Munir Commission Report-Part 41: Whether Martial Law Could Be Avoided
Justice M. Munir
commission investigated the large-scale riots against the Ahmadya sect in
Pakistan in 1953. His report is an eye-opener. It shows that our ulema are not
even able to agree on a definition of who a Muslim is. Justice Munir had called
heads of all Islamic schools of thought and asked them the definition of a
Muslim. No two ulema agreed. It also exposes the pusillanimity of our so-called
scholars of Islam and their near-total disregard of the beauty and generosity of
Islam. --Editor
It is fitting to review the
whole situation. Everybody was agreed that the Ahrar were a subversive force.
They were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and even Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar
thinks that they were anxious to “rehabilitate” themselves. In 1950 and again in
1952, Mr. Anwar Ali, then D. I.-G, (C. I. D.) strongly recommended that they
should be declared an unlawful body. Mr. Qurban Ali Khan wrote very strong and
prophitic notes on the possible consequences of neglect. One lawlessness breeds
another. One damn thing leads to another. But whenever there was a conference,
either they were persuaded to change their strong views, or official decorum
restrained them from protesting. Mr. Daultana, therefore, says that everybody
agreed with whatever decision we find on the files, and the officers concerned
have not contradicted him. We ought to hold, therefore, that the responsibility
was joint, though we feel differently. Further, we feel that the Ahrar were
treated as members of the family and the Ahmadis as strangers. The Ahrar behaved
like the child whom his father threatens with punishment for beating a stranger,
but, who, knowing that he will not be punished, beats the stranger again. Then,
out of sheer embarrassment, since other people are watching, his father does
strike him—but gently.
General Azam thought even the troops were
unnecessary, if timely action had been taken. “Half-hearted measures and poor
leadership resulted in chaos. The police force were first class, and if they had
followed a firm policy at a certain stage, they could have dealt with the
situation without the help of the Army. What was needed were guts and a fixed
aim, coupled with a realization that this was a question of law and order and
had to be faced at any cost.”
It may not be correct that the Army could be
dispensed with altogether, but it is true that considerations extraneous to
those of pure law and order have influenced the action of the civil authority.
The Government were reluctant to employ the troops unreservedly, for fear of
bloodshed, as Mr. Anwar Ali says, and the Ministers were upset with the protests
of leading citizens that the police were firing even on violent crowds—even on
violent crowds, we repeat—which did no more than attack a police station with
bricks, or burn a stray omnibus here and there, or put to fire a sinning post
office, or stone a railway train full of passengers because it tried to move out
of the station, or blackened the faces of tonga-drivers and shop-keepers who
plied their trade. These were small incidents compared to the stuffed gunny-bag
made into the semblance of Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din or the Donkey of Qasur on whom
rode a man labelled Zafrullah Khan. The result was that some order was issued
which was No case against Army.
If there had been no reluctance to employ
troops.
understood to be an order of relaxation, and
which naturally had an adverse effect on the police force. But we go back to the
4th of March, when Sayyed Firdaus Shah was murdered. Even before that, they all
knew that Wazir Khan mosque is the seat of trouble, that Maulana Abdus Sattar
Niazi has enthroned himself there and is scintillating hatred of Government from
a firm seat, that even a warrant of arrest cannot be executed against him. If
the situation can be controlled by the police, why is the mosque left to itself?
If it cannot be controlled, why is it not handed over to the military? We are
firmly of the belief that the handing over of this one situation would have made
all the difference to the course of riots.
And we go still further back. Unless the Punjab
Government had an understanding with the Majlis-i-Amal that the centre of
agitation would be Karachi, an order under section 144, Cr. P. C. was a measure
of prudence on the 28th February. It is for that reason called a “preventive”
remedy. Such an order was passed on the 26th or 27th of July 1952 when there was
a very localised threat of violence in front of the League Office, and the order
was passed by the District Magistrate without reference to anybody. A sense of
proportion would certainly be lacking if that occasion were regarded as
possessing more dangerous potentialities than the 28th of February, when the
Direct Action challenge was due for execution and the Central Government had
accepted the challenge by ordering arrests of prominent leaders—“non-entities”
according to the District Magistrate.
We have felt again and again that the case of
Lahore is one of “too many cooks.” In other districts the District Magistrate
and the Superintendent of Police discuss the situation and evolve a plan of
action which they can execute without interruption. In Lahore there are a number
of high officers who ought to be consulted, and, notwithstanding what Mr.
Daultana and his officers have said as to the duties of a District Magistrate,
if they had a stout person who could have imposed a prohibitory order in time,
ordered Wazir Khan mosque to be immediately isolated, or turned the blind eye of
Nelson on the let-up decision, we are not quite certain that his next post would
not have been that of the Controller of Foodstuffs and Fountain Pens in Karachi.
But you need officers who could ride alone to Wazir Khan mosque on the evening
of the 4th of March with only a pistol in their pocket. You should encourage
this breed. You should foster independence in them.
To pursue the subject of “too many cooks”, we
shall tell you what the District Magistrate of Lyallpur, Mr. Ibn-i-Hasan, did
single-handed, unaided by the Inspector-General, the Home Secretary, the Chief
Secretary, the Chief Minister, the Governor. It is a small place compared to
Lahore, but has a somewhat larger area than Wazir Khan. mosque. On the 2nd of
March, provocative speeches were made in Jamia Masjid in honour of the
volunteers proceeding to Lahore or Karachi, but we heard nothing more of those
If Wazir Khan Mosque had been isolated.
If preventive action had been taken
earlier.
If there had not been too many
“cooks”.
An example at Lyallpur. volunteers: they were
spirited away by the police at Salarwala. On the 3rd of March news of firing at
Sialkot caused a flutter, and forthwith section 144 was applied. A procession of
four or five thousand marched to the Deputy Commissioner’s house and a number of
arrests were made before they reached destination.
On the 4th
March there was complete hartal
and a procession made again for the Deputy Commissioner’s house, but
that officer tactfully diverted it to jail. The procession was aggressive and
provoking, but feeling that the police force was inadequate, he did not disperse
it. Nevertheless he arrested 125 persons. He telephoned to the Home Secretary
for military aid and an aircraft to create respect for law and order, and both
came without delay. On the 5th March a procession was taken out in
defiance of section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, and 55 persons were arrested.
There were
processions on the 6th and 7th also, attended by arrests. But on the 7th, the
atmosphere became tense and rowdyism appeared. The District Magistrate received
news that three trains had been held up, that the women passengers had been
molested and robbed. He did not send a magistrate to take “firm” action. He
himself went and ordered the crowd to disperse. When they did not disperse, he
did not take the risk of a lathi-charge—
which, as often as not, results in the police being worsted. He ordered firing
which resulted in killing four and wounding five. He provided army guards for
trains, so that the flow of traffic should not be suspended. On 8th March, he
heard that bricks had been collected in housetops in Chiniot bazar, with a view
to throwing them at the police if they should disturb processions. At 7-30 p. m.
he visited Chiniot bazar accompanied by the D. I. G. and met an aggressive mob.
They both returned and brought a military patrol and ordered the crowd to
disperse. When it did not, he ordered firing. Three persons were killed and one
wounded. Thereafter nothing happened—except that one evening the Chief Minister
congratulated him on the telephone for firm action.
In Sialkot, at least two situations were handed
over to the military, and there was no fear that the army might take such
complete control of it as to oust civil authority. Nor was there any
apprehension that there might be bloodshed. We mean, there was no nervousness
about it, for bloodshed there must be with firing. “And things like that you
know must be in every famous victory.” We have observed in a different place
that the District Magistrate acted wisely in handing over to the Army when the
situation so demanded.
After Martial Law, General Azam employed only one
battalion, consisting of between four and six hundred men, in the walled city
which had defied control since 1932. He complained that before the declaration
of Martial Law the army was used merely for a “demonstrative role”, namely,
patrolling, and not for a “suppressive role”. “For instances if I had been asked
to enforce the curfew order by firing or arresting, it would have been a
suppressive role. Then again, the storm centre, which was the Wazir-Khan-mosque
area, and in fact the entire walled-city area, was ignored. In a suppressive
role, we would have established posts all over the city and prevented people
from coming in and going out of their dens. As it was, whenever the military
patrols appeared, people disappeared.”
An example at
Sialkot.
The District Magistrate has told us that by the
evening of 5th March, the police, which had been struggling to deal with the
situation, began to fail, and that “it was for the police then to avail of the
services of the military”. Asked why he did not make this possible, he said
helpfully: “The military were there and the police were there”. His duty was to
call in the military and they were already in the down. “It was for the head of
the police to tell them how they should act. Even when a magistrate is present
it is for the police to require the military to act”. He said that was the
meaning of section 129 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
This is what we mean by saying that if there had
been but one stout man who could ignore all considerations extraneous to law and
order and vitalise the excellent material lying at his feet, there would have
been a different story to tell. And thus do we end this chapter: We long for the
Lion of God and the Rustom of encident lore.
شير خدا و رستم دستانم دستانم است
CONCLUSIONS ON THIS
PART
It is fitting to review the whole situation.
Everybody was agreed that the Ahrar were a subversive force. They were opposed
to the creation of Pakistan and even Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar thinks that they
were anxious to “rehabilitate” themselves. In 1950 and again in 1952, Mr. Anwar
Ali, then D. I.-G, (C. I. D.) strongly recommended that they should be declared
an unlawful body. Mr. Qurban Ali Khan wrote very strong and prophitic notes on
the possible consequences of neglect. One lawlessness breeds another. One damn
thing leads to another. But whenever there was a conference, either they were
persuaded to change their strong views, or official decorum restrained them from
protesting. Mr. Daultana, therefore, says that everybody agreed with whatever
decision we find on the files, and the officers concerned have not contradicted
him. We ought to hold, therefore, that the responsibility was joint, though we
feel differently. Further, we feel that the Ahrar were treated as members of the
family and the Ahmadis as strangers. The Ahrar behaved like the child whom his
father threatens with punishment for beating a stranger, but, who, knowing that
he will not be punished, beats the stranger again. Then, out of sheer
embarrassment, since other people are watching, his father does strike him—but
gently.
And so, as the Central Government was constantly
inquiring, and C. I. D. Notes were mounting pile upon pile, a conference was
held on the 25th of May 1952, and it was decided to ban all Ahrar and Ahmadi
meetings. This was good enough, but by the 5th of July it was whittled down to a
mere nothing. Let processions be taken out, let meetings be held, in defiance of
the ban. Let nobody be arrested—except the Ahrar, Let no Ahrar be
arrested—except the prominent Ahrar. Let no prominent Ahrar be arrested, if he
addresses a meeting not organised by his own party, without reference to
Government. And the district authorities naturally added to it a fourth
injunction. Let there be no reference to Government. For if there is a
reference, it will take time. After all, the Government has to look after
sixteen police stations, and refugees and receptions make two additional police
stations. The case will have to be referred to a meeting after seven or eight
other files of the same kind become available. Then, after three months, you
hear that Abdullah and Narain are only petty people and their prosecution will
serve no useful purpose. But even if a prosecution were sanctioned, what
deterrent value has it after three months?
Although the decisions of the 5th July were taken
when Mr. Daultana was at Nathiagali, there are indications that they were
discussed with him before he went there.
The Home Secretary also maintained telephonic
contact with him. While on the one hand it was impressed upon the officers that
these decisions were intended to isolate the Ahrar, on the other the Ahrar were
allowed to join hands with the Ulama of all Muslim parties by holding a
convention on the 13th July. By this device the Ahrar won the sympathies of a
very large section of the public, who respected the Ulama infinitely more than
the Ahrar.
When the Ahrar found, that their meetings were
banned and some of them were prosecuted, they bought their freedom for a penny.
They made a statement that they had never before preached violence, that they
did not propose preaching it thereafter. But Government knew that they had
preached violence, or at least that was the effect of their speeches, and
knowing this, they accepted the statement as though it were an
apology.
Only a fortnight ago they had refused to
apologise, when Mr. Anwar Ali had suggested it to them. Government know how to
elicit a proper apology, as they did from Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan on the 28th
February; but in the case of the Ahrar, a statement which did not detract from
their respectability was accepted as a great achievement, and they were allowed
to make speeches, to vilify the Foreign Minister, to calumniate the Prime
Minister, to use words which tingle decency. All this time Mr. Daultana was
being reminded by his officers that the Ahrar were not abiding by their
undertaking, but they themselves suggested little action. Either they were
conscious that their notes had little effect, or they fell into the habit of
writing notes. When a number of files had accumulated, a policy meeting was
suggested, and it was decided on 24th December 1952 that the ordinary law should
be respected. It seems to be a joke that until then the Punjab Government in the
Ministry of Law and Order, inclusive of its civil and police secretariat, did
not know that the ordinary law had to be respected. But by this time the
officers had reached a stage of insensitiveness where the violation of ordinary
law could also be appropriately punished with a mere
warning.
The Central Government issued a policy letter in
September 1951 and another in July 1952, making it clear to the Provincial
Government that aggressive sectarianism must be suppressed with a heavy hand.
The provincial authorities, however, emphasized in their notes that the demands
were a matter for the Centre’s decision, and that unless these were decided one
way or the other, the law and order situation will not improve. They knew very
well that the Centre could under no circumstances accept the demands and that if
there was going to be any decision, it would be a decision of rejection. But
they insisted that a decision must be taken, and the Centre, represented by
Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, did not wish to say openly that he was rejecting the
demands, as, he thought, this would bring him into a head-on clash with the
Ulama, and he had a profound leaning towards the
Ulama.
But while
we think that the demands could have been rejected without any religious
scruple, and without any danger to public peace, and without injury to public
feelings, we do not think it was necessary to give an answer for the purposes of
the law and order situation. That situation had tremendously improved by the
imposition of a simple ban, inadequate as it was, but was allowed to deteriorate
by an attitude of complete indifference to what the Ahrar or the Ulama
said or did after July 1952. On the contrary, it was encouraged by
the Chief Minister’s public utterances supporting the view that the Ahmadis were
not Muslims.
The press was definitely encouraged by the
Director of Public Relations to fan the agitation, and with Dr. Qureshi we are
inclined to think that Mr. Daultana could not have been unaware of what the
press was doing. Four vernacular papers had been handsomely paid for thousands
of copies which were perhaps never purchased, in pursuance of an old policy that
papers which supported the Government should be patronised, and although these
very papers were the keenest agitators, their contracts were renewed early in
July 1952 with the knowledge of Mr. Daultana. A sum of over two lakhs which the
Assembly had voted for the education of illiterate adults was diverted under the
orders of Mr. Daultana to the purchase of these four papers and the scheme was
to be kept confidential. The Director told us without the least compunction that
his scheme was to aid a certain type of papers, not to promote literacy. The
“Zamindar”, notwithstanding that it continued spreading hatred even after July
1952, when Dr. Qureshi complained to Mr. Daultana, was treated as God’s own
agent and action delayed against it until it could no longer be delayed. In
short, the Centre complained vigorously. The “Azad”, the Ahrar’s official organ,
was repeatedly brought to the notice of the Provincial Government by the Centre
and repeatedly treated with mere warnings.
The challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not
treated seriously by either Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the
last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government
seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in
Karachi.
Finally, when the ultimatum was rejected, the
whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where
processions are stage-managed and slogans raised, for the benefit of a contented
audience. “Processions in Lahore are taken out almost daily, and nobody takes
them seriously”. There were many palavers and little action, “The police was
there and the army was there.” And everybody was devoting deep thought to the
situation, as one officer said, and everybody knew what to do. Everybody felt
that the army could have accomplished a great deal, but nobody can say why it
did not happen. “Some say, they were three, and the fourth was their dog; others
say, they were five, and the sixth was their dog, guessing at random. * * * *
say, my Lord knoweth best.”
And it is our deep conviction that if the Ahrar
had been treated as a pure question of law and order, without any political
considerations, one District Magistrate and one Superintendent of Police could
have dealt with them. Consequently, we are prompted by something that they call
a human conscience to enquire whether, in our present state of political
development, the administrative problem of law and order cannot be divorced from
a democratic bed fellow called a Ministerial Government, which is so
remorselessly haunted by political nightmares. But if democracy means the
subordination of law and order to political ends—then Allah knoweth best and we
end the report.
M. MUNIR
President.
M. R. KAYANI
Member
268, 362 CS 3,000—2-7-54 SOPP
Lahore
REPORT of THE COURT OF INQUIRY
constituted under
PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954 to enquire
into the PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953, Lahore
Printed by the Superintendent,
Government printing, Punjab 1954
M. MUNIR,
President
M. R.
KAYANI, Member
Commonly known as Munir
Commission report
11:29 PM
Sultan Shahin
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