SWAT: Not the end of the road

Islam,Terrorism and Jihad

01 Sep 2009, NewAgeIslam.Com

SWAT: Not the end of the road

Extrajudicial killings will set the wrong precedent and further complicate the situation. Killing a militant in action is permissible as he is ready to kill a soldier or a cop, but those taken prisoner or the ones who surrender ought to be dealt with under the laws of the land. Another controversial practice is demolition of the houses of wanted militants. The government and the security forces have now made it a policy to dynamite, bulldoze or put on fire the houses and properties of not only ranking Taliban militants but even Taliban foot soldiers. This policy must be revisited as houses built with hard-earned money are often homes to large families, and which in Pakhtun society are jointly owned by brothers and their children. Blowing up a house to punish a militant in most cases punishes the whole family, including his brothers, parents, the womenfolk and children. -- Rahimullah Yusufzai URL of this page: http://newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1709 -------   SWAT: Not the end of the road Rahimullah Yusufzai August 04, 2009   A number of positive things have happened in Swat and the rest of Malakand division in recent days and weeks. Educational institutions have opened in some, if not all, conflict-hit places, and these include girls' schools which were a favourite target of the rampaging Taliban. Repatriation of displaced people is in full swing to areas that, according to the military, have been cleared of the militants. Certain basic services have been restored to Mingora and Saidu Sharif and some other towns and villages. The police are again visible on the streets and the civil administration is being slowly revived.   However, a lot needs to be done to make the situation normal. Elected representatives, including lawmakers and nazims and other prominent people such as anti-Taliban landlords, have yet to return to their hometowns due to insecurity. Their return would be the yardstick for judging whether the situation is normal or not. The judges too don't feel secure to resume their work in Swat and parts of other districts in Malakand division. Commercial, agricultural and other economic activities will take time to revive, and until then it won't be easy to provide means of livelihood to the affected people. Tourism, once the mainstay of Swat's economy, and marble mining, the major job- and income-generating industry in Buner, will remain a closed chapter in the foreseeable future.   The most intense phase of the military operations has almost ended and now the emphasis is on targeted and quick action against suspected hideouts of the militants and search missions in villages and hamlets. The use of jet fighters and helicopter gunships for destroying and softening up the militants' positions has become infrequent and shelling by artillery guns to target faraway Taliban hideouts is far less than what it was in the initial phase of the action. Matta and Kabal tehsils, and parts of Charbagh and Khwazakhela in Swat, are still not fully cleared of militants, and hence not ready to receive the internally displaced persons. This is also the case in small parts of upper Buner valley, portions of the Maidan tehsil in Lower Dir district and in Puran area in Shangla. In fact, Shangla district's Puran tehsil bordering Buner has become the new sanctuary for militants escaping military action in Swat and Buner.   In keeping with their strategy, the militants are making their presence felt in Shangla by attacking pro-army notables, destroying government installations such as telephone exchanges and schools, and setting up roadside checkpoints to send a message to the community as to who is in control. The example of Shangla, which was overrun by the Taliban in 2007 despite their insignificant presence there, is a classic example of poorly and inadequately governed places becoming sanctuaries for militants fleeing military action elsewhere. This is a pattern that is likely to be repeated in future, not only in the settled districts of the NWFP but also in the tribal belt on the border with Afghanistan. The government will have to strengthen the defences of every vulnerable tehsil and district, not only through deployment of more police and militia and better law-enforcement measures but also by giving the communities a stake in running their affairs, and by prioritising the solution of their problems.   Counter-insurgency operations cannot be a one-time action, and it would be wrong to conclude that the militants, after suffering setbacks in one place, will give up their fight altogether. Instead, they will try to regroup after every encounter, move to places beyond the reach of the army and the government and plan their hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in a manner that terrorises the civilian population and demoralises the law-enforcement and security forces. This is a fight that is unlikely to end any time soon.   Keeping this fact in view, there is a need to consider and review some of the practices that are presently being witnessed in the fight against militants in Swat, the rest of Malakand region and even beyond in the adjoining tribal areas. Though a high-ranking military officer operating in the NWFP denied the involvement of his troops in hanging bodies of slain militants from electricity poles or bridges in Swat and Malakand Agency, the general impression is that this could not have happened without the army's blessings. Eyewitnesses and villagers have reported how bearded militants after being killed were strung up from poles at Utror near Kalam in Swat and at Thana and Batkhela, among other places in Malakand following the military action in these areas. In a few cases, a note was left with the bodies carrying the message that this would be the fate of all Taliban or those fighting the state. In one or two cases, the messages warned that the bodies shouldn't be removed until a specific time, something the Taliban used to do at the peak of their power in Swat. It is like repaying the militants in the same coin.   But the state cannot be expected to behave like the militants, who took the law into their hands and began delivering questionable justice in their own barbaric ways. The army too has to perform its tough and often thankless job as a disciplined force even if the provocative actions of the militants are unbearable and the urge to take revenge is high. In fact, the state and its institutions must follow the law under all circumstances so that it retains the moral right to take action against those violating the law.   Extrajudicial killings will set the wrong precedent and further complicate the situation. Killing a militant in action is permissible as he is ready to kill a soldier or a cop, but those taken prisoner or the ones who surrender ought to be dealt with under the laws of the land. Another controversial practice is demolition of the houses of wanted militants. The government and the security forces have now made it a policy to dynamite, bulldoze or put on fire the houses and properties of not only ranking Taliban militants but even Taliban foot soldiers. This policy must be revisited as houses built with hard-earned money are often homes to large families, and which in Pakhtun society are jointly owned by brothers and their children. Blowing up a house to punish a militant in most cases punishes the whole family, including his brothers, parents, the womenfolk and children.   One has heard stories of extended families being rendered shelterless because one errant son had joined the Taliban. In one case in a village near Matta, a weeping woman and her young children saw their house being demolished because she had no control over her son who became a Talib in the absence of his father working in Saudi Arabia. No doubt the Taliban militants in Swat, Buner and Lower Dir also destroyed the houses and properties of their opponents, most of whom were rich landowners, and dynamited government installations, but the orders to do so came from their commanders, who must be brought to book and punished. There is a tradition of demolishing houses of tribesmen in the tribal areas for anti-state and anti-social activities, but the decision to do so is taken unanimously by jirgas comprising elders and then carried out jointly by lashkars, or armed tribal forces. Extending this practice from the tribal areas, which adhere to peculiar customs and traditions and where the country's police and courts have no jurisdiction, to the districts where Pakistani laws are applicable, isn't the right way of tackling the situation. Also, destroying a militant's house precludes any chances that this person could be reformed. It is like closing the door for him to repent and provoking him to continue on his destructive path.   In such a situation, there is need for steps to promote reconciliation among families that have become entangled in blood feuds. In every village and mohalla, families have become sworn enemies because one sided with the militants and the other threw its lot with the government and the army. There would be no end to revenge killings in presence of such blood feuds. The Swati landlords or those in Buner and the influential politicians should know that killing each and every militant is almost impossible. They cannot possibly return to their villages and live in peace until all the militants and each one of their enemy is eliminated. The way must be opened for those militants to surrender who are reconcilable. The irreconcilable won't surrender and will continue to fight.   But a way must be found to reconcile those willing to repent their past and ready to change course. The fact that so few militants have surrendered is due to the fear that they won't get a fair deal from the security forces and the government, which for obvious reasons is dominated by the rich and the resourceful who suffered at the hands of the Taliban and are in no mood to reconcile with their tormentors. The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahimyusufzai@yahoo.com Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=191276 URL of this page: http://newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1709