| War on Terror | |
| 26 Aug 2009, NewAgeIslam.Com | |
| Is the "good" war in Afghanistan lost? | |
| A Potpourri of comments: Some Optimistic, a lot Pessimistic THE August 21 Presidential election in Afghanistan will not immediately change the fundamentals of the situation there, whatever the final outcome. The deficiencies of the principal political protagonists, opportunistic alliances, the ethnic divide, warlordism, the development deficit, poor governance, the Taliban insurgency, foreign military presence, poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, Pakistan's strategic ambitions in Afghanistan — all are established realities on the ground. -- Kanwal Sibal Whatever the outcome of last week's Afghan elections - the results are due Sept. 17 - the cruel fact is that the Afghan war is a deadly trap. It makes no difference whether Hamid Karzai or his former foreign minister Abdallah Abdallah is declared the winner. Rather than pouring in more troops, the United States and its NATO allies should urgently seek an exit strategy from that unfortunate country.The war in Afghanistan has lasted eight years, with no end in sight. It has claimed 780 American lives and more than 200 British ones. It has cost the American taxpayer $220 billion which, had it been spent on development, could have transformed not only Afghanistan but its neighbors as well. The war is being widely compared with Vietnam. The time to get out must surely be approaching. -- Patrick Seale The West is spending a fortune in aid to Afghanistan. As the new head of Britain's army recently pointed out, it is likely to have to go on supporting the country for decades. Yet the roads that are foreign development's proudest boasts also serve to meet the insurgents' and drug-dealers' logistical needs. -- Economist Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is completing an assessment of what he needs to win the fight there. That review, however, won't specifically address force levels, according to Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. -- William B. Plowman The poll was conducted by telephone Aug. 13-17 among a random national sample of 1,001 adults including users of both conventional and cellular phones. Results from the full survey have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points; it is higher among subgroups. -- Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen Billions of dollars have been spent but life for ordinary people, barring some progress in education and health, is still as hellish as during the civil war. "The rich here have become super rich and the poor have become beggars," says Dameen, who drives a rental car for a company that charges $50 for four hours. -- Shobhan Saxena URLof this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1679 ---------- Uncertainty ahead in Afghanistan despite polls by Kanwal Sibal 25 Aug 2009
THE August 21 Presidential election in Afghanistan will not immediately change the fundamentals of the situation there, whatever the final outcome.
The deficiencies of the principal political protagonists, opportunistic alliances, the ethnic divide, warlordism, the development deficit, poor governance, the Taliban insurgency, foreign military presence, poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, Pakistan's strategic ambitions in Afghanistan — all are established realities on the ground.
These elections, even if Karzai wins in the first round, will not increase his legitimacy to the point that he becomes a truly national leader capable of delivering the much awaited good governance that the country badly needs. Participation in elections has been highest in the northern and western parts of the country — not the natural Pushtun support base of Karzai — and Nangharhar province in the east.
Participation in Kabul has been weak, as was the case in the 2004 elections. In southern Afghanistan, especially in the Taliban infested Helmand area where US and British troops are operating, participation has been particularly low. As the Taliban are a Pushtun phenomenon, Karzai's Pushtun ethnicity has always been critical in terms of reaching out to the country's Pushtun majority and promoting interethnic reconciliation for longer term political stability. Karzai, however, has not been able to impose himself as a Pushtun leader, with the Pushtuns accepting that through him they exercise political dominance at the centre. There are, of course, many reasons for this: the tribal structure of Afghan society, Karzai's origin from a less important tribe, his installation in power by the Americans and, most importantly, Pakistani machinations through Taliban leaders enjoying protection on its soil and Soviet era mujahhideens to eventually wrest power in Kabul in furtherance of the ambition of its military to acquire strategic depth against India and prevent it from exercising influence within Afghanistan detrimental to Pakistan's interests.
Candidates
" Democratic" elections in politically underdeveloped societies do not always provide the answer to the manifold problems they face. The just concluded elections could actually make the situation more difficult to handle. If Karzai obtains less than 50 per cent vote and is obliged to go through a second round, then even if he emerges eventually as the victor, he would have been weakened politically, making governance even more vulnerable to unhealthy compromises.
President Karzai, in the forefront since December 2001 has shown a great degree of political resilience, even as his record of governance has come under severe criticism. Failure to impose himself as Pashtun leader, corruption, unsavoury deals with warlords, manipulation of ethnic divisions, drug trafficking involving his family members — all this is being placed at his door step. If, as is believed, the US wanted him replaced at one stage because of his failure to deliver, the absence of a viable alternative would have stymied that initiative.
He has shown himself to be a wily politician, working with the Americans, depending on them, suffering disparagement by the US liberal press, and yet carving out some autonomy for himself, making intra- Afghan deals not altogether approved by the US and criticising US military strikes responsible for civilian casualties. Even as US policy in Afghanistan has been faulted and the point repeatedly made that the writ of the Karzai government does not extend much beyond Kabul, the Afghan President has been successful in gathering for himself international backing from such diverse quarters as Russia, Iran and China. India's relationship with Karzai has been particularly productive.
He has given political space to India in Afghanistan, supported our assistance projects and taken a robust position on the role of Pakistan in spreading terrorism in the region.
His principal opponent in the election, Abdullah Abdullah, an associate of Ahmad Shah Massoud, is close to India. As his family moved to India when the Taliban captured power, he has frequently enjoyed Indian hospitality.
India would be comfortable with the success of either contender.
As Foreign Minister from 2002 to 2006, Abdullah Abdullah has had considerable international exposure.
That he is articulate, personable and has recognition is an asset; that he is a Tajik may not be one in terms of ambitions to occupy the President's post. Replacing a Pashtun as the head of the government by a non- Pashtun may not be very politic at this juncture. It is also believed that his candidature has strong Iranian backing. Iran has worked closely in the past with the Northern Alliance in which Abdullah Abdullah was a prominent figure.
Options
Unlike Karzai who has interest in expanding his Pashtun base and has been pressing the US and British for overtures towards the " moderate" Taliban, Abdullah Abdullah should have little interest in inducting such elements, with their pernicious ideology, in the government. In this particular context the Karzai- US- British strategy of strengthening the Pashtun base of the government by accommodating the Taliban presents problems for India. Through this strategy, the US and the British will also find it possible to accommodate Pakistan's longer term strategic interests in Afghanistan. Ironically though, this strategy, earlier thought of to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan, may now have the merit in western eyes of helping stabilise Pakistan threatened by indigenous Taliban groups.
India's limited options in Afghanistan should remain unaffected by the Presidential election.
Our successful assistance programme has generated goodwill, but does not provide a durable political and economic base in the country.
We could not prevent Karzai from politically marginalising the erstwhile Northern Alliance over the years, though to improve his election prospects he decided to choose Mohammed Fahim, the former Defence Minister of Tajik stock, much reviled by the West, as his Vice- Presidential running mate.
Limits
To counter the dangers of the western policy of reintegrating the Taliban in the state apparatus, reviving that Alliance would not be feasible today. The Russians are now agreeable to US transporting men and war material to Afghanistan across their airspace. General Kiyani's recent visit to Moscow suggests that the focus now is on obtaining Pakistan's cooperation in controlling the Taliban menace. We are today present in the Pashtun areas with our Consulates, but any advance of the Taliban in this area will jeopardise this presence.
We cannot get militarily involved in Afghanistan. A Hindu soldier killing a Muslim Afghan will reverberate in the land of the Hindukush and could invite reprisals inside J& K. We should continue with our development aid programmes, offer help in training the Afghan police, para- military and military forces in Afghanistan or in India.
The US is now accepting the legitimacy of India's assistance programmes, but Pakistan has not ceased its efforts to press the US to force India to reduce its presence in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military spokesman in fact referred recently to this Pakistani demand as a quid pro quo for arranging for the US and the Taliban leadership to meet.
If the Chabahar- Zaranj- Delaram route could be made operational, Afghanistan's and India's strategic options would increase, but Iran is dragging its feet. The best we can hope for is that the West would be able to contain the hardcore Taliban, and that we will be able to remain present in Afghanistan in a limited way.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary( sibalkanwal@ gmail. com) Source MailToday, New Delhi ---
The 'good war' isn't: Afghanistan looks increasingly like an unwinnable quagmire. We need an exit strategy. By Patrick Seale August 25, 2009
Whatever the outcome of last week's Afghan elections - the results are due Sept. 17 - the cruel fact is that the Afghan war is a deadly trap. It makes no difference whether Hamid Karzai or his former foreign minister Abdallah Abdallah is declared the winner. Rather than pouring in more troops, the United States and its NATO allies should urgently seek an exit strategy from that unfortunate country.
The war in Afghanistan has lasted eight years, with no end in sight. It has claimed 780 American lives and more than 200 British ones. It has cost the American taxpayer $220 billion which, had it been spent on development, could have transformed not only Afghanistan but its neighbors as well. The war is being widely compared with Vietnam. The time to get out must surely be approaching.
Waged to overthrow the Taliban, the war has mushroomed into a ferocious yet unwinnable campaign against the fiercely Islamic and xenophobic Pashtuns, who straddle the Afghan-Pakistan border and are Afghanistan's dominant community.
In such tribal country, where the government's writ barely runs, it is well-nigh impossible to say who is a Taliban fighter and who is simply an armed villager, anxious to defend his fields and family.
President Barack Obama and Britain's Prime Minister Gordon Brown have repeatedly claimed that the war is being waged to protect Western society from terrorist attack - to prevent another Sept. 11. But one could argue the opposite: The longer the war continues, the more Afghans and Pakistanis are killed and the more intrusive the Western military presence, the greater the likelihood that enraged Muslims in different parts of the world will want to hit back at the "enemy."
Al-Qaeda has long since ceased to be a centrally controlled, highly structured organization. It is an idea, a franchise, an inspiration to some and a danger to others. It is best fought not with guns but on the level of ideas.
Mr. Obama has clearly recognized this when he argues for reconciliation with the world of Islam. He has promised to announce numerous initiatives to promote cooperation with Muslim countries in the fields of science, education, technology and health. He has also understood that withdrawing from Iraq and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state solution will draw out a great deal of the poison from the West's relations with Islam.
All this is admirable and should be applauded and encouraged. But, at the same time, Mr. Obama seems to believe that the war in Afghanistan is a "war of necessity." This is a mistake - perhaps the central mistake of his foreign policy. He must correct it, or sink in the swamp.
Afghanistan is a complex mosaic of tribes, regions, languages and ethnic groups. There is considerable doubt whether a centralized presidential system, such as Mr. Karzai has set up with American backing, which concentrates power, wealth and patronage in Kabul, is really the best way to govern Afghanistan.
Elections, such as the recent presidential one, are to be welcomed. But no one could claim that Afghanistan is ready for anything like a functioning democracy. What the great bulk of the population seem to want more than anything else are jobs, drinking water, electricity, freedom from the oppression of warlords and other local bosses, and a reasonably fair justice system to settle disputes.
But what they also want is an end to the Western military presence, to sudden assaults on peaceful villages, to the missiles fired from drones that shatter families and kill children - in other words, an end to the war.
It is by no means self-evident that young Western men and women should go to their death in Afghanistan in order to impose a Western model of society on a population that (in its vast majority) wants none of it.
What Mr. Obama and his Western allies should urgently devise is a new formula. Instead of waging war, they should summon Afghanistan's principal tribal leaders, as well as the leaders of the regional states, to a great conference to talk peace. No doubt a pledge to withdraw foreign troops would be a salutary shock. At the same time, a pledge to pour in billions of dollars in development aid could be a great incentive to the Afghans to sort out their quarrels and govern themselves without outside interference.
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of "The Struggle for Syria," "Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East" and "Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire." This article is distributed by Agence Global. http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.afghanistan25aug25,0,4802903.story Copyright © 2009, The Baltimore Sun ----------- Losing Afghanistan? Comment in Economist, Lomdon Aug 20th 2009 To stop the country sliding out of control, the West needs more men and a better strategy
THIS is the just war, the "war of necessity", as Barack Obama likes to put it, in contrast to the bad war, the war of misguided choices in Iraq. But as a deeply flawed election went ahead in Afghanistan this week, there were echoes, in the mission by America and its allies, of the darkest days of the Iraq campaign: muddled aims, mounting casualties and the gnawing fear of strategic defeat. Gloomy commentators evoke the spectre of the humiliations inflicted by Afghanistan on Britain in the 19th century and the Soviet Union in the 20th.
Why the West is there The war is going badly. Much of the south of the country is out of government control. A scattered, disparate insurgency has gained strength and risks turning into a widespread insurrection against Western forces and the elected government they are backing (see article). In Britain, a sceptical public wonders what its soldiers are dying for. And as the costs and casualties continue to mount, Americans too will ask that question increasingly loudly (see article). Western governments use a lazy shorthand to justify this war. Its purpose, they say, is to deny terrorists the base and haven that Afghanistan under the Taliban provided to al-Qaeda. But al-Qaeda's surviving leaders are reckoned to have decamped across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan, where Western forces do not tread. The other reasons that Western governments keep their soldiers in Afghanistan are harder to sell to voters: first, because a precipitate departure would damage the West's global clout, and, second, to stop the country becoming the theatre for a war which could destabilise Pakistan and draw in other powers, such as Iran, India and Russia.
As the West struggles to maintain its weak hold on Afghanistan, so its ambitions there are narrowing. Early aspirations to bring peace, prosperity and decent government to the country have been replaced by the hope of establishing a functioning state and of improving security. By that measure, success in the short term will look much like stalemate. But the chance of achieving even these modest aims is being jeopardised by too few troops and a flawed strategy.
The shortage of soldiers has hampered the generals' ability to hold territory and forced them to use air power to make up for the lack of numbers. The civilian casualties that are the inevitable consequence of conducting a war from the air are, in turn, damaging the war effort. The generals need more troops both to regain territory from the Taliban and to fight the war in a way that does not breed hostility to the West.
Yet swamping Afghanistan with foreign soldiers will never bring outright military victory. The surge that helped secure Baghdad was carried out in a smallish, densely populated area. Such tactics cannot be contemplated in a country as mountainous and rural as Afghanistan. If the West is to stop the place slipping further out of control, it needs not just to direct more resources to the place, but also to use them better. That means different approaches to three elements: the opposition, the government and aid.
The opposition, casually described as "the Taliban", is far from a unified force in a country of great ethnic complexity. It includes not just religious zealots but all manner of tribal warlords and local strongmen. Many have alarming ideas and repellent social attitudes. But if Afghanistan is to be stabilised, the West will have to hold its nose and encourage its allies in government to do deals with them.
On the campaign trail, President Hamid Karzai has appealed to his enemies to make peace. But his government—inept, corrupt and predatory—does not look like a trustworthy partner. In parts of Afghanistan where insurgents have been driven out and the writ of the government has been restored, residents have sometimes hankered for the warlords, who were less venal and less brutal than Mr Karzai's lot.
Cleaning up government is not just an end in itself but also a means to building a functioning state, for Afghans will not support an administration as corrupt as the current one. The West should therefore use its leverage over the government to insist that the next cabinet is dominated by competent technocrats, rather than thugs owed a favour.
How to spend it The West is spending a fortune in aid to Afghanistan. As the new head of Britain's army recently pointed out, it is likely to have to go on supporting the country for decades. Yet the roads that are foreign development's proudest boasts also serve to meet the insurgents' and drug-dealers' logistical needs.
That is inevitable: infrastructure serves the wicked as well as the righteous. But the West has not spent its money as well as it could have. By giving too many contracts to foreigners, it has created grudges instead of buying goodwill. To most Afghan eyes, watching heavily guarded foreign aid-workers glide by in their Land cruisers, it is obvious that much of the money is going straight back out of the country. To a degree, this is forgivable: in such a poor country it is difficult to build the capacity to manage huge volumes of aid, and channelling more of the cash through the government may mean that more of it gets stolen. But that is a risk that needs to be taken to build support for the West and the government.
Taking even the rosiest view, the war in Afghanistan is likely to get more expensive, and worse, before it gets better. The mini-surge this year to enable the election to take place in most of the country will probably be followed by another to try to contain the growing insurgency. For the moment, Mr Obama is better off than George Bush was when Iraq went bad, because he enjoys broad political and popular support for this commitment. But as casualties mount, political pressure in America to announce a timetable for military withdrawal will intensify. To resist it, Mr Obama will need more men, a better strategy and a great deal of luck. Source: http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14258750 ----------
Afghanistan poses tough choices for Obama by William B. Plowman Aug 24, 2009
WASHINGTON — With the nation's top military officer calling the situation in Afghanistan dire, President Barack Obama soon may face two equally unattractive choices: increase U.S. troops to beat back a resilient enemy, or stick with the 68,000 already committed and risk the political fallout if that's not enough.
Adm. Mike Mullen on Sunday described the situation in Afghanistan as "serious and deteriorating," but refused to say whether additional forces would be needed. "Afghanistan is very vulnerable in terms of (the) Taliban and extremists taking over again, and I don't think that threat's going to go away," he said. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is completing an assessment of what he needs to win the fight there. That review, however, won't specifically address force levels, according to Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
But military officials privately believe McChrystal may ask for as many as 20,000 additional forces to get an increasingly difficult security situation in Afghanistan under control. And one leading Republican is already saying McChrystal will be pressured to ask for fewer troops than he requires. "I think there are great pressures on General McChrystal to reduce those estimates," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., in an interview broadcast Sunday on ABC's "This Week." "I don't think it's necessarily from the president. I think it's from the people around him and others that I think don't want to see a significant increase in our troops' presence there."
Mullen also expressed concern about diminishing support among a war-weary American public as the U.S. and NATO enter their ninth year of combat and reconstruction operations.
In joint TV interviews, Mullen and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry said last week's presidential election in Afghanistan was historic, given the threats of intimidation voters faced as they headed to polling stations. It could be several weeks, however, before it's known whether incumbent Hamid Karzai or one of his challengers won.
Charges of fraud in the election are extensive enough to possibly sway the final result, and the number of allegations is likely to grow, according to the independent Electoral Complaints Commission, the U.N.-backed body investigating the complaints. Obama's strategy for defeating the Taliban and al-Qaida is a work in progress as more U.S. troops are sent there, Mullen said. Three years ago, the U.S. had about 20,000 forces in the country. Today, it has triple that, on the way to 68,000 by year's end when all the extra 17,000 troops that Obama announced in March are in place. An additional 4,000 troops will help train Afghan forces.
Mullen said the security situation in Afghanistan needs to be reversed in the next 12 to 18 months. "I think it is serious and it is deteriorating, and I've said that over the last couple of years, that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated," he said. Just over 50 percent of respondents to a Washington Post-ABC News poll released this past week said the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting.
Mullen, a Vietnam veteran, said he's aware that public support for the war is critical. "Certainly the numbers are of concern," he said. "We're just getting the pieces in place from the president's new strategy on the ground now," he said. "I don't see this as a mission of endless drift. I think we know what to do."
McChrystal's orders from Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were "to go out, assess where you are, and then tell us what you need," Mullen said. "And we'll get to that point. And I want to, I guess, assure you or reassure you that he hasn't asked for any additional troops up until this point in time," he said. Mullen and Eikenberry appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press" and CNN's "State of the Union." Copyright 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. -------- Public Opinion in U.S. Turns Against Afghan War By Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen Washington Post Staff Writers August 20, 2009
A majority of Americans now see the war in Afghanistan as not worth fighting, and just a quarter say more U.S. troops should be sent to the country, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
Most have confidence in the ability of the United States to meet its primary goals of defeating the Taliban, facilitating economic development, and molding an honest and effective Afghan government, but few say Thursday's elections there are likely to produce such a government. When it comes to the baseline question, 42 percent of Americans say the United States is winning in Afghanistan; about as many, 36 percent, say it is losing. The new poll comes amid widespread speculation that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, will request more troops for his stepped-up effort to remove the Taliban from Afghan towns and villages. That position gets the backing of 24 percent of those polled, while nearly twice as many, 45 percent, want to decrease the number of military forces there. (Most of the remainder want to keep the level about the same.)
In January, before President Obama authorized sending an additional 17,000 troops to the country, public sentiment tilted more strongly toward a troop increase. Should Obama embrace his generals' call for even more forces, he would risk alienating some of his staunchest supporters. Although 60 percent of Americans approve of how Obama has handled the situation in Afghanistan, his ratings among liberals have slipped, and majorities of liberals and Democrats alike now, for the first time, solidly oppose the war and are calling for a reduction in troop levels.
Overall, seven in 10 Democrats say the war has not been worth its costs, and fewer than one in five support an increase in troop levels. Republicans (70 percent say it is worth fighting) and conservatives (58 percent) remain the war's strongest backers, and the issue provides a rare point of GOP support for Obama's policies. A narrow majority of conservatives approve of the president's handling of the war (52 percent), as do more than four in 10 Republicans (43 percent).
Among all adults, 51 percent now say the war is not worth fighting, up six percentage points since last month and 10 since March. Less than half, 47 percent, say the war is worth its costs. Those strongly opposed (41 percent) outweigh strong proponents (31 percent). Opposition to the Iraq war reached similar levels in the summer of 2004 and grew further through the 2006 midterm elections, becoming issue No. 1 in many congressional races that year. By the time support for that conflict had fallen below 50 percent, disapproval of President George W. Bush's handling of it had climbed to 55 percent, in contrast to the solid overall approval of the way Obama is dealing with Afghanistan.
But there are warning signs for the president. Among liberals, his rating on handling the war, which he calls one of "necessity," has fallen swiftly, with strong approval dropping by 20 points. Nearly two-thirds of liberals stand against a troop increase, as do about six in 10 Democrats. On the GOP side, views are more evenly distributed, as Republicans divide about equally in support of an increase, a decrease and no change to troop levels. Partisan divisions on the handling of the Afghan war are tempered when it comes to faith in the ability of the United States and its allies to get the job done. Broad majorities across party lines say they are confident that the United States will defeat the Taliban and succeed in spurring economic development. Far fewer, 34 percent, say they think Afghanistan's national election will result in an effective government, with just 3 percent "very confident."
The poll was conducted by telephone Aug. 13-17 among a random national sample of 1,001 adults including users of both conventional and cellular phones. Results from the full survey have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points; it is higher among subgroups. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html?hpid=topnews -------- Afghanistan: The pretend game Shobhan Saxena, TNN 23 August 2009
KABUL: The smell of lamb chops makes him nostalgic. As a little boy, Hamid and his friends used to roam this shady street in the Afghan capital where dozens of stalls sell kebabs and hot chai. Further along, there were the flowers sellers of Gulzar Street. Some of them are still there. The smells awaken Hamid's memories: Russian shells hitting the boundary wall of his bungalow; his parents packing their bags with panic writ large on their faces; the family driving towards the border in the dead of night and life in a hotel in Peshawar. Then Hamid moved to New York and became a successful businessman. Now, he is back in Kabul — like a tourist, he speaks halting Dari.
Kabul has changed from 1979. The trees have disappeared — chopped down by the Russians. The old city still looks like a war zone — bombed houses, broken roads, clogged drains, shattered people. Most of the houses — with a single door, small windows and riddled with bullet holes — appear to perch precariously on a brown mountain, covered with layers of dust.
But Kabul's green zone — Shar-e-Nau — is different. The houses of the rich are hidden behind huge concrete walls with razor wire on top. Steel barricades run across the smooth roads and a ring of blast walls fence in diplomatic buildings. The security guards are armed to the teeth. There is a machine gun on every street corner. Armoured SUVs, blaring rap, zip up and down the tree-lined boulevards.
Hamid is not thinking of this part of the city he left as a child. He has plans for a restaurant in an abandoned building. "Then a mini-mall and, who knows maybe, a bowling alley too. People here have lots of money to splurge," says the man from Queens via Kabul.
In Kabul's Green Zone, there are many like Hamid. Many claim to have great plans for the Afghans. Apart from expat Afghans, they include Western military commanders, aid-workers, development specialists, contractors, diplomats, drug dealers, warlords and politicians. To what avail?
Billions of dollars have been spent but life for ordinary people, barring some progress in education and health, is still as hellish as during the civil war. "The rich here have become super rich and the poor have become beggars," says Dameen, who drives a rental car for a company that charges $50 for four hours.
"They give me $200 per month. A bag of rice costs $40. How are we supposed to live?" On the margins, it seems. In the old city, those who aren't being helped by donor agencies and the local government have turned to crime. Kidnapping is rampant. The elite have their safe houses in Dubai and London. This past week, as election tension gripped Kabul, the rich vanished, boarding flights to Dubai. "All the money coming from abroad is going into their pockets," says Farad, a restaurant manager. "They drink with the Westerners and take their money," says the young Tajik from Ghazni. "The Westerners are using these people to sell their dreams to us."
A UN official who formerly worked for an NGO admits, "All the aid comes with strings attached. All the countries active here, including India, have their own agenda. The welfare of the local people is the last thing on anybody's mind." The official, who is not allowed to leave the UN compound for security reasons, acknowledges that "nobody is going into the field to work with people."
Aamir Hassan, a local journalist who is an active member of South Asian Free Media Association, complains that "everyone is pretending that they are here for us, but they are here for themselves. They are manipulating us."
In the 19th century, Afghanistan was the scene for the Great Game. Today, it may be the setting for the great pretend game that revolves around aid. -------- URLof this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1679
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