hindus against the Christians. Of course,
this means the ‘riot’ narrative has to be complex, and it can be complex only if
newspapers devote sufficient resources and do not rely on police handouts or
statements of political parties to get to the truth.
The second theme that I want to
stress is the issue of representation or workplace diversity. In one of his
Republic Day speeches, K.R. Narayanan (then president of India ) spoke about the
need for Indian companies to emulate US-style diversity polices. He was drawing
upon the Bhopal declaration drafted by the Dalit Conference at Bhopal . What he
said was in the context of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The logic
was that the state sector as a means of economic empowerment has perhaps run its
course in this era of privatization, where the state would not be the provider
of jobs, and perhaps it is time for Indian companies to take a leaf out of the
book of their US counterparts, which practice employee diversity only because
the government forces them to do so. If you want to do any business with the US
government, you have got to include some level of minority participation in your
company. The president threw up the suggestion that perhaps it is time for
Indian companies to do the same thing. This got us thinking in the newsroom.
In The Pioneer, there was once a very interesting column written
by B.N. Unniyal, in which he went through the list of journalists accredited to
the Press Information Bureau and concluded that there was not a single Dalit in
it. Similarly, if one were to count the number of Muslims involved in the
‘mainstream English media’, a case can be made for our newspapers to look
seriously at the question of diversity in the newsroom. This is not to say that
a larger number of Muslim and Dalit journalists would necessarily alter the way
in which news is covered; the discourse of news is far too well structured to be
undermined or changed easily. But certainly, if we are looking at images of
minorities in the press, this is something to be looked at seriously. It is time
for major newspapers and news media organizations in India to look inward and
ask themselves whether it is in our interest to have greater diversity in our
newsroom so that there are more reporters who are Muslims and more reporters who
are from Scheduled Castes and Tribes, so that the newsroom itself becomes
diverse and news coverage becomes richer, if not more balanced and more
objective.
Response To The Discussion
In the English print media, bias
against Muslims is not an intentional thing, but exists as a result of the
concerted efforts of the RSS as well as because of residual biases journalists
may bring with themselves. Some newspapers were funded by the BJP during its
rule, and many English journalists and editors officially joined the party or
flirted with it, so their bias can be understood. Nevertheless, if you look
carefully and compare the English-language media to the language media, the
record of the former is by and large better in terms of the reporting of
communalism and communal riots. Of course, because of stereotypical images the
coverage is certainly anti-Muslim at times. It is also true that the English
media does not always pursue and investigate most cases related to Muslims. So
the need for raising one’s voice is most when a riot takes place. During the
riots in Delhi from 31 October to 10 November 1984, if the English mainstream
newspapers had reported the matter objectively and published the truth about
political complicity on the first or the second day on their front pages, maybe
the Congress would have changed course much earlier and the brutality may have
been stopped. What the PUCL-PUDR (People’s Union for Civil Liberties-People’s
Union for Democratic Rights) report highlighted twenty days later -- about the
role of Congress MPs like H.K.L. Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar, Jagdish Tytler and other
leading Congress leaders in connivance with the police – should have been in our
newspapers while the killings were going on. That might have made all the
difference.
We can give the same argument for
the Bombay riots or other riots. Detailed reports are required most when the
violence is at its peak. The subtle show of disregard towards the plight of
Muslims exposes the weakness of the English media. We cannot say that this is
always a conscious bias, but often it is. My own experience in the Times of
India was that editors did not have an anti-minority bias, but the
stereotypical images they had of communities had their own negative and decisive
impact in respect of Muslims. Sadly, the problem of Muslim stereotypical images
is everywhere, as the RSS has been doing its bit quite vigorously for more than
80 years, and secular Indians have not done much to counter this
propaganda.
If anything, most editors recognize
and are conscious of the policies of discrimination against the minorities and
want to reverse them. The problem is that, because of the technique of
newsgathering and dissemination of news and the reliance on police reports and
lack of objective sources, bias creeps into reporting. One may also ask whether
there is any political control and interference in our newspapers. Political
leaders do try to put pressure on the management of newspapers, but if there is
an element of self-consciousness prevailing in the newsroom, political pressures
can be resisted. But this is not possible all the time and everywhere—for
example, a correspondent in Kashmir may think twice before writing the truth
about some human rights violation for fear that he could be dubbed an
anti-national on the ISI payroll. In case that correspondent happens to be a
Muslim, the pressure of self-censorship may be trebled. It is my view that had I
been a Muslim, it may not have been possible for me to say and write whatever I
have been these past few years on communalism because there are pressures which
operate. This is especially true after 9/11, where those who wanted to criticize
the American reaction were equated with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaida or its
sympathizers.
In this context I must mention an
incident which is quite relevant. In Malegaon, Maharashtra, some leaflets were
distributed entitled ‘Be Indian, Buy Indian’ in which Indians were asked not to
buy goods from companies belonging to countries that were waging war against
Afghanistan. They called for a boycott of Coca-Cola and other companies. The
police put a forcible stop to these leaflets, and some people died in the
firing. When this news reached Delhi and Mumbai from Malegaon , it was reported
that ‘pro-Osama bin Laden’ leaflets had been distributed.
I don’t agree with those who argue
that it is the duty of the Muslims to raise a voice against all incidents of
violence by Muslims. The well-known economic historian, Dharma Kumar, who rarely
raised her voice or was active on any political issue, got very angry over one
particular issue in 1984. This was in reaction to an article written by the
editor of The Times of India, during the 1984 riots, in which he
questioned why ‘the Sikhs’ did not condemn Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Dharma
Kumar wrote back to the editor: ‘As a Hindu I do not feel obliged to condemn or
to speak out every time one of my co-religionists does something terrible.’ She
added, with her characteristic wit, that if she did that she would perhaps be
doing nothing else! So many incidents take place everywhere and what has to be
condemned should be condemned—and is condemned—by many, but I do not at all
agree with this pressure on Muslims every time.
It is the duty of the media to
properly investigate and put issues in perspective. If Osama bin Laden does
something or if Parliament is attacked this will be condemned by those who
normally condemn such things—politicians, journalists, or writers to
newspapers—but you cannot expect those who normally do not make public
statements to be pressurized to issue a statement.
One last point: newspapers are run
on market principles. That is definitely a constraint. There is more coverage of
a film star’s clothes than of the problems of education. We have to accept that
reality, because we do not have a solution for now. But one should not write-off
the newspapers as totally biased against the Muslims or some other community,
because there are still many, many people in the media who are professional,
honest and sensitive, and who are trying to highlight genuine problems by taking
up vital issues that concern the general populace. And they require the support
of the thinking populace in their endeavour to do the right
thing.
Siddharth Varadarajan is
the Strategic Affairs Editor and National Bureau Chief at The
Hindu, India ’s leading English-language newspaper. He can be contacted
at svardarajan@gmail.com
(This
article was included in the book edited by Ather Farouqui titled "Muslims and
the Media Images: News versus Views" published by the Oxford University Press,
India.)
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