This
period ends with the famous “assurance” by the Ahrar to keep the peace but not
to be of good behaviour. Before discussing it, however, we wish to refer to a
note of the D. I. G. which gives an indication of the Ahrar mind immediately
before the assurance. Master Taj-ud-Din and some others had by this time been
arrested for violating prohibitory orders. Mr. Anwar Ali wrote the following
note (in substance) on 5th July, 1962: “Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan came today with
Maulvi Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi, now President of Ahrar. The object was to give an
assurance that no speeches will be made which are likely to disturb public
peace, provided the persons arrested were released and section 144 was
withdrawn. I explained the decisions reached today at the officers’ meeting and
told them Government might consider release, etc., if the two leaders
apologised.
Maulvi
Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi said that so far, he and his party were of the belief that
Master Taj-ud-Din had not committed any wrong. Once it is realized by the Ahrar
that Government will not change its decisions, they will be more disposed to
come to a settlement.”
7th July
1952: Mr. Qurban Ali Khan—“I do not think Government have any cause to change
their decisions that law and order shall be maintained. Whatever tends to cause
disorder must be hit on the head, well and hard.”
The Home
Secretary forwarded the note with the remark that the Ahrar were realising that
they are being isolated, and Mr. Daultana initialled the note on 8th July. The
Home Secretary’s note that the Ahrar realized the effect of the policy of
isolation reminds us that the Government also viewed their isolated state
sympathetically and allowed them to invite the Ulama of all parties to relieve
the monotony of their isolation. It should have been foreseen that the Ahrar
were making a very open bid for breaking loose from the ring which the
Government thought it had forged round them, in which case the wisdom of
allowing the convention to be held in defiance of the law is questionable. The
law was an ass, but they have made it a joke now. The ostensible object of
allowing the convention was to contact the Ulama before the meeting and persuade
them to preach against violence. Mir Nur Ahmad, D. P. R., says the Chief
Minister particularly asked him to contact Maulanas Abul Hasanat Sayyed Muhammad
Ahmad Qadri, Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim and Ghulam Murshid.
He was
given to understand that “in the atmosphere of the convention” these Maulanas
could not secure a decision “on the desired lines.” But if the Chief Minister
was interested in the decision, as he ought to have been, it is remarkable that
neither did Mir Nur Ahmad inform him that the “contacts” had failed nor was Mir
Nur Ahmad asked by him as to the result. These Maulvis began to take an active
part in the agitation, and in October, 1952, the Department of Islamiat,
determinedly ignoring these activities, selected them for making lectures on
payment.
Mr.
Daultana said it was not his policy that the Ulama should be encouraged to
attend this convention. (The decision had been taken at the meeting of officers
on 5th July.) On seeing file No. 16(2)94, however, he agreed to having written
the following note on 5th July: “This convention may actually prove to be useful
from the Government point of view if the intending participants were contacted
by District Magistrates or D. P. R. and prevailed upon to denounce violence and
defiance of law”.
5th
July: two Ahrar leaders meet D. I. G.
They do
not accept his suggestion of
“apology”
Mr.
Anwar Ali’s fears.
Ahrar
defeat Government’s effort at isolation.
“Contacting” policy failed, but notice of it was not
taken.
But
these remarks as to the convention have been provoked by the use of the word
“isolated” in the Home Secretary’s note. It occurred to us that the two
positions were inconsistent. We take no serious objection to the hope
entertained, if it was entertained in good faith, and it is possible to have two
honest opinions in this matter. To revert to the meeting of Maulana Akhtar Ali
Khan and Maulana Sarhaddi with the D. I. G., it will be noticed that the Ahrar
were not prepared to apologize, and wished Government to withdraw the ban and
the prosecutions on their own terms. They would continue making speeches, but
the speeches will not be such as were likely to disturb the peace. There is at
least an implied admission that hitherto the speeches possessed that quality.
Next, there is noticeable in the D. I. G’s note a fear that Government might
change its decisions and Mr. Qurban Ali Khan assures him that Government will
not change its decision to maintain law and order. But Mr. Anwar Ali’s fear was
soon realized. We are not thinking yet of the agreement with the Ahrar. We are
thinking of the withdrawal of cases in Gujranwala on the 14th or 15th July. When
questioned as to these, Mr. Daultana said it was merely a technical decision
taken by the officers in respect of two Ahrar leaders who had already been
convicted on similar charges in Sargodha. Firstly, if a person commits one act
of cheating in Sargodha and another in Gujranwala, it will not be a technical
decision to withdraw the case at Gujranwala, and there will be no justification
for it. If a District Magistrate makes that foolish suggestion, he should be
told that it is foolish. Secondly, the decision related to six persons of whom
only two had been convicted in Sargodha. When this was brought to Mr. Daultana’s
notice, he said he did not recollect having attended the officers’ meeting of
15th July at which this decision was taken, as no matter of policy was involved.
When, however, his attention was drawn to the following note of the Home
Secretary, dated the 18th July:—
“The
Gujranwala case was withdrawn yesterday. I sent for the D. G. on 15th,
immediately after our meeting with H. C. M. and communicated to him the decision
of Government when he came to see me on the 16th.”—he said he must have agreed
to the withdrawal. “My impression is that these persons had been arrested merely
for attending a meeting in contravention of section 144, and as there was
considerable agitation in the city, the District Magistrate of Gujranwala
contacted the Home Secretary.”
Even if
this explanation is correct, Mr. Anwar Ali’s fear that Government might change
its decisions was realized. But it is not correct, for we have seen in Part II
of these Minutes, that no suggestion came from Gujranwala.
On the
same day when the decision to withdraw the prosecution was taken, Mr. Qurban Ali
Khan made a note that the convention of Ulama had a very adverse effect on
people, that the Ahrar had gained their object by exciting their sentiments on,
religious issues, that there was a race between the Government and the
Ahrar,
Gujranwala cases withdrawn: 15th July 1952: Mr. Anwar Ali’s fears
realized.
Withdrawal unjustified.
Convention of Ulama on 13th July had adverse effect: says
I.G.
that the
Government should be on its toes and let no grass grow under its feet. The Home
Secretary wrote to the same effect and Mr. Daultana saw this file on 16th July.
He was asked by the Government counsel whether, in the face of these notes,
showing as they do that these officers held very strong views about the
situation, he still insisted that the decision to withdraw was that of the
officers and not his own. The answer was as follows: “This file came to me for
information only. The question of withdrawal had nothing to do with it.” It was
then pointed out to him that in this very file there was a note, dated the 16th
July, by the Inspector-General that the subject was discussed at the previous
day’s meeting. In other words, the subject of Mr. Qurban Ali’s note of 14th July
was discussed with the Chief Minister in the meeting of 18th July, Mr. Daultana
thereupon agreed that he must have been present at the meeting. The answer to
the first question, however,—that officers with such strong views could not have
agreed to the withdrawal of prosecution—still remains to be given. It is
impossible to believe that while on paper Mr. Qurban Ali Khan agitated his mind
over the tactical victory which the Ahrar had gained by the convention and
warned Government to be on its toes and let no grass grow under its feet, in the
conference he advised Mr. Daultana to withdraw the cases because people were
upset—as, after all, they had merely defied an order. After all, an order of
Government in a democratic set-up is subject to the implied proviso that the
execution thereof will not agitate the public mind. We mean, Mr. Qurban Ali
Khan, as a police officer, could not have worried about “justifying” the
prosecution “before the people who had accepted a democratic form of overnment”.
This contribution to the meeting must, therefore, have been made by Mr. Daultana
himself.
Now we
come to the actual “assurance”. It is well-known. Some Ahrar leaders undertook
to make a statement condemning violence and Mr. Daultana in return agreed to
with-draw the ban and prosecutions. Mr. Daultana says they told him it was not
their intention to break the law, but the movement was an article of faith with
them and it was their right to put the issue before the people constitutionally.
At the same time, they were convinced that it was their political and religious
duty to protect the Ahmadis, their property and their honour. It was understood
that after the withdrawal of the ban, they would continue their normal political
activities, but do nothing to jeopardise law and order. In answer to a question
by ourselves, Mr. Daultana said that it was implied on his part that in the past
the Ahrar’s normal political activity was accompanied by acts of violence, but
that he was not sure if the Ahrar also admitted this position. This accounts for
our earlier observation that while they promised to keep the peace, they did not
promise to be of good behaviour.
The
Ahrar said in their statement that neither had they in the past committed any
act in breach of law and order nor did they intend committing such act in the
future. This takes us back to Mr. Anwar Ali’s insistence on an apology and
Maulana Sarhaddi’s insistence that there was no case for an apology. But we have
no intention of devoting any time to the merits of the agreement. With Mr. Anwar
Ali’s exception, the officers are all agreed, for different reasons, that it was
the best course to adopt under the Ahrar’s “Assurances”: 19th July
1952.
circumstances. Mr. Qurban Ali Khan said it exposed the Ahrar to the
criticism that they had no liking for the prison, Hafiz Abdul Majid said that as
an administrator he would give them a chance. Mr. Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad said that
on a religious question a prohibitory order could not remain effective for long.
He also said that although the decision had already been taken by Mr. Daultana,
when it was put before the meeting, everybody agreed.
Mr.
Anwar Ali said that it was due to the wholesome effect produced by the
prosecutions that the Ahrar came in a deputation to the Chief Minister and gave
a written undertaking to keep the agitation within legal limits. “They did not,
however, abide by the promise. If I had been consulted, I would have said that
the withdrawal of these prosecutions and the release of these persons was
injurious, because I knew the Ahrar to be unreliable.”
III. After The “Assurance”.
“The
undertaking by the Ahrar was followed by a lull and then again a spate of
objectionable speeches started. After calling off this action, if action had
been taken to prosecute all the people who were delivering objectionable
speeches, or if preventive action had been taken against some of them, then the
agitation could have been curbed further.”—Mr. Ghias-ud-Din
Ahmad.
With
these remarks of the Home Secretary in mind, we can now start examining some
incidents following the 19th of July 1952 and test the good faith of the
decision to let the Ahrar carry on the agitation in a “constitutional”
manner.
(1) At
Qasur, on the 25th July 1952, after Juma prayer there was a meeting, and one of
the speakers was a “bad character”, Alam Shah. Thereafter a procession was taken
out, with beating breasts. One man shouted “Zafrullah Kanjar” and others joined
in chorus of “Hai, hai”. Then Alam Shah and another procured a she-ass and wrote
on it “Begum Zafrullah”, seated a man on it and garlanded him with shoes. He
wore a top-hat with “Ghulam Ahmad Mirza” written on it. The procession halted in
front of an Ahmadi’s factory and shouted: “Destroy Mirzaeeat”, “Zafrullah
Kanjar”, “Zafrullah Kutta”, “Zafrullah Soowar” for about fifteen
minutes.
Mr.
Anwar Ali noted on the diary relating to Qasur that fanatical elements and
Maulvis had gained strength and that hooligans had jumped into the arena. Mr.
Qurban Ali Khan said: “This is the outcome of all agitations in defiance of law.
One lawlessness breeds another lawlessness and unless some preventive method is
possible, it ends in a revolution. This is a lesson of history which may be
delayed but cannot be belied.”
The
Chief Minister initialled the note on 12th August 1952.
Acceptance of “assurance” not per se
objectionable.
At
Qasur: 25th July 1952.
D. I. G.
and I. G.’s remarks.
But we
are not going to put any more faith in these notes. They seem to be intended to
make good reading. They do not say: “But where is the Ahrar’s promise?” They
don’t propose any action, and Mr. Daultana says he was not taking any action
where no action was proposed, unless it was a glaring case of inaction. This
certainly was not a glaring ease! Again, we have lost faith in these notes
because if Mr. Daultana holds another conference, they will all agree with him
in holding that this is not a democratic approach to the problem. The Foreign
Minister has been grossly insulted, true enough, but unless the Central
Government decide whether the demands are to be accepted or rejected, how can
one say whether the abuse is or is not justified?
On 31st
July, the D. I. G. made the following note on a source report: “The movement is
no longer canalised, but has got into the hands of the riff-raff * * * * I am
not sure about the bona fides of the Ahrar.” So far we had not heard that
Government intended “canalising” the movement, and therefore do not know which
way the canal was to be directed. But this word may be borne in
mind.
(2) On
24th July 1952, the D. I. G. informed Government that mock funerals of the
Foreign Minister had been taken out at several places in the province and that
this constituted an offence under section 23, Public Safety Act. The Home
Secretary said that the Safety Act should not be used, but that the Chief
Minister might talk to the Ahrar leaders to abide by the undertaking, as parleys
with them at a lower level had proved futile. The Chief Minister signed the note
on 30th July. In his statement in Court, he said he took no action because he
agreed with the Home Secretary. But the Home Secretary, when he discouraged the
Safety Act, was apparently thinking of section 3, by which a person is detained
without trial. Section 23, however, is on the same footing as any section of the
Penal Code, and if Mr. Daultana agreed with him because Mr. Daultana also had
section 3 in mind, then it is very fortunate indeed for the law-breakers that
both the Chief Minister and the Home Secretary had the same conception of
section 23 as they had of section 3. But even Mr. Daultana admitted that in 1952
there were ninety persons detained under the Safety Act and that none of them
was a political detenu.
He added
that so far as the Home Secretary’s note recommended that the Ahrar be reminded,
he did not consider any further interview with them necessary as in his speech
of the 27th or 28th July to the Muslim League Council he had clearly asked the
Ahrar leaders to adhere to their undertaking. We think this is what they call an
explanation. We come across them in press conferences, but not in law
Courts.
(3) On
the 26th or 27th July, there were demonstrations on a wide scale outside the
Muslim League office when a meeting was being held; stones were thrown at motor
But no action.
D. I.
G., says movement is in the hands of riff-raff.
Mock
funerals of Foreign Minister.
Action
not approved under Safety Act.
Because
Safety Act is a bugbear.
But no
warning either: cars; quite a number of policemen and some members were injured.
Begum G. A. Khan had to be carried away in an injured condition. The police had
to use tear gas and lathis.
(4) A
pamphlet entitled ( مرزائيوں کے
ناپاک عزايم ) came to
the notice of the C. I. D. on 4th August 1952. In the first chapter, relating to
fundamental beliefs, there are quotations from the writings of Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad. “Those who do not believe in me are swine and bitches”, is an
illustrative quotation. In the second chapter it is stated that the Ahmadis
still believe that Pakistan will reunite with India, In the third chapter it is
stated that Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan is opposed to the establishment of
Pakistan.
The
objects or at least the effect, of the pamphlet clearly was to rouse and
maintain bitter feelings between two sections of people. The Assistant to the
D.I.G. recommended proscription. The D.I.G. said on 3rd September 1952, that a
month had passed since the pamphlet had first come to notice and that no useful
purpose would be served at this stage by proscription. The Home Secretary agreed
and the Chief Minister initialled the note.
(5) On
the 21st August 1952 there was a meeting at Multan at which public servants were
particularly castigated. The D.I.G. noted on the daily situation report that
inflammatory speeches against public officers undermined their morale, that the
leaders had been released in order that they should tell their colleagues to
keep within the limits of law, that they should be called now and administered a
warning, that they were utterly unreliable, though it was worthwhile warning
them a second time, that the meeting which they proposed on 29th August at
Multan to celebrate a “Martyr’s Day” should be banned, that since according to
the report of Kayani J. on the Multan firing the officials were not at fault, if
the Ahrar, still hold them up to criticism, it was against all principles of
decency.
The
Chief Minister did not approve the proposal to ban the meeting, but agreed to a
warning being issued that they should behave at the meeting. The Deputy
Secretary, Home, had proposed that press notes be issued about warnings having
been administered. This also was not approved. The local leaders were warned
through the Commissioner. The Home Secretary inquired whether a general warning
should be administered to Ahrar leaders also, adding, in his own handwriting
(the rest of the note is in type), “I think we may wait for a little
longer”.
The
Chief Minister said on 31st August: “I don’t think we need bother about a
general warning at this stage.”
An
objectionable pamphlet—4-8-52.
No
action. Multan: 21-8-52.
D.I.G.
suggests warning.
Warning
to local leaders only.
General
warning unnecessary.
- 328
-
Report Of The Court Of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act Ii Of
1954 To Enquire Into The Punjab Disturbances Of 1953
We have
referred to the Multan firing elsewhere. It occurred on the 19th July 1952, when
the police station of Kup found itself surrounded by a threatening mob. After
the firing, as a concession to public feeling, the Government directed a
judicial inquiry which was conducted by one of us. It was held that the firing
by the police was justified as a measure of self-defence. That should have
satisfied all right-minded people, if they had any regard for judicial
independence and the dignity of a judicial finding. The celebration of a
Martyr’s Day thereafter implied a disapproval of that finding, and Mr. Anwar Ali
rightly laid stress on decency. This point was lost on Government. The law of
contempt is a law of decency.
(6)
Fortnightly Report from the Provincial to the Central Government for the first
half of August 1952. It was stated in this report that a certain Maulvi Ahmad
Khan of Sargodha, speaking at Samundri, criticised the Pakistan Army because its
officers were given to dancing and drinking, and charged high officers of
Government with corruption and favouritism. The Central Government was naturally
perturbed, and asked for a report, inquiring what action, if any, had been taken
by the Province: The reply was that although the Maulvi had used defamatory
language and endeavoured to spread hatred against the Army, since he was an
unknown entity, it was better to ignore him.
(7) At
an Ahrar meeting on the 25th August 1952, at Montgomery Maulvi Muhammad Ali
Jullundri told his audience that the Government was compelled to give way and
withdraw section 144. Mirzaeeat was no religion but a farce, and Mirzais were
worse than sweepers or cobblers. The Ahrar no doubt were deadly against the
creation of Pakistan, but they are loyal now, while the Ahmadis are still trying
to reunite with India, The Mirza of Qadian was immoral: many murders were
committed as a result of his haram sara affairs. Mirzais should not be allowed
water from water taps or to sit with you in the same tonga. They should be
forced to embrace Islam. It is true that Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan’s
reply to the Prime Minister’s communique of 14th August was objectionable, but
he had to squeal because he got it in the bottom.” The Chief Minister saw this
report on 18th September 1952.
Perhaps
even “at this stage” it was unnecessary to bother about a general warning. But
where was the law of the land? Did nobody feel ashamed of this speech? But we
are forgetting that no action could be taken by Government because no action had
been suggested by the C.I.D, or the Home Secretary. And as for the District
Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, we suppose they were occupied with
other duties which have fallen to them since the Partition—“reception of
dignitaries”, as the District Magistrate of Lahore said.
“Martyr’s Day” meeting constituted a protest against judicial
finding.
Criticism of Pakistan
Army:
August 1952.
The
speaker was “an unknown entity”.
Montgomery speeches: 25-8-52.
No
suggestion, no action.
At least
we know now what the Ahrar themselves thought of the “Assurance” they had given.
According to Maulvi Muhammad Ali Government had been compelled to give way.
Maulana Daud Ghaznavi put the same thought, in a different form when he stated
in the Lyallpur Convention of 26th—28th September that the lifting of the ban
was evidence of the fact that Government had submitted.
(8) On
29th August 1952, Mr. Nazir Ahmad, S.P.(B), on a reported split between Master
Taj-ud-Din’s group and Sheikh Husam-ud-Din’s group, recorded an opinion that
“the Council of Action was showing signs of decadence and disunity”. This was
regarded by Mr. Daultana as “interesting”, and he asked the C.I.D. to inform the
Central Government “of these developments and their likely consequences”. In the
report, however, S.P.(B), mentioned a fatwa given on 14th October 1952, by
Maulana Daud Ghaznavi and three other Ulama to the effect that those who
regarded Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet or even a mujaddad or imam were
murtadd, liable to be killed according to Islam, and that a Government which
does not execute this injunction should be boycotted. This was to be put up for
ratification before certain Ulama who were
expected
from Karachi but who did not turn up. He also mentioned objectionable speeches
at Jhang, Lyallpur, Tulamba, Montgomery, Barana and Rangu (Campbellpur), winding
up with the opinion that the agitation was “practically dying and the leaders
were trying to keep it live for maintaining their importance and collecting
money”. The contents of the report do not leave any scope for complacency, and
it seems that Mr. Nazir Ahmad was misled by the reported split between the two
groups. The other police officers were not so happy. Mr. Anwar Ali said on this
note that although the Ahrar leaders were “a bit tired”, there was no reduction
in the number of meetings and that the agitation had dangerous potentialities.
The Inspector-General said on 23rd October 1952: “If it is allowed to go on in
this fashion, we shall one day be faced with serious troubles and It may become
difficult to control it. He sent up the note to the Governor, not the Home
Secretary or Chief Minister. Mr. Anwar Ali says this was probably done in the
belief that the Governor might bring the matter to the notice of the Central
Government. It was because we also had that feeling that we put the question to
Mr. Anwar Ali. Mr. Qurban Ali Khan apparently did not think that the Provincial
Government’s treatment of the situation was satisfactory, and he took the
unusual course—perhaps objectionable from the Ministerial point of view—of
trying to interest the Governor.
But the
Governor merely initialled the note.
(9)
Between 19th August and 9th September 1952, S.P.(B), thus reviewed the
situation, with reference to its effect on the Ahmadis: One hundred and fourteen
Ahmadis had forsaken their faith since July 1952, principally in Multan,
Lyallpur, Montgomery and Jhang.
What the
Ahrar thought of the “assurances”.
Was the
agitation dying?
I. G.
sends a note to the Government, not to Chief Minister.
Review
of situation:
August-September 1952.
Eleven
Ahmadis had left residence, apparently with families. Two male and four female
Ahmadi teachers had been discharged by the Wazirabad Municipality on 25th July
1952. The Deputy Commissioner had suspended the order.
Mr.
Anwar Ali remarked: “Pakistan has returned to the Middle Ages”. Mr. Daultana
signed the note on 17th September 1952. These conversions remind us of Sardar
Abdur Rab Nishtar’s observation that, while Governor of this province, he had no
apprehension of a breach of the peace from the Ahmadiyya community, because it
is a small community. Therefore, if threatening speeches are made against the
Ahmadis, there is no fear of a breach of the peace, for they can always renounce
their faith.
(10) All
Muslim Parties’ Convention at Daska on 21st and 22nd September 1952.—The
following is a resume of the objectionable portion of the speeches made at this
convention:
M.
Ghulam Nabi Janbaz: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a juggler (
مداری
) a wretched person, a womaniser.
Maulvi
Muhammad Ali Jullunduri: Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan is responsible for the
stalemate in Kashmir.
Sahibzada Faizul Hasan: Just as a jackal cannot be trusted with
melons and a cat with meat, so Zafrullah and other Mirzais could not be trusted
with Pakistan, as they were traitors. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was “nonsense”. He used
gur for latrine use, mistaking it for clay. If Mirzais do not embrace Islam, we
shall do all in our power to achieve that end. In that case they will lose their
allotments of land, factories and bungalows and also
Rabwah.
Sayyad
Muzaffar Ali Shamsi: Mirzais are base, mean, lacking a sense of
honour.
Sheikh
Husam-ud-Din: Zafrullah had underhand links with India and had occasioned the
division of Palestine to give a stronghold to Jews, in the interests of the
Anglo-American bloc.
Sayyad
Ataullah Shah Bukhari: They are a band of spies (Then there is something about
Queen Victoria and the present Queen which had better be left unsaid). (11) The
“Ehsan” of 25th August 1952, referring to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a “banaspati
Nabi“, advertised “Janbaz Pocket Book”, containing indecent matter in relation
to the religious controversy, first published in February
1952.
(12)
Convention at Sheikhupura on 9th October 1952 and Chuharkana on 10th October
1952.
Sahibzada Faizul Hasan: A man who could not save the honour of
Nubuwwat and the Prophet’s daughter could not protect Pakistan. Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad said those who did not accept him were the progeny of prostitutes. The
Punjab Ministers and Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din also did not accept him. They should
protect their mother’s honours at least, if they did not protect the Prophet’s
honour.
Daska
speeches: 21-9-52.
Sheikhupura speech 9-10-52.
Mirza
Ghulam Nabi Janbaz: This snake of straw—Zafrullah—was more dangerous than
external enemies.
We are
fighting constitutionally. Buy my books:
Sayyed
Muzaffar All Shamsi: Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din and Daultana should respect the
feelings of the people, who had given them “chairs” and could take them back.
Gurdaspur was lost through Zafrullah. Mirzais did not hesitate to offer girls to
achieve their object. Sheikh Husam-ud-Din: Zafrullah was a spy and a
traitor.
The D.
I. G. wrote on this report that the Ahrar continued spreading bad
blood.
The
Chief Minister initialled the note.
12:27 AM
Sultan Shahin
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