Why Meaning and Implementation Are Inseparable

By V.A. Mohamad Ashrof, New Age Islam 13 October 2025 Naseer Ahmed's article, “The Enduring Quest for Meaning — or the Refusal to Accept Clarity” presents a critique of contemporary hermeneutical approaches to the Quran, particularly regarding the Muhkamat (clear verses). Ahmed posits a rigid distinction between divine meaning, which he asserts is fixed and unambiguous, and human implementation, which he allows for flexibility. He argues that the "quest for deeper meaning" is often a "refusal to accept clarity," implying a form of intellectual rebellion or distortion of the divine message. This rejoinder contends that Ahmed's framework fundamentally misunderstands the nature of hermeneutics, the complexities inherent in language, and the rich tradition of Islamic scholarship that has, for centuries, engaged in nuanced interpretation of the sacred text. Far from being a refusal of clarity, the "enduring quest for meaning" is a profound and necessary commitment to accessing the multi-layered depth that divine revelation inherently possesses, ensuring its perpetual relevance and transformative power across diverse human contexts. A False and Unworkable Dichotomy Ahmed's central thesis rests on the assertion that meaning (معنى, maʿna) is divine, fixed, and unequivocal, while implementation (تطبيق, tatbiq) is human and therefore allows for flexibility. He argues that attempts to interpret the Muhkamat beyond their "plain meaning" conflate these two distinct realms, thereby distorting the Quran's clear messages. However, this bifurcation is, in practice, theoretically incoherent and jurisprudentially unsustainable. The meaning of a text, particularly a sacred one intended for guidance and action, is not a static dictionary definition. It is, rather, the intended function, scope, purpose (maqṣad), and ethical implication of that text within the divine system. How can one possibly implement a verse without first interpreting its scope, conditions, and purpose? The very act of applying a divine principle necessitates an understanding of what is being applied, to whom, under what circumstances, and for what ultimate aim. This discernment process is, by definition, interpretive. The Quran itself invites such intellectual engagement. Verses like Q. 4:82, "Do they not consider the Quran?" and Q. 47:24, "Will they not ponder the Quran, or are there locks upon their hearts?" enjoin Tadabbur (deep consideration, reflection, contemplation). Tadabbur is an act of going beyond the mere surface-level signification to grasp the underlying wisdom, ethical implications, and broader applicability. This is the antithesis of passively accepting a static "plain meaning"; it is an active, dynamic engagement with the text's potential for meaning. The Khawarij Incident Ahmed cites the episode of ʿAli ibn Abi Talib and the Khawarij (originally cited by me in this discussion) to support his claim, arguing that ʿAli merely corrected their implementation of the verse, "Inna Al-Ḥukm Li-Llah" (All rule belongs to God). However, Ahmed fundamentally misreads the hermeneutical import of this pivotal historical event. The Khawarij's slogan is indeed a Muhkam phrase—clear in its grammar and vocabulary. Yet, ʿAli’s famous retort, "A true phrase with a false purpose" (Kalimat Ḥaqq Urida Biha Baṭil), is the strongest possible evidence against Naive Literalism and in favour of necessary interpretation. • Context of the Khawarij: The Khawarij interpreted "All rule belongs to God" to mean that any form of human arbitration or leadership, including ʿAli's, was illegitimate and a rejection of divine sovereignty. Their error was not just a practical misapplication but a fundamental interpretive distortion of the scope of divine sovereignty in a human political context. They took a universally true theological statement and applied it with a narrow, exclusionary, and politically destructive literalism. • ʿAli's Response as Ta'wil: ʿAli was engaged in Ta'wil—the act of discerning the text's ultimate end and avoiding its misuse. He corrected not merely an implementation error (Ijtihad in its narrow sense of applying a fixed rule), but a fundamental interpretive error regarding the conceptual boundaries of divine command and human agency. He demonstrated that even the clearest phrase (Dhalalah Qaṭ'iyah - definitive in its indication) requires contextual interpretation (Ta'wil) to prevent distortion and ensure fidelity to the broader spirit and purpose of the Divine Law. • Meaning Emerges from Context: The incident vividly illustrates that textual clarity does not equate to finality of understanding. The linguistic perspicuity of the phrase did not prevent its abuse. Meaning is continually rediscovered and refined in dynamic circumstances. To claim fixed meaning but variable implementation ignores that human comprehension of the "fixed" is always mediated through implementation itself. The very act of determining what a verse commands—as opposed to what it permits, counsels, or contextually exemplifies—requires interpretive judgment. The historical practice of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his companions further undermines Ahmed's rigid separation. The Prophet's Sunnah itself demonstrates how divine commands, clear in their wording, allowed for dynamic understanding and application based on circumstance. • Prayer during the Battle of the Ditch (al-Ahzab): During the intense siege, some companions delayed their prayers past their prescribed times due to the exigencies of battle. Others performed them immediately. When this was brought to the Prophet, he did not condemn either group but affirmed both, saying, "You are all right." (Bukhari 946). This demonstrates that even a Muhkam command like prayer times, seemingly unambiguous, permitted different interpretations of its application in extreme circumstances, where the meaning of obedience itself became contingent on context. • Hudaybiyyah Treaty: The Prophet's decision at Hudaybiyyah to accept terms that initially appeared unfavourable to Muslims was not mere application; it was a contextual reading of Quranic imperatives for peace over immediate conquest (cf. Q.48:1). This was a profound act of Ijtihad intertwined with Ta'wil, where the understanding of divine will shifted based on a broader strategic and ethical vision. • Tayammum (Dry Ablution): Q. 5:6 permits tayammum as an "implementation" of purification. However, its "meaning" evolves with the context (e.g., water scarcity, illness). The very act of determining when one is "ill" or when water is "unavailable" requires interpretive judgment, a clear instance where meaning adapts via human insight, not divine fixity alone. These examples underscore that human comprehension of divine commands is not a passive reception but an active, mediated process. The Prophet's companions, facing diverse challenges, continually engaged in Ijtihad to adapt teachings to their circumstances. This practice exemplifies a dynamic interaction between divine guidance and human agency, reinforcing that implementation can and should evolve, and this evolution is inextricable from the ongoing quest for meaning. Rigidity vs. Flexibility Ahmed critiques what he perceives as a "false dilemma" in arguing for flexibility in the application of Quranic principles, claiming that preserving clarity does not require rigidity. He then paradoxically offers verses governing moderation and charitable spending as evidence, inadvertently supporting the very concept of semantic flexibility he seeks to refute. Ahmed cites verses such as Q. 2:215 ("They ask thee what they should spend. Say: Whatever you spend of good (Maruf)..."), Q. 2:241 ("...and for divorced women, maintenance on a reasonable (bil-maʿruf) scale"), and Q. 65:7 ("Let the man of means spend according to his means, and the man whose resources are restricted, let him spend according to what Allah has given him."). He concedes that "'Reasonable' thus needs no juristic definition—it is a moving standard, varying with income, station, and context." • The Power of Maʿruf: This concession is precisely the argument for semantic flexibility. The word Maʿruf (reasonable, customary, good) is itself a semantically flexible operative term in the Quran. Its meaning is not fixed but is defined by the very socioeconomic and cultural context in which it is applied. What is considered "reasonable" or "good" in 7th-century Arabia differs significantly from 21st-century urban centres. • Ijtihad to Define Semantic Content: The Muhkam principle is indeed Moderation, Justice, and Benevolence. However, the Muhkam term (Maʿruf) carries an inherent semantic capacity to absorb and mandate diverse outcomes. This requires the continuous Ijtihad of the jurist and scholar to fill the textual term with the proper contextual meaning. This process of filling a term with its proper context-driven content is, by definition, hermeneutics (Ta'wil), not mere implementation. As classical scholars like Al-Shafi'i elucidated in his Risala, maʿruf is a term whose specific content is largely determined by prevailing custom and reason, subject to interpretive discretion. • The Anecdote of John and Max: Ahmed's anecdote about John, the billionaire's son, and Max, the middle-class father, precisely confirms this thesis. He highlights that what constitutes "waste" or "reasonable spending" varies significantly across different contexts and means. This is not just about "implementing" a fixed rule; it is about interpreting what the fixed rule of moderation means for John and Max respectively. If "reasonable" shifts, so does its semantic application. This process is not a "false dilemma"; it is the natural consequence of applying universal moral principles to diverse human realities. Without this interpretive flexibility, Quranic values would be rendered impractical or unjust in varying circumstances. • The Relativity of Kufr: Ahmed's argument regarding kufr (disbelief) further undermines his rigid stance. He argues that kufr for an ignorant polytheist might be seen as "deviation from reason" rather than an "unforgivable sin," implying a relative understanding of sin contingent on knowledge and conviction. If the meaning of kufr itself is contingent on context and knowledge, then the very concept of "fixed, unambiguous meaning" that Ahmed champions becomes inconsistent, demanding an interpretive lens beyond simple literalism. The Quran's moral and ethical teachings are indeed clear in their essence, but they are often context-dependent in their detailed application. This necessitates a flexible approach to implementation, which stems from a deeper interpretive engagement with the text. The concept of Maqaṣid al-Shariah (higher objectives of Islamic law)—justice, mercy, welfare, wisdom—developed by scholars like Al-Shatibi, demonstrates that the law's ultimate goals necessitate contextual interpretation, not rigid literalism. The "clarity" of the Muhkamat, therefore, lies in their foundational ethical direction, not in every mutable socio-legal detail. To deny this interpretive labour is to reduce the Quran's dynamic wisdom to a static set of pronouncements, suffocating its capacity to speak to the evolving human condition. The Fallacy of "Plain Meaning" Ahmed argues that if "plain meaning" is a fallacy, then all meaning is, and that this undermines the very premise of communication, implying that such a position renders God incapable of speaking clearly or humans incapable of understanding. This argument, however, misrepresents the critique of "plain meaning" and constructs a straw man. No sophisticated hermeneutic, Islamic or otherwise, suggests that words lack all meaning or that communication is impossible. The critique is directed at naive literalism—the assumption that a text's initial, surface-level signification exhausts its total meaning and relevance for all time, and that this surface meaning is universally self-evident without any contextual or interpretive mediation. Language, especially divine language rich in rhetorical depth (balagha), operates on multiple levels. Semantic fields, idiomatic expressions, historical context, and intertextual relationships all contribute to the full meaning of a word or phrase. • Polysemy in Arabic: Classical Arabic linguistics, as exemplified by scholars like Sibawayh in Al-Kitab, demonstrates that many Arabic words are inherently polysemous, carrying multiple related meanings that are disambiguated by context. For instance, the word Salat (صلاة) can mean ritual prayer, supplication, blessing, or even a place of worship, with its specific meaning determined by the surrounding text and situation. To reduce such terms to a singular "plain meaning" without acknowledging their inherent semantic breadth is to impoverish the Quran's eloquence. • Divine Attributes: Consider the term Yad (يد, hand) when attributed to God in verses like Q. 48:10 ("The hand of Allah is over their hands"). Lexically, "hand" is "plain." However, its theological meaning is clearly not literal (anthropomorphic), as classical Mufassirun (exegetes) universally insisted. They interpreted it metaphorically to mean power, control, or favour. This exemplifies how even a lexically clear term requires interpretive depth to grasp its true theological meaning, moving beyond a simplistic "plain reading." • Context-Dependent Terms: Words like Fitna (فتنة, temptation, trial, discord, sedition), Adl (عدل, justice, balance, equity), and Taqwa (تقوى, God-consciousness, piety, awe) have rich, context-dependent applications throughout the Quran. To assert these have only one "plain meaning" reduces Quranic eloquence to banality and diminishes its capacity for nuanced ethical guidance. Ahmed cites Q. 54:17, "We have made the Quran easy to understand and remember; is there any who will take heed?" to argue for the Quran's unambiguous clarity. While the Quran is indeed accessible for its primary message of guidance (dhikr, remembrance/admonition) and moral direction, "easy to understand" does not equate to "devoid of depth requiring scholarly exertion (ijtihad)." • The Mandate of Tadabbur: Q. 47:24 ("Will they not ponder the Quran?") and Q. 38:29 ("A Book We have sent down to you, full of blessings, that they may ponder its verses, and that men of understanding may take heed") explicitly command believers to engage in Tadabbur (deep consideration, reflection). Tadabbur is an act of going past the mere surface to grasp the underlying wisdom and broader implications. It is the antithesis of passively accepting a static "plain meaning." Deep reflection inherently assumes multi-layered possibilities of meaning, not rigid fixation. • Categories of Interpretation in Usul al-Fiqh: The entire classical discipline of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) was developed precisely because the "plain meaning" of the text often required qualification, specification, and deeper analysis. Scholars developed intricate categories such as ʿAmm (General) and Khaṣṣ(Specific), Mutlaq (Absolute) and Muqayyad (Qualified), Nasikh (Abrogating) and Mansukh (Abrogated), and various forms of Dalalah (textual indication) precisely because the initial signification of a general term is often qualified by another verse or the Sunnah. This sophisticated framework itself is a testament to the recognition that divine communication, while clear in its ultimate source, operates with a linguistic richness that demands rigorous interpretive tools beyond simple literalism. • Prophetic Explication: If "plain meaning" alone sufficed, why was the Prophet Muhammad's own role as an explainer and interpreter (Mubayyin) of the Quran so crucial (Q. 16:44)? His Sunnah (practice and teachings) constantly clarified, specified, and contextualized Quranic injunctions. For example, while Q. 2:282 clearly commands "witnessing" in financial transactions, the Hadith clarifies and adapts specific aspects related to gender equity (Muslim 1598) and other practicalities. This demonstrates that even the clearest verses required prophetic interpretation for their full understanding and proper implementation. Ahmed's assertion that questioning "plain meaning" implies blasphemy fundamentally mischaracterizes scholarly inquiry. It confuses linguistic stability with moral rigidity. The Quran's self-description as "easy to understand" refers to its accessibility for guidance, not to the absence of interpretive depth or the complexity of its legal and theological explication. Communication thrives on depth and nuance, not just surface-level signification. To claim that interpreters are "twisting their tongues" simply for seeking deeper understanding is to stifle genuine scholarly inquiry and reduce the Quran to a superficial text. Ahmed claims that the quest for deeper meaning is born from suspicion and rebellion against clarity, misapplying Q. 3:7 to condemn all interpretative quests. He categorizes "the interpreter's temptation" as "rebellion masked as reflection" and a "desire to escape clarity." This dismissal is intellectually dishonest and profoundly misrepresents the motivation and methodology of genuine Islamic scholarship. The verse Q. 3:7 is foundational to understanding the Quran's interpretive landscape: "He it is Who has sent down to you the Book. In it are verses that are Muhkamat (clear, precise)—they are the foundation of the Book—and others are Mutashabihat (allegorical, ambiguous). As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow the Mutashabihat, seeking discord (Ibtigha’a Al-Fitnah) and seeking their own interpretation (Ibtigha’a Ta’wilih)." • Condemnation of Corrupt Intention, Not Ta'wil Itself: Crucially, the verse condemns those who follow the Mutashabihat with a corrupt intention (Ibtigha’a Al-Fitnah —seeking discord, sedition) and for self-serving interpretation (Ibtigha’a Ta’wilih —seeking their own, perhaps illegitimate, interpretation). The emphasis is on the corrupt intention and destructive purpose (Fitnah), not the act of Ta’wil (interpretation/exegesis) itself. To use this verse to blanket-condemn all interpretive quests is a misapplication. • The Rasikhun fi al-ʿIlm (Firmly Grounded in Knowledge): The verse famously concludes with a distinction: "...and none knows its final interpretation (Ta’wilahu) except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge (Wa-Al-Rasikhuna Fi Al-ʿilm)..." (according to a powerful and majority reading). This reading establishes that Al-Rasikhuna Fi Al-ʿilm—the true scholars—do possess the capacity to know the Ta’wil or at least a significant dimension of it. This is a direct mandate for qualified, responsible scholarship. The distinction is therefore between Ta’wil that seeks discord (condemned) and Ta’wil that is the natural, obligatory function of the Rasikhun (mandated). Scholarship, by its very nature, begins with a deep, reverent engagement with the text, not "suspicion." The "quest for meaning" is not a desire to escape clarity, but a recognition that divine wisdom often manifests in layers, requiring intellectual and spiritual effort to fully apprehend. • Historical Precedent: The history of Islamic scholarship demonstrates that interpretation and intellectual inquiry are essential to understanding the Quran. The companions of the Prophet Muhammad regularly sought clarification and deeper understanding from the Prophet himself, demonstrating that seeking knowledge and understanding is an integral part of the Islamic tradition. • Moral Richness Invites Engagement: The moral richness of the Quran is not merely in its clear principles, but in the interpretive pathways it embeds to realize those principles across history. When I argue for "semantic flexibility" in the Muhkamat, it is not about destabilizing them, but recognizing that their clarity lies in the enduring moral principle, not in unchanging socio-legal details. For instance, Q. 4:34—a verse sometimes misconstrued to permit spousal abuse—is "clear" lexically, but requires hermeneutical re-evaluation to align with the Quran's overarching principles of justice (Q. 4:135) and compassion (Q. 30:21). This is not distortion; it is moral depth requiring semantic recalibration to ensure fidelity to the divine spirit of the law. • The Maqaṣid Perspective: The Maqaṣid al-Shariah (Higher Objectives of Islamic Law) framework, developed by scholars like Al-Shatibi, emphasizes that the aims and purposes of the divine law are paramount. These objectives—such as the preservation of life, intellect, religion, progeny, and property—often necessitate interpretive discernment to apply Muhkam texts in ways that genuinely uphold justice and welfare in changing contexts. This approach actively seeks deeper ethical meaning, not as a rejection of clarity, but as a sophisticated method to achieve true clarity in application. Ahmed's assertion that "plain listening" should suffice ignores historical shifts and the ongoing challenges faced by Muslims. For example, the ethical impetus for the abolition of slavery, while rooted in Quranic principles of human dignity and verses encouraging manumission (e.g., Q. 90:13, 3:79), involved significant ijtihad and interpretive movement beyond a purely literal reading of verses that initially permitted slavery. This demonstrates that semantic flexibility isn't ambiguity; it's divine wisdom accommodating humanity's moral and social evolution. To freeze meaning, as Ahmed suggests, is to reject the living tradition of Ijtihad and to risk fossilizing God’s moral will into historically contingent customs, thereby actively refusing the Quran’s enduring relevance. Ahmed's arguments concerning "plain meaning" and the "interpreter's temptation" falter when confronted with the inherent complexities of language, the Quran's explicit invitations to reflection, and the rich intellectual history of Islamic scholarship. The critique of "plain meaning" is not an abolition of meaning but a rejection of naive literalism that limits the Quran's profound depth. Furthermore, scholarly interpretation, when conducted with integrity and grounded in knowledge, is not an act of rebellion but a sacred duty mandated by the Quran itself, essential for ensuring that divine guidance remains dynamically relevant and ethically resonant across all times and places. The Imperative of Human Agency Ahmed posits that meaning is purely divine, while implementation is human, implying that human agency should not "tamper" with the text's meaning. He suggests that preserving divine clarity does not negate human agency, but then subtly implies that any departure from a strict reading constitutes manipulation. This framework, however, collapses into epistemological naiveté by failing to recognize that understanding itself is an inherently human act—mediated by language, cognition, context, and evolving realities. To treat divine meaning as purely static and wholly accessible without any interpretive process is to deny the fundamental nature of human cognition and the role of language. As the renowned scholar Mohammed Arkoun observed, "Text is given, meaning is produced." While the divine text is indeed revealed (Tanzıl), its meaning is apprehended and produced through human interpretive frameworks. • The Act of Understanding: Every reader, including Ahmed himself, approaches the text with a pre-understanding, a set of assumptions, and a historical-cultural situatedness. The choice is not between interpretation and no interpretation, but between responsible, evidence-based (dalil) interpretation informed by tradition and reason, and an unreflective literalism that can be just as distorting as an unmoored subjective reading. To claim a pure, unmediated apprehension of divine meaning is epistemologically unsustainable. • The Quran's Call for Reason (ʿAql): The Quran repeatedly calls upon believers to use their intellect (ʿAql), to reflect, to ponder, and to reason (e.g., Q. 2:44, 2:164, 3:191, 13:4, 30:24). This constant exhortation to intellectual engagement belies the notion that meaning is simply to be received passively. If the meaning were purely self-evident and required no intellectual exertion, these verses would be redundant. Rather, they highlight a divine expectation for human rational and interpretive agency in engaging with revelation. • Intertwined Interpretation and Implementation in Sunnah: Ahmed affirms human discretion in implementation but denies its role in shaping meaning. Yet, the Prophet's adaptations—such as changing battle tactics despite apparent Quranic war guidelines or his decision at Hudaybiyyah—demonstrate interpretive Ijtihad intertwined with implementation. These were not mere applications of fixed meanings; they were contextual readings of Quranic imperatives that shaped the meaning of obedience in specific circumstances. The companions' Ijtihad, as seen in divergent rulings on the same Quranic principles, further validates that adaptability in practice does not equate to a distortion of meaning, but reflects a nuanced understanding of the text's purpose. • The Evolution of Jurisprudence: The entire history of Islamic jurisprudence demonstrates that interpretation and implementation are deeply intertwined. Scholarly efforts, from the earliest jurists to the founders of the four Sunni schools, engaged with the text to understand its meaning and apply it in different, often evolving, contexts. Imam Shafi‘i, a foundational figure in Usul al-Fiqh, insisted that linguistic clarity must be weighed against context, the Sunnah, and the broader purpose (Maqsad) of the law (Risala). Ahmed's rigid textualism, which seeks to sever meaning from the interpretive process, thus contradicts centuries of established Islamic legal methodology that thrived on interpretive elasticity grounded in sincerity and methodological rigor. Ahmed's conclusion—that the "enduring quest for meaning" is a "refusal to accept clarity"—represents a fundamental mischaracterization of scholarly inquiry and the very nature of spiritual growth. This perspective dismisses the rich tradition of Islamic scholarship that has engaged with the Quran over centuries, as well as the inherent dynamism required for a living faith. The Quran's clarity (Bayan, Q. 16:89) is its foundational role as guidance (Huda, Q. 2:185) for humanity (Huda Lil-Nas). This clarity concerns accessibility of its core moral and theological message, not that every verse's socio-legal detail is eternally self-evident or univocal across all contexts. Even Muhkamat are clear in their referent purpose, yet allow for evolving understanding and application. The Quran's Universality: The Quran's claim to be guidance for "all humankind" (Q. 2:185) implies its capacity to transcend specific temporal and cultural idioms. This universality is precisely what necessitates ongoing interpretation. If the meaning were rigidly fixed to its 7th-century Arabian context without any interpretive adaptability, its relevance would diminish for subsequent generations and diverse cultures. To keep the Quran "open to interpretation" is not to evade obedience but to ensure its perpetual relevance and transformative power. • The Ethical Imperative: The Quran's moral architecture—justice (Q. 4:135), compassion (Q. 21:107), equality (Q. 49:13), mercy (Q. 30:21)—cannot be operationalized effectively without interpretive engagement attuned to history and humanity. For instance, the application of Quranic principles of justice to contemporary economic systems, environmental challenges, or gender relations requires profound hermeneutical work. This is not merely an academic exercise; it is a spiritual imperative for ensuring that the Quran remains a living, transformative guide. • The Living Tradition of Ijtihad: To suggest that the Muhkamat require no new interpreters ignores the reality that each generation faces unique challenges and contexts. Addressing contemporary issues through a Quranic lens is not a refusal of meaning but a commitment to understanding its implications in our lives today. The quest for understanding is essential for ensuring that the Quran remains relevant and transformative. The Quranic discourse was never meant to be frozen; it is a living discourse. • The True "Refusal": Ahmed's accusation that hermeneutical inquiry is a "refusal to accept meaning" ironically reverses reality. It is an uncritical, rigid literalism that risks refusing the Quran's vastness and depth. By insisting on a singular, static interpretation, literalism risks fossilizing God’s moral will into historically contingent customs, thereby actively refusing the Quran’s enduring relevance and its capacity for dynamic moral leadership. This is akin to reducing a profound symphony to a single note, losing all its richness and complexity. Ahmed concludes that believers need not interpret but merely obey. Yet, obedience presupposes understanding, and understanding presupposes hermeneutical labour. The very act of determining what a verse commands—as opposed to what it permits, counsels, or contextually exemplifies—requires interpretive judgment. A parent's instruction to "dress warmly" demands interpretation across seasons and geographies; the clarity of intention does not eliminate the necessity of hermeneutical mediation. Ahmed's final exhortation to "live" divine clarity, unsupported by any principled account of how one identifies that clarity, amounts to an appeal for intellectual surrender disguised as spiritual fidelity. The Enduring Necessity of Scholarly Engagement Naseer Ahmed's critique reflects an anxiety toward interpretive freedom, mistaking moral constancy for semantic immutability. His theological framework, which rigidly separates meaning from implementation and dismisses nuanced interpretation as rebellion, stands alien to the dynamic and intellectually vibrant tradition of Islamic hermeneutics. This rejoinder has systematically demonstrated: • The inseparability of meaning and implementation: Quranic injunctions, even the Muhkamat, require interpretive engagement to define their scope, purpose, and application in diverse contexts, as evidenced by the Khawarij incident and prophetic practice. • The "Fallacy of Plain Meaning" is a straw man: The critique is directed at naive literalism, not the existence of meaning. The Quran's linguistic richness, its call for Tadabbur, and the historical development of Usul al-Fiqh confirm its multi-layered depth. • Interpretation is a scholarly duty, not a temptation: Q. 3:7 condemns corrupt intentions, not legitimate Ta'wil by the Rasikhun Fi Al-ʿilm. Scholarship is an act of reverence and a means to access the Quran's profound moral wisdom. • Divine meaning invites human partnership: Understanding is a human act, mediated by reason and context. The Quran expects active intellectual and moral agency from believers. • The "enduring quest" ensures living relevance: Far from being a "refusal to accept clarity," this quest is a commitment to upholding the Quran's moral universality and ensuring its guidance remains alive and transformative across all times and places. The "clarity" of the Muhkamat is their role as the unwavering moral and theological foundation—the Umm al-Kitab. It is not a license to nullify the intellectual and spiritual struggle (Jihad Al-Nafs) required to understand and apply the Word of God in all times and places. The quest endures not as a refusal to accept clarity, but as a faithful obedience to the Quran’s call to reflect, ponder, and understand—a call that resonates far beyond the confines of a simplistic and ahistorical literalism. The real task is not to live a pre-packaged divine clarity, but to strive, as our noble predecessors did, to faithfully discern and implement it through sincere, scholarly, and principled engagement. By fostering this dialogue, we can truly illuminate the Quran's enduring relevance and its potential to guide humanity in the 21st century. ----- V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship. URL: https://www.newageislam.com/debating-islam/meaning-implementation-inseparable/d/137220 New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism