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Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Islam,Terrorism and Jihad
15 Jan 2011, NewAgeIslam.Com
Is Riaz Bhatkal really dead?

If media reports are to be believed, Riaz Bhatkal, a ring leader of Indian Mujahideen, has been killed by members of the Chota Rajan gang in Karachi. It’s impossible to say whether the story is correct. But the killing, if true, will add yet another twist to the saga of jihadi terror that plagued India till the fidayeen strike on Mumbai in November 2008

Terror within the Indian heartland has been on a path of decreasing intensity ever since the deadly attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The year 2009 was relatively quiet for terror but for the separatist violence in the north-eastern States, especially Assam, and stray incidents in Jammu & Kashmir. The year 2010, however, saw a couple of high profile attacks marked more for the various claims of responsibility than for the intensity of the incidents. The year 2010 also saw the return of the trademark Indian Mujahideen e-mails delivered from hacked wi-fi networks and discarded mobile SIM cards.

Meanwhile, the terror landscape in Pakistan has undergone a relative transformation as well with increasingly sectarian targets through much of 2010. If there is a new dimension to the terror landscape, it is the mainstreaming of Islamist violence in Pakistan. It started with targeted political hits in cities like Karachi. It has since assumed a mass phenomenon with the assassination of the Governor of Punjab Province, Salman Taseer.

It is unclear at this time if this was the act of a lone ranger or if this had broader support, the claim of responsibility from a Taliban faction notwithstanding. It is, however, clear that a chain of events has been triggered in Pakistan which will make it increasingly difficult for the courts and for the Government of the country to take hard actions with this mainstreaming of the jihadi sentiment. The recent release of HuJI chief Qari Saifullah Akhtar from detention by Pakistani authorities must be seen in this light---- Shashi Shekhar

Is Riaz Bhatkal really dead?

By Shashi Shekhar

January 13, 2011

If media reports are to be believed, Riaz Bhatkal, a ring leader of Indian Mujahideen, has been killed by members of the Chota Rajan gang in Karachi. It’s impossible to say whether the story is correct. But the killing, if true, will add yet another twist to the saga of jihadi terror that plagued India till the fidayeen strike on Mumbai in November 2008

Terror within the Indian heartland has been on a path of decreasing intensity ever since the deadly attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The year 2009 was relatively quiet for terror but for the separatist violence in the north-eastern States, especially Assam, and stray incidents in Jammu & Kashmir. The year 2010, however, saw a couple of high profile attacks marked more for the various claims of responsibility than for the intensity of the incidents. The year 2010 also saw the return of the trademark Indian Mujahideen e-mails delivered from hacked wi-fi networks and discarded mobile SIM cards.

Meanwhile, the terror landscape in Pakistan has undergone a relative transformation as well with increasingly sectarian targets through much of 2010. If there is a new dimension to the terror landscape, it is the mainstreaming of Islamist violence in Pakistan. It started with targeted political hits in cities like Karachi. It has since assumed a mass phenomenon with the assassination of the Governor of Punjab Province, Salman Taseer.

It is unclear at this time if this was the act of a lone ranger or if this had broader support, the claim of responsibility from a Taliban faction notwithstanding. It is, however, clear that a chain of events has been triggered in Pakistan which will make it increasingly difficult for the courts and for the Government of the country to take hard actions with this mainstreaming of the jihadi sentiment. The recent release of HuJI chief Qari Saifullah Akhtar from detention by Pakistani authorities must be seen in this light.

High profile assassinations in this region have, on more than one occasion, preceded high profile terror attacks elsewhere. The 9/11 terror attacks in the US were preceded by the assassination of Ahmed Shah Masood by Al Qaeda. The November 26, 2008 attacks on Mumbai were preceded by the assassination of Gen Faisal Alvi by individuals said to be closely affiliated to Ilyas Kashmiri. It is anybody’s guess whether Salman Taseer’s assassination is a precursor to other events. However, news comes from Karachi of an assassination of considerable interest to India.

Unconfirmed reports in a section of the Indian media suggest that Riyaz Bhatkal, an Indian Mujahideen ring leader of sorts, has been killed in Karachi by members of the Chota Rajan underworld outfit. This hit in Karachi, if indeed true, follows the pattern of a similar hit a few years back of Shahid Bilal, a HuJI accused responsible for the Hyderabad serial bombings. In the absence of further details, it is hard to determine the circumstances of his death or the specific ramifications. Much of what we know of Riyaz Bhatkal’s role in organising the Indian Mujahideen and coordinating the wave of terror between 2005 and 2008 comes from confessions. There has been speculation in the past if Riyaz Bhatkal was one of the two signatories in the Indian Mujahideen e-mails, who went by the aliases Guru-al-Hindi and Al-Arbi. It must be noted that in most recent e-mails from the Indian Mujahideen, only the alias Al-Arbi appears.

Riyaz Bhatkal’s death in Karachi also signifies what has been long described as the ‘Karachi Project’. The Karachi Project, as has been described by this wroter in the past, involved the coming together of jihadi elements aligned to the ISI and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba with jihadi elements aligned with Ilyas Kashmiri’s 313 Brigade to recruit and operate a network of terror cells in India by leveraging the Indian origin underworld groups based in Karachi. Much of the wave of terror between 2005 and 2008 is believed to be a consequence of the Karachi Project. The local logistical support to David Headley is also believed to have been facilitated through the Karachi Project.

There have been stunningly detailed disclosures by the American digital publication Pro-Publica in recent weeks on the role played by the ISI officers who handled David Headley ahead of the 26/11 attacks and for several months after the attacks. Despite these disclosures, much remains unknown of the murky terror landscape in India.

As an example to date there has been no explanation as to why the US Government had proscribed Arif Kasmani, a former LeT-affiliated Pakistani citizen, in the 7/11 attacks on Mumbai and the subsequent blasts on the Samjhauta Express. It must be noted that while Arif Kasmani finds no mention in the 7/11 chargesheet and trial that is going on in India. The Samjhauta Express blasts case is now shrouded in political controversy with the reported ‘confession’ of Aseemanand. It is important to set aside politics and take a dispassionate look at the tit-for-tat cycle of terror between 2005 and 2008.

According to Aseemanand’s reported ‘confession’, some of the anti-Muslim blasts such as the one at the Ajmer Sharif Dargah were carried out by the Sunil Joshi cell with logistical support from a few Muslim individuals. Sunil Joshi’s murder, which remains unsolved, was also blamed on individuals affiliated to the banned Students Islamic Movement of India. In fact, one of the reasons for the 2008 Malegaon bombing was cited as retribution for Sunil Joshi’s murder by the SIMI.

The Abhinav Bharat’s Lt Coll Purohit has been quoted from interrogations of plans to eliminate the RSS office-bearer Indresh, who has been at the centre of some of the anti-Muslim terror allegations. Media reports suggesting that the anti-Muslim terror attacks were planned first on October 21, 2005 in Indresh’s presence fail to mention the fact that no Islamist serial bombings had occurred before that date to warrant such a conspiracy. The first Indian Mujahideen attack in Delhi occurred only a few days later on October 29, 2005.

It must be noted that Abhinav Bharat was formed by Lt Col Purohit in June 2006 just week before the 7/11 Mumbai blasts. The formation of Abhinav Bharat occurred just a few days after the failed fidayeen attack on the RSS headquarters in Nagpur. During that failed fidayeen attack on the Sangh headquarters, the only national office-bearer of the RSS who was present in Nagpur was Indresh.

While correlation of events may not imply causation, the question must be posed if the Indian Mujahideen and the Abhinav Bharat had common sponsors from Pakistan as part of the Karachi Project.

There remain many gaps in our understanding of the origins, sponsorship and the execution of the tit- for-tat cycle of terror between 2005 and late 2008. It is unhelpful when inspired leaks and deliberate political grandstanding obscure facts, making it difficult to tie the several loose ends and to resolve the unanswered questions. India needs a Blue Ribbon Commission along the lines of the 9/11 Commission to examine the entire spectrum of terror investigations starting with 2005. Such a Commission is critical to preserve the integrity of our investigative and intelligence agencies while insulating them from accusations of political partisanship.

Truth must prevail for the sake of India’s brave men and women in uniform and undercover, who continue to put their lives on the line for the sake of the freedom we so cherish.

Chronology of Events

October 21, 2005

It is claimed that first meeting to conspire on anti-Muslim terror was held in Jaipur. Important to note the Indian Mujahideen series of blasts had not even started on this date.

October 29, 2005

Delhi serial bombings that have since been attributed to Indian Mujahideen modules.

June 1, 2006

Fidayeen attack on RSS headquarters in Nagpur

11th June 2006

Abhinav Bharat was formed in Raigadh.

July 11, 2006

Mumbai 7/11 attack.

The writer tracks terrorism and related security issues.

Source: Daily Pioneer

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamIslamTerrorismJihad_1.aspx?ArticleID=3938


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