New Age Islam Edit Bureau
10 August 2015
Hopes, Fears under New Taliban Leadership
By Muhammad Waqas
Gulf States and Iran’s Diplomacy of ‘Openness’
By Raghida Dergham
The Risk of ISIL Retaliation
By Ömer Taspinar
Turkey’s Fatal Voyage
By Nuray Mert
Whatever Is The Matter With Egypt?
By Hisham Melhem
Hopes, Fears under New Taliban Leadership
By Muhammad Waqas
10 August 2015
The months-long speculation surrounding death of Mullah Omar, supreme commander and spiritual leader of the Taliban, have finally been laid to rest.
In a startling revelation, both the Afghan government and the Taliban have confirmed his death more than two years ago.
An extremely recluse leader, Mullah Omar had not made a public appearance since the fall of his government in Afghanistan in 2001. Yet, it appears that he had a strong influence and authority to run the Taliban movement from his grave. The Taliban have swiftly elected Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, another founding member of the group, as their new leader after Omar’s demise.
The appointment of Mullah Mansoor as the new chief of Taliban has raised new hopes and fears for the Afghan peace process brokered by Pakistan. In the inner circles, he is known to be a relatively moderate leader wishing to promote peace talks with the Afghan government. Therefore, his leadership may augur well to bring peace and stability back to the troubled country. However, only the naive would view the Afghan situation so simplistically. Although Mullah Mansoor had been leading Taliban under the shadow of Omar for past several years, his promotion to the top post has sparked a bitter dispute in the Taliban.
Some factions of the Taliban have opposed his succession as the new leader without a wider consensus of the movement. Further, Tayeb Agha, head of the Taliban’s Qatar-based political office, has also stepped down in protest against the cover up of Mullah Omar’s death terming it “a historical mistake.” The announcement of Mullah Mansoor was marked by some Taliban insurgents with a deadly suicide attack near a police compound. The attack signals a growing sense of insecurity faced by the security forces and civilians in Afghanistan as different splinter groups of the Taliban voice their opposition to the peace process.
The situation is likely to test Mullah Mansoor’s leadership skills and patience of the Afghan government with the Taliban. As the newly elected head of Taliban, Mansoor is faced with the stern task of uniting all groups and establish legitimacy of his command. Realizing the need to overcome splits in the movement, he has appealed for unity within the ranks in his first audio message as their new leader. Hardliner groups oppose the ongoing peace process as an attempt to bring commanders closer to Pakistan to the forefront. Mullah Mansoor, and his new deputies, Haibatullah Akhundzada and Sirajuddin Haqqani, are also known to lean toward Pakistan and push for peace talks. At the same time, the Taliban face challenge of staying relevant in Afghanistan as the Daesh gains ground in the country.
The death of Mullah Omar, believed to be a moderate with a voice of reason, is a potential setback to the Afghan peace process. Given the leadership crisis faced by Taliban after his death, the pace of negotiations could slow down or take a new direction altogether. Although Mullah Mansoor is expected to pursue the peace process, it is possible that he may have to make some compromises to bring all Taliban blocs on the same table and present a new set of conditions to the Afghan government.
This will certainly put pressure on the Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani to take a firm stance in dealing with the Taliban.
http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/788981
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Gulf States and Iran’s Diplomacy of ‘Openness’
By Raghida Dergham
9 August 2015
There have been interesting developments this week in U.S.-Russian relations with the Gulf states, Egypt, and Turkey – and also interesting developments in the political discourse of both Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The strategic dialogue between the United States and Egypt resumed earlier this week, for the first time since 2009, tackling the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations. The relations had become tense following the Muslim Brotherhood rise to power in Cairo. The talks also tackled Egypt’s regional role in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.
The declaration by the GCC as spoken by Qatar’s Foreign Minister Khalid Al-Attiyah welcoming the deal with Iran is a notable development that helps Obama’s administration, which needs such stances on the eve of the deliberations over the deal in Congress.
This is also happening in conjunction with an agreement to resume strategic dialogue between the United States and the GCC, which started in Camp David two months earlier. The next session of the dialogue will take place in New York next month.
The U.S.-Russian partnership represented by Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov brought a new initiative to the GCC for political and diplomatic efforts in the Arab region, launched in the wake of the nuclear deal with Tehran. The details of the American and Russian attitudes on regional issues did not yet amount to a radical shift, whether vis-à-vis Syria or vis-à-vis the Iranian role there. In truth, the tripartite meeting bringing together Kerry, Lavrov, and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir reflected Washington and Moscow’s desire to reassure Riyadh that the sprint towards Tehran does not mean a split with Riyadh or the reduction of the Arab regional weight in favor of Iran.
The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is also trying to reassure the Gulf through his “broad smile” diplomacy. Zarif wrote an article in Al-Safir, titled “Neighbors before the house”, in which he called for looking for ways to help all regional countries to uproot the causes of tension and the absence of trust. The Qatari foreign minister responded by calling for a serious and constructive dialogue with “our Iranian neighbors”, including discussing what he said was Iranian interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf countries and Tehran’s continued support for President Bashar al-Assad.
There is a flurry of diplomatic and political activities coinciding with a campaign to market the Iranian nuclear deal. There are also economic and intelligence activities involving the United States, Russia, and Europe in the direction of Iran and the GCC, part of which to market arms and part of it to secure a place in the reconstruction of the countries ravaged by this decade’s mysterious and odd wars.
Zarif’s statements were seen as “amusing” in the words of a one Gulf figure. “He is far from decision-making positions in Tehran and very far from the Iranian revolution and only speaks for himself as a pro-Western liberal.”
According to the Gulf interpretation of Zarif’s editorial, Zarif’s statements are inconsistent with Iran’s actions and come in an inappropriate timing, immediately in the aftermath of Iranian meddling in Bahrain. According to the Gulf source, Kuwait and Qatar told Zarif during his visit to their capitals in the wake of the nuclear deal that they were waiting for proof from Tehran that it really wants good neighbourliness and that it is no longer seeking to export the Iranian revolution.
It would be good if the Iranian foreign minister can prove Iran’s newfound moderate streak is real with a crucial decision from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, this decision is probably above the pay grade of Minister Zarif, and it is also likely the Supreme Leader is not in the process of dispensing of the Revolutionary Guards and their regional ambitions.
Good-Cop-Bad-Cop
The good-cop-bad-cop game will continue for the time being until strategic decisions are made regarding the future of the Islamic Republic. This period of time requires giving moderate forces represented by President Hassan Rouhani and the foreign minister room to send messages of reassurance, because the opposite would end up undermining the nuclear deal, especially as it is currently under close international scrutiny before it comes into force and the sanctions are lifted.
The verbal escalation increased this week from U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and his British counterpart Philip Hammond against Tehran. The two men criticized Iran for its support of terrorism with a view to impose its regional influence. However, this is just verbal escalation and is not an annex of the nuclear deal, which today dominates U.S. and British priorities.
The American, British, German, and French diplomacies may be truly convinced that Iran’s rejoining the international community would force it into moderation and would curb the hardliners who want to export the Iranian revolution and impose religion on the state. However, these nations have decided in advance not to use any of the pressure cards they have to influence Tehran’s policies and regional roles, out of keenness for the conclusion of what they see as a historical nuclear deal. Hence, their policies vis-à-vis Iran’s regional ambitions are based on wishful thinking not as a result of secret understandings with Tehran as part of the deal.
Part of the implications is acknowledging Iran as a regional player and lending legitimacy to its regional roles, particularly in the Arab countries where Iran is involved led by Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. But another implication of the deal is that Turkey is now pushing to reformulate its policy to guarantee itself a strong position before this is made impossible by the new Iranian role as drawn and approved by the major powers.
Jawad Zarif tried to address both issues - the momentum of the deal and the implications. In his editorial, he said that Iran, despite living in “security and stability”, cannot stand idly by vis-à-vis the huge devastation in its periphery. He wrote, “Experience tells us that chaos and unrest know no boundaries, and it is not possible to guarantee the security of any country in a tumultuous climate in a globalizing world.”
This is an important position that the Iranian minister must communicate to other Arab capitals, including Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, to prove Tehran’s determination to shrink its role, which has fuelled chaos and unrest across the border, because it believes that this is no longer in its interest. The continuation of the classical Iranian role in Syria will be at the expense of the new Iran, because it will draw it further into a quagmire that it helped turn into a wasteland, a humanitarian crisis, and a magnet for terrorism which now justifies Iranian-Western partnership to crush it.
The mechanisms for uprooting tension and the mistrust between the countries of the region are available to Tehran as well as Riyadh, Ankara, and Doha. The litmus test is Syria, where none of these players is innocent, just like Moscow, Washington, London, and Damascus are not either. The roadmap and its mechanisms is now plain for all to see, and any delay in taking Syria towards a new phase away from perdition remains a black stain on the consciences of all those involved.
Defeating ISIS in Syria will not happen if Tehran and Moscow cling on to Bashar al-Assad. For this reason, there is talk that Russia and Iran are less intransigent about Assad’s role in the new political configuration in Syria. This configuration does not adopt the Geneva 1 and Geneva 2 call for a transitional political process through a governing body with full powers, but proceeds from a starting point where the regime in Syria remains in power with Assad being gradually phased out. It seems that the multilateral talks that took place this week addressed scenarios for regional understandings on new foundations, but have yet to negotiate over mechanisms of implementation.
Another important thing that Mohammad Javad Zarif said was that “we must all accept the truth that the time of futile gambits is over, and that we all are either winners together or losers together, because sustainable security cannot be achieved by undermining the security of others.”
Zarif chose Yemen to be a “good model” for serious talks to start. This comes on the heels of military gains made by the Arab coalition and an American move towards the Gulf with a message to Riyadh that Washington understands Saudi’s priorities and intends to tell Tehran: stop your meddling in Yemen.
Nevertheless, it would be extremely worthwhile for Yemen to become a model for understandings between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yemen is completely different from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, because Yemen falls in the Saudi backyard. Iran is fully aware of this and knows what it must do if it wants to reassure its neighbors.
Tehran can demonstrate its good intentions in Iraq, where both the Iranian and Arab interests require working together on clear non-sectarian bases to crush ISIS. They must build trust through a conscious government that represents all popular segments in Iraq – be they sectarian or ethnic. There can be no way to defeat ISIS through Shiite militias without active participation from Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and its tribes.
In Syria and in Lebanon, Tehran knows clearly what the roadmap to good neighbourliness is. What needs to be done is not to restructure old initiatives and give them new titles, while Iranian actions follow the same usual patterns. What is needed is serious and honest actions that pull Yemen and Syria back from the disaster and protect Lebanon from coming ones.
For their part, the Gulf nations know what they must do to bring about the desired shift in Arab-Iranian relations. It is not enough for them to believe that the doubts and concerns of the GCC are placing pressure on Tehran and that Iran’s desperate need for international acceptance will force it to rein in the Revolutionary Guards or Hezbollah.
How the Gulf Can Benefit
It is the duty of the Gulf nations to benefit from and influence Iran’s openness diplomacy. The foreign minister of Qatar has done well to welcome the nuclear deal and call for serious dialogue with Iran.
The choice of Doha to hold the bilateral and trilateral meetings between Kerry, Lavrov, and the GCC foreign ministers is noteworthy. Indeed, Qatar has been accused of playing roles opposed by both Washington and Moscow, especially in the context of supporting extremist groups.
Accordingly, the shift that took place between Washington and Ankara last week converges with the U.S.-Russian shift with Qatar this week, and both converge in the direction of the Turkish-Qatari cooperation in the war on ISIS and closing the book on their alleged – denied by Turkey and Qatar – support for extremist groups in Syria.
These signs of a breakthrough require more than ever from the Gulf countries to develop a strategy of openness to meet the Iranian openness and encourage the U.S.-Russian efforts to reassure the GCC countries. It does not suffice for them to accept, refuse, express reservation, accuse or voice skepticism. The current phase requires the GCC countries to plan their next steps in a smart and pragmatic way. This is indeed possible if there is will.
Raghida Dergham is Columnist and Senior Diplomatic Correspondent for the London-based Al Hayat, the leading independent Arabic daily, since 1989. She writes a regular weekly strategic column on International Political Affairs. Dergham is also a Political Analyst for NBC, MSNBC and the Arab satellite LBC. She is a Contributing Editor for LA Times Syndicate Global Viewpoint and has contributed to: The New York Times, The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune and Newsweek Magazine. She serves on the Board of the International Women's Media Foundation, and has served on the Advisory Council of Princeton University's Institute for Transregional Studies of the contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. She was also a member of the Women's Foreign Policy Group. She addressed U.N. General Assembly on the World Press Freedom Day when President of The United Nations Correspondents Association for 1997 and was appointed to the Task Force on the Reorientation of Public Information by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. She moderated a roundtable of 8 Presidents and Prime Ministers for UNCTAD at Bangkok in 1991. Dergham served as Chairman of the Dag Hammarskjold Fund Board in 2005.
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/08/09/Gulf-states-and-Iran-s-diplomacy-of-openness-.html
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The Risk of ISIL Retaliation (1)
By Ömer Taspinar
August 09, 2015
Given the understandable focus on Turkey's renewed war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) it is easy to forget that the country is supposedly also at war against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). I say "supposedly" because the quasi-totality of Turkish air strikes have so far exclusively targeted PKK targets and refrained from attacking ISIL. This is about to change in the coming days. Turkey's active participation with its own jets in the anti-ISIL military campaign required a period of tactical and operational coordination with allies. Thanks to such coordination in the last 10 days and with the active use of the Turkish bases such as Incirlik, the Turkish Air Force will very soon become an active member of the coalition forces striking ISIL targets.
If Ankara steps up its anti-ISIL military campaign, as it is expected to do so in the next few days, the international and domestic criticism of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will no longer be able to argue that Turkey is using the war against ISIL as a pretext to fight the PKK. This will be a potentially positive development for Turkey and the AKP government because Turkey's war against ISIL has so far suffered from a credibility gap, stemming from the fact that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used the Suruç bomb tragedy and its aftermath to launch a war against the PKK rather than seriously targeting ISIL.
This credibility gap was exacerbated by the perception that in the fight against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Ankara has thrown its lot in with the al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Although there have been rumours of Turkish support for ISIL, Ankara has not directly provided assistance to ISIL but has turned a blind eye and not done much to stop cross-border support. The international perception is that Turkey has been notoriously lax on border security, allowing many thousands of foreign recruits to cross from Turkey into Syria. All this will change when Turkey actively and visibly takes part in airstrikes against ISIL from its own bases.
On the other hand, finally getting serious about ISIL and targeting its forces in Syria and Iraq comes with serious risks for the AKP government. The most serious risk would also be the most obvious: retaliation from ISIL. It was this risk that led me to write that Turkey would be reluctant to join the anti-ISIL campaign despite the incident in Suruç. I was proven wrong after Turkey opened Incirlik Air Base and is now becoming more active in the fight against ISIL.
I hope I will also be wrong about the risk of retaliation, but recent statements from ISIL are not encouraging. ISIL sources have warned Turkey that it would be very easy to destabilize the country with a few bombs placed in urban and touristic areas. One ISIL source has even stated that it would be easier to target Turkey than to target Tunisia.
Imagine such a disastrous scenario of ISIL retaliating with attacks in Istanbul or Bodrum. One can argue that the war with the PKK has served Erdogan's interests well. It put the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in a difficult position, made coalition talks with the Republican People's Party (CHP) more difficult, and reduced the appeal of the anti-Kurdish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). But the war against ISIL and potential retaliation would not only be a disaster for the AKP but also for the Turkish economy.
Unlike retaliatory attacks by the PKK, which target mainly soldiers and police, retaliation from ISIL would target civilians. In short, retaliation from the PKK would help Erdogan, but serious retaliation from ISIL would have the opposite effect.
Think about precedents in Tunisia, where ISIL attacked centres of tourism. Such a scenario would no doubt alter Erdogan's domestic political calculations for a potential AKP victory in early elections. The very hot Turkish summer is likely to get hotter. As we will discuss next, how Turkey might react to retaliation from ISIL will be crucial.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/omer-taspinar/the-risk-of-isil-retaliation-1_396073.html
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Turkey’s Fatal Voyage
By Nuray Mert
August/10/2015
An Islamist newspaper (Dirilis Postasi-Resurrection Post) warns that Turkey should not attack the al-Nusra Front in northern Syria, adding that Turkey should also discourage the United States from doing the same. It explains why: It is al-Nusra that is “doing a favor to Turkey” by withdrawing and giving space to other supposedly more moderate organizations. The next gesture may be that the al-Nusra Front could free the Free Syrian Army soldiers who were captured during an al-Nusra attack on coalition-trained troops. As such, al-Nusra (which is listed as a terrorist organization) should not be provoked, the paper suggests. No matter that al-Nusra is categorized as a radical Islamist terrorist organization and attacked and killed coalition-trained soldiers just a short while ago!
No, it is no marginal Islamist paper; on the contrary, it reflects the Islamist government’s views, so much so that it is on the shopping list of Turkish Airlines and can be picked up for free in airports and on planes. More mainstream pro-Islamic newspapers imply more or less the same message, while also not refraining from war cries against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).
It seems that there is no worry that armed operations against the PKK and attacks against the HDP might run the risk of provoking a civil war in Turkey. The government dismisses all calls for a ceasefire as “playing into the hands of the PKK” and, moreover, refuses to engage in any dialogue with the Kurdish HDP in parliament since the HDP has been stripped of its democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the government and its supporters. Apart from the calls initiated by the president for judicial action against HDP politicians in parliament, many minor party members are now being detained on accusations that they are linked with the PKK. It means that al-Nusra is less a threat and more an agreeable interlocutor than not only the PKK but also the HDP in the eyes of government circles.
As for the president and his party’s plan to overcome the government’s crises, it is to go to an “early election,” whose theme will be “the war on PKK terror.” Everybody knows that the HDP has some links with the PKK and that it is supported by PKK supporters. Nonetheless, the HDP got 13 percent votes in the June 7 election, which is beyond PKKsupport in the Kurdish region.
Besides, everybody knows that the most unforgivable crime of the HDP was its refusal of the “presidential system.” The government’s real problem with the HDP seems to be the HDP’s growing democratic support and its success in the democratic field. Otherwise, the government was happy to talk to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on a peace plan and still some government politicians and supporters are flattering Öcalan for his supposed criticism of the HDP. Yalçin Akdogan, vice president of the AKP, only recently claimed that “given the chance, Öcalan would chase HDP politicians with a stick.” After all, the AKP seems to have no problem with “stick politics” – be it Öcalan’s stick or theirs.
The core of the problem with Kurds is a highly desired “deal with Kurds on the presidential system,” and it will not be settled until Kurds are forced to agree. In fact, it is not only the core of the problem with the Kurds; it appears that the president and his government will not agree with anyone on anything other than changing the political system. Moreover, it seems that they will not need to agree with anyone on anything if they manage to change the system.
Theirs is fatal attraction and ours is a fatal voyage into a nightmare.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-fatal-voyage.aspx?pageID=449&nID=86677&NewsCatID=406
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Whatever Is The Matter With Egypt?
By Hisham Melhem
9 August 2015
‘Whatever happened to Egypt’? The American official exclaiming in dismay at Egypt’s stunning diminishing regional role in recent years. He was lamenting what he termed Egypt’s retrenchment from its previous status as the Arab world’s political powerhouse that exercised regional leadership, influencing and shaping events and mediating conflicts. Egypt’s role in those bygone years as a regional influential was supplemented by what we can call now a huge reservoir of ‘soft power’. Egypt’s intellectuals, novelists, musicians and artists created pioneering and experimental works in fiction, and theatre, edgy cinema and re-invigorated classic Arabic music by creatively incorporating western instruments and styles. Cairo inspired and Alexandria enchanted generations of Arabs in modern times.
The lament came in the context of a conversation about the utter failure of Arab states and societies to extinguish the fires of civil wars and sectarian strife that threatens the very being of some states like Syria and Iraq, and the growing, and at times suffocating influences of regional powers like Iran and Turkey in shaping and maybe determining the future of these majority Arab states. For generations Egypt was a political and cultural power to be reckoned with in the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula, in addition to its immediate African environment. But today Egypt is not in the same league as Israel, Turkey and Iran. Egypt can barely shield itself from the chaos of Libya, and unable to influence Gaza on its border except by shutting the crossings. Under Mubarak, Egypt was stagnant. Since his political demise, Egypt has been a drift.
Cultural Sacrilege
The vibrant cultural and artistic life of Egypt between the two World Wars began to shrivel during the autocratic reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser beginning in the 1950’s until his death in 1970. The decline continued under Anwar Sadat, and reached a state of stagnation during the long aimless years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. The signs of decline, even decadence were everywhere. The case of Nasr Abu Zayd is telling. This academic’s modern interpretation of the Qur'an created a storm of protests among the ultra-conservative Muslims, culminating in an absurd court ruling against him as an apostate. What followed is the stuff of skewed surrealism. And since under Sharia law a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim, and since Abu Zayd has been stripped of his religion, a court declared in 1995 the marriage of Abu Zayd and Ibtihal Younis null and void.
The decision forced Abu Zayd to seek refuge in the Netherlands. The case against Abu Zayd was part of an assault on liberal and secular intellectuals, professors and journalists waged by radical Islamists. It took an act of violence against the Egyptian icon Naguib Mahfouz winner of the 1988 Nobel Prize for Literature to show the depth of depravity some radical Islamists are willing to go to. During the controversy over Salman Rushdie’s novel the Satanic Verses, Islamist extremists remembered that some of Mahfouz’s novels such as Children of Gebelawi were considered blasphemous, and dispatched two young men to kill the 82 year old author. They almost succeeded. That assassination attempt was rich with symbolism. By knifing Mahfouz, the Islamist extremists were stabbing the modernity and liberalism that he embodied. That single act of cultural sacrilege was an indictment of the whole Mubarak era.
Living In Denial
Watching Iran and Turkey throwing their weight around, Egypt is reduced to complaining and chafing. The country is surviving economically only because of the kindness of outsiders. And although Egypt is no longer the cultural gift to the Arabs, boasting mediocre universities, unreadable newspapers, and outrageous television programs, still its political and intellectual leaders continue to live in denial of their predicament. Egypt’s political leaders, still speak as if their country is entitled to be treated with the deference reserved for pivotal, powerful ancient cultures. In this skewed Egyptian view of reality, Egypt is ‘entitled’ to Arab largess, because the Arab Gulf states need Egypt to balance Iran and Turkey. Egypt is ‘entitled’ to U.S. economic and military aid because of the peace treaty with Israel and because Egypt is supposedly important for America’s strategic interests in the Middle East. The bitter reality many Egyptians find it impossible to admit, is that a country that is not in full control of its own territory cannot aspire to play a regional role. Forty two years ago the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal and breached the supposedly impenetrable Bar Lev line and battled the Israeli Army occupying Saini. Today the Egyptian Army is engaged in battles in Sanai, but the enemy is a viscous home grown Islamist Insurgency.
A Badly Needed Celebration…
Last week, amid great deal of pump and ceremony and hyper nationalism Egypt celebrated the opening of what they called a ‘new Suez Canal’, which was in fact a parallel channel running one third the length of the Canal. It was an impressive engineering feat achieved and paid for by Egyptians, even though many economists doubted that it will live up to the official hype that it will double the annual revenues in few years . President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi used hyperbole called it ‘an additional artery of prosperity for the world’. But the Sisi government, after two years in power over a divided country, battling a growing insurgency with greater brute force, and not meeting the minimal expectations of millions of disenfranchised Egyptians, needed the celebration and its political and symbolic importance. That’s what prompted Sisi to say ‘Egyptians needed to confirm to themselves and to the world that they still can’.
And A Bloody Day
But the celebrations came few days after scores of extremist Islamists and soldiers were killed in fierce fighting in Northern Sinai. It was another ugly reminder that the Sinai Province, formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a local terrorist group that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) and other extremist Islamists will not end any time soon, and that it will likely increase in ferocity. Rarely a day passes by without casualties. Few months ago the casualties were in single digits; today they are in double digits. Egypt’s low intensity civil strife can only get worse in the absence of a major shift in the counterinsurgency strategy of the Sisi government which is solely based on the application of brute military force, instead of a multipronged approach that includes political and economic incentives to a large alienated block of Egyptians. Brian Katulis and Mokhtar Awad, Two astute observers of Egypt summarized Egypt’s dilemma thus: ’Radical Islamist groups are taking root in a toxic environment of incitement by the brotherhood and its radical Salafist allies. The spectrum of the opposition’s zero-sum politics on one end and regime repression on the other has hindered possibilities for national reconciliation’.
A Strategic Dialogue with a Difficult Friend
Last week’s resumption of the strategic dialogue between Egypt and the United States, which was accompanied by the arrival of eight American made F-16s, and the visit by Secretary of State John Kelly and his meeting with President Sisi is a clear indication that the Obama administration, after dithering for a long time, has decided not to let its concerns with the poor state of human rights in Egypt stand in the way of resuming full military cooperation with the Sisi government. The U.S. also agreed to resume the ‘Bright Star’ military manoeuvres with the Egyptian armed forces, which were suspended in 2013 following Sisi’s overthrow of the Mursi government. It is ironic that American officials believe that the Egyptians don’t need F-16s or other conventional expensive weapon systems to combat terrorism in Sinai, just as they don’t believe that large military manoeuvres to deter conventional threats are warranted, but nonetheless, they are reluctantly trying to slowly convince a ‘prestige army’ to overcome its obsession with competing with the Israeli forces for big military systems.
Secretary Kerry, delivered the obligatory and pro-forma statement about America’s concerns about violations of human rights of peaceful activists and journalists, and the overall smothering of what’s left of political life in Egypt. Kerry’s visit to Cairo came in the context of growing conviction in Washington that not engaging President Sisi, while simultaneously pushing him on human rights, runs the risk of allowing Egypt to drift further towards greater civil strife. Already, some American officials say that Sisi’s counter terror strategy in Sinai is failing and that it will drive Egypt towards greater disorder.
One of the reasons, conditions in the Arab East are so troubling is the marginalization of Egypt in recent decades. It will take Egypt many years to regain its previous regional leadership role, at least in the political/security domain, and the first step is to defeat the terror networks by pursuing a comprehensive strategy against extremists that balances the security requirements and Human rights imperatives. Conditions in the region have changed radically in the last few years, and Egypt’s return to its old unique position in the Middle East may not be possible. Certainly it will not be possible as long as the Egyptian decision makers and opinion makers continue to live in denial of their predicament. They have to collectively and critically ask themselves: What is the matter with Egypt?
Hisham Melhem is the bureau chief of Al Arabiya News Channel in Washington, DC. Melhem has interviewed many American and international public figures, including Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, among others. Melhem speaks regularly at college campuses, think tanks and interest groups on U.S.-Arab relations, political Islam, intra-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli issues, media in the Arab World, Arab images in American media , U.S. public policies and other related topics. He is also the correspondent for Annahar, the leading Lebanese daily. For four years he hosted "Across the Ocean," a weekly current affairs program on U.S.-Arab relations for Al Arabiya.
english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/08/09/What-is-the-matter-with-Egypt-.html
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