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Tuesday, January 9, 2024

Online Radicalism and the Threat of Lone Wolves

By Grace Mubashir, New Age Islam 9 January 2024 The Emergence Of ISIS And The Manipulation Of Online Tools To Spread The Terrorist Ideology Brought To The Fore The Danger Of Lone Wolfism. This Article Studies The Pattern And The Strategies Of Lone Wolfism. ----- Main Points: 1. The recent surge in lone wolf attacks, particularly those inspired by IS, has underscored the increasing danger posed by individuals who adopt radical ideologies and engage in violent actions without detection or intervention. 2. The complexity and diversity among lone wolf terrorists make it difficult to create a singular framework or profile that can be applied universally. 3. The planning conducted by lone wolf terrorists often remains unnoticed until it's too late. 4. Factors such as exposure to extremist materials, influence from spiritual leaders, feelings of alienation, marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, perceptions of Western government misconduct, and the desire to take action all contribute significantly to the radicalization of individuals. ----- Lone wolf terrorism has emerged as a significant trend in modern terrorism, presenting an undetectable and unpredictable threat to Western societies. The appeal and influence of this approach gained traction notably in September 2014 when Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the official spokesperson for the Islamic State (IS), called upon sympathizers and Muslims in Western nations to commit acts of violence against non-believers, particularly Americans, Europeans, Australians, and Canadians. This tactic isn't entirely new. However, the recent surge in lone wolf attacks, particularly those inspired by IS, has underscored the increasing danger posed by individuals who adopt radical ideologies and engage in violent actions without detection or intervention. Notable incidents involving individuals like Man Haron Monis in Australia, Zale Thompson in the U.S., Martin Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau in Canada, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein in Denmark, and Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium have emphasized this growing threat. Consequently, there has been a rise in research focusing on lone wolf terrorism. While there has been an increase in studies shedding light on the ideologies, motivations, behaviours, and pathways leading individuals to embrace lone wolf tactics, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon. Despite efforts, establishing a definitive and typical profile of a lone wolf remains challenging due to the highly individualized nature of each case. The complexity and diversity among lone wolf terrorists make it difficult to create a singular framework or profile that can be applied universally. Who is a Lone Wolf Distinguishing lone wolf terrorists from other terrorist categories like group-based terrorists, home-grown extremists, or Pantucci’s (2011) four types of lone wolves is crucial for pinpointing intelligence and policing gaps that allow these individuals to evade detection. Definitional challenges in accurately discerning differences among terrorist types pose a hurdle in identifying lone wolf terrorism as a distinct phenomenon and understanding the timing and nature of lone wolf attacks. Pantucci’s categorization defines lone wolf terrorism as “individuals pursuing Islamist terrorist goals alone, motivated either by personal reasons or their belief in being part of an ideological group.” This definition shares similarities with others but lacks precision regarding membership or association with terrorist groups. It presumes that the lone wolf is Islamic and suggests the potential for psychological issues driving their belief in belonging to a terrorist organization. For a definition to be effective, it should be precise, without imposing unnecessary limitations or assumptions. Spaaij (2010) offers a more refined definition aimed at isolating lone wolf terrorism. According to Spaaij, a lone wolf terrorist may hold identification or sympathy toward extremist movements or terrorist organizations but ceases to be classified as a lone wolf upon joining an established organization. Spaaij, known for conducting one of the most comprehensive studies on lone wolf terrorism in 2012, provides a practical definition that sets this form of terrorism apart from others. In his definition, lone wolf terrorists are individuals who: (a) operate alone, (b) lack affiliation with an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) conceive and direct their modus operandi independently, without direct external command or hierarchy. This distinction, alongside the broader terrorism definition, clarifies the disparities between group-based terrorists and outlines the actions that qualify as terrorism, specifically identifying when an act is considered lone wolf terrorism. Strategies The strategies employed in lone wolf attacks and those orchestrated by organized extremist groups often share similarities yet yield distinct outcomes. While it proves more challenging for extremist groups to execute successful attacks in Western territories compared to lone wolf terrorists, these groups tend to be more effective in advancing their agenda through terrorist strategies. Kydd and Walter, in their essay "Strategies of Terrorism," assert that "terrorists must delegitimize the regime and impose costs on occupying forces," aligning with the goals pursued by both lone terrorists and extremist groups. Terrorists typically utilize five primary strategies to delegitimize the state or propagate their message. Of these, two are particularly prominent in Western attacks: Attrition And Provocation In an attrition strategy, terrorists aim to convince their adversary that they possess sufficient strength to impose substantial costs if the enemy continues a specific policy. For Islamist extremist terrorism, this might involve targeting 'unbelievers' and 'apostates' in the West, pressuring the government to withdraw from Middle Eastern operations, or imposing penalties on voters, thereby escalating costs for the government and its populace. On the other hand, provocation involves instigating the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which, in turn, radicalizes the population and garners support for the terrorists. The underlying theory is that government crackdowns on perceived dangerous or similar populations to the terrorist attacker could lead to radicalization within the target population, thereby increasing support or sympathy for the extremist cause. Radicalization Suicide bombing Community manipulation ISIS, al Qaeda, and Global Threat of Lone Wolves Terrorist organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda have evolved their tactics to include inspiring lone attacks. They've shifted away from centralized approaches due to struggles for power. Daniel Byman pointed out that when these groups are weak, they tend to encourage lone wolf actions. For instance, in a 2010 issue of Inspire magazine, al Qaeda focused on disseminating 'do-it-yourself' terrorism methods, providing basic instructions on target selection and attack methods. This approach emphasizes the strength of lone wolf attacks compared to the cumbersome, bureaucratic processes of organized extremist groups. Techniques like vehicle ramming require minimal planning and few weapons, making them accessible to individuals without extensive guidance. These types of attacks demand less organization, planning, and funding compared to larger extremist operations, making them easier to carry out and potentially more efficient in causing violence. Propaganda magazines such as Inspire for al Qaeda and Dabiq and Rumiyah for ISIS target potential lone terrorists. These individuals are often vulnerable to the messaging of these groups, especially when focusing on narratives like belonging. While mainstream audiences may witness gruesome videos of brutal acts by these organizations, they also craft narratives portraying a supposed community, fostering a sense of belonging. Easterly and Geltzer suggest that belonging is a powerful draw for recruits, particularly those from Western states. This aspect of ISIS's propaganda tends to resonate with individuals who feel disconnected or alienated from their own communities. The appeal lies in becoming part of something larger than themselves by taking up arms or carrying out violent acts, offering a sense of purpose and community, contrary to feeling alone or isolated. Induction Of Lone Wolves Through Online Tools The present surge in the influence of IS (Islamic State) has raised apprehensions regarding the future generation of terrorists, necessitating further research into all facets of lone wolf terrorism. Lone wolves, as previously defined, operate independently, detached from organized terrorist networks, and are propelled toward violence without external assistance. Spaaij's study in 2012 examined 88 lone terrorists responsible for 198 attacks, delving into five prominent cases. This research provides crucial insights into the ideologies, motivations, and radicalization processes of these individuals. Despite the absence of a universally agreed-upon profile for lone wolf terrorists due to their individuality and rarity, researchers have identified some common characteristics. These include a higher likelihood of facing mental and social challenges, a history of criminal behaviour, a tendency to blend personal frustrations with extremist ideologies and externalize blame onto others, experiences of depression, grievances, personal crises (e.g., job loss, financial issues, stress), familiarity with weapons, and a tendency not to act impulsively. While the ideologies of terrorists and lone wolf terrorists may align, the pathways to radicalization often differ. Typical terrorists commonly undergo radicalization by travelling abroad for training, associating with known terrorist or extremist groups, and procuring weapons or creating explosives before an attack, actions that usually draw attention from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In contrast, the planning conducted by lone wolf terrorists often remains unnoticed until it's too late. Presently, lone wolves primarily seek training online, researching methods to cause harm in the name of their ideology and connecting with like-minded radicals to develop their beliefs and motivations without direct physical contact. The process of lone wolf radicalization is complex and lacks a single defining factor. Typically, it begins when individuals experience frustration with their lives, societal structures, or both foreign and domestic government policies. Precht outlines a common radicalization trajectory where individuals connect with like-minded people and collectively undergo a series of events and phases, potentially culminating in terrorism. Various factors contribute to this process, including social and religious identification, interactions and integration within social circles, experiences in prison, influences from family and friends, socioeconomic status, government policies, personal experiences, criminal backgrounds, globalization, racism, psychological well-being, the internet, and broader global political, cultural, and economic developments. To gain a comprehensive understanding of radicalization, it's crucial to examine each factor and behaviour individually, discerning their roles in the radicalization process Presently, the Internet is considered a significant factor in the radicalization of lone wolves, although opinions on its level of influence vary among researchers. This perception often hinges on specific case studies. Online platforms allow potential lone wolves to connect with like-minded individuals, shaping their beliefs, expressing grievances, and fostering a sense of belonging to a cause. Anders Behring Breivik, for instance, revealed his use of the Internet to gather tactical knowledge from Al-Qaeda and participate in extremist forums, aiding his solo terrorist attack in Oslo. The Internet offers access to endless extremist propaganda and violent ideologies, often evading detection. Factors such as exposure to extremist materials, influence from spiritual leaders, feelings of alienation, marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, perceptions of Western government misconduct, and the desire to take action all contribute significantly to the radicalization of individuals. However, despite extensive research on terrorist radicalization and home-grown terrorism, a comprehensive understanding of lone wolf radicalization remains limited. Prior studies have struggled to differentiate between true lone wolves and individual terrorists with ties to terrorist organizations or networks. While a single-case study may not yield broadly applicable conclusions, it aims to offer valuable insights into the radicalization process of a lone wolf. Conclusion Omar Mateen orchestrated the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil post-9/11 precisely because he acted alone. He operated without connections to suspicious groups that would trigger counterterrorism surveillance, radicalizing in isolation through online exposure. Purchasing weapons legally, he evaded suspicion. His attack drew inspiration but lacked direction from Islamist extremist groups. Its impact, however, didn't resonate on a governmental scale, failing to instigate change or impose significant costs on the state. Lone wolf actors necessitate fewer resources and less organization compared to structured extremist groups, rendering their identification and apprehension more challenging. Their elusive nature makes attacks in high-security Western countries more probable. Radicalization via online propaganda and conspiracy theories, originating from extremist groups, blurs the line for law enforcement between curious bystanders and those actively planning violence. While lone wolf attacks often result in higher casualties, they lack the capacity demonstrated by organized extremist groups, such as the impactful 9/11 attack by al Qaeda, which coerced governments to yield to terrorist demands. Numerous lone wolf incidents in the West have failed to prompt significant shifts in state or international policies, hence posing a less substantial threat to state survival. References Burke, Jason. “The Myth of the ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist.” The Guardian, 30 March 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist Pantucci, R. (2011). A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists. Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, 1-39. Precht, T. (2007). Homegrown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice. Spaaij, R. (2012). Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention. London/New York: Springer. Spaaij, R. (2010). The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 854—870. Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick. “How and Why Vehicle Ramming Became the Attack of Choice for Terrorists.” The Conversation, 29 March 2017. https://theconversation.com/how-andwhy-vehicle-ramming-became-the-attack-of-choice-for-terrorists-75236 ----- A regular columnist for NewAgeIslam.com, Mubashir V.P is a PhD scholar in Islamic Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia and freelance journalist. URL: https://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/online-radicalism-threat-lone-wolves/d/131479 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism

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