US gloves are off against Pakistan: Crunch Time

War on Terror

22 Sep 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com

US gloves are off against Pakistan: Crunch Time

By M Rama Rao  21 September 2008 New Delhi, 21 September, (Asiantribune.com): So the US gloves are off against Pakistan. The battle zones in eastern Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are merged into one. From September 3, American ground assault troops with helicopter gunships providing aerial cover are targeting Taliban and al Qaeda militants who made America lose any hope of winning the unending war in Afghanistan. US air strikes on militant bases deep inside Pak territory are also not new. The first reported strike took place at Damadola village in Bajaur agency early 2006 in which 18 civilians were killed. But what distinguishes the September 3 attack was that it was publicly acknowledged by the Americans with the White House 'leak' to the New York Times that President Bush had authorized in July itself attacks on terrorist havens inside Pakistan. According to a version of the 'attack', two Chinook helicopters dropped several American soldiers at 1 pm on the Afghan side of the border near the Saway Waray area of Angoor Adda. They then moved swiftly towards Pakistan border villages with a helicopter gun ship flying over them, completed their 'mission' and returned to their bases across the Durand Line. Well, this is hot pursuit of militants to smoke them out of their holes, as promised by President Bush nearly seven years ago. But the timing of his action is intriguing. Is he on a desperate push for an 'al-Qaeda trophy? Or is he trying to pump prime the fortunes of the Republicans in the Presidential elections after a string of diplomatic set backs from Georgia to Iraq and in Bolivia and Venezuela. Whatever be the 'truth' on which the Americans are always economical, the US President's hands were forced by his military commanders who for long were talking about the Pakistan's double-crossing in the fight against terrorists. There was a clear sign of desperation when the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, told the House Armed Services Committee: 'Frankly, we are running out of time…..I am not convinced we are winning in Afghanistan….(but) I am convinced we can.' Both Admiral Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates told Congress this week that for victory in Afghanistan the US needed to take the fight to the enemy inside Pakistan. And on September 9, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush all but called Pakistan a terrorist state, saying that terrorists were 'increasingly using Pakistan as a base from which to destabilize Afghanistan's young democracy'. PAK FIXATION Before 11 September 2001 the US refused to acknowledge Indian complaints against Pakistan and its ISI. And routinely rejected the 'Indian evidence' as insufficient. t Indian complaints that Pakistan had become a haven for terrorists. Also preferred Islamabad over overtly eager New Delhi as its frontline ally in the war against terrorism, refusing to believe that Pakistan's ISI was a major part of the problem of terrorism. Now, it is mounting pressure on Pakistan to reform its 'powerful' Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). "It (ISI reform) has to be done," Assistant Secretary of State for south and central Asian affairs Richard Boucher told the Reuters in Washington on September 16. Why ISI has suddenly become the bad guy for the Americans is unclear as yet. It could be a result of the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July. The ISI helped Jalaluddin Haqqani's fighters to carry out the attack. American officials told Dexter Filkins, a correspondent for The Times that the evidence of the ISI's involvement was overwhelming. "It was sort of this 'aha' moment," one of them said. Jalaluddin is a long-time associate of bin Laden. His son, Serajuddin Haqqani, is a senior Taliban commander battling the Americans in eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqanis are believed to be overseeing operations from a hiding place in North Waziristan. The Pakistan establishment has never tried to hide its equation with the Haqqanis. Two years ago, for instance, a senior ISI official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told a New York Times reporter that he regarded Serajuddin Haqqani as one of the ISI's intelligence assets. "We are not apologetic about this," the ISI official said. For a presumed ally of the United States, that was a stunning admission. The September 3 strike reportedly killed Jalaluddin's wife and his daughter. The question, therefore, is why did the Bush administration not undertake the hot pursuit of Pak based militants thus far. And instead, as a Stratfor commentary points out, used New Delhi as a lever to extract concessions from Islamabad like it did during the 2001-02 military standoffs between the two South Asian rivals. The answer lies in the personal rapport Gen Pervez Musharraf had with President Bush, and his success in hoodwinking the Pentagon, CIA and the State Department. He did not even once visit the Wazirs and Mashuds in Waziristan during his nine- year rule. The tribal chiefs felt emboldened as they realized that the leadership in Islamabad lacked the will to deal with them. Yes, under American pressure, Gen Musharraf 'declared' war against the militants and deployed 'over 100,000 troops' to 'flush' them out. He ordered the arrest of some 2,000 militants, many of whom were trained in ISI sponsored camps in POK and Northern Areas. Deception was the game Musharraf practiced in this drive as well. Quietly he allowed the release of most arrested militants. Pak Scouts and Frontier Constabulary were made the cannon fodder in the offensive against militants and the army was mostly spared. Also foreign militants were hit the most while the Afghan militants and the Pakistani militants who support the Afghans were 'kid -gloved', according to Khalid Aziz, who heads the Peshawar based Regional Institute of Policy Research. PREDATOR DIPLOMACY President Bush had an opportunity to arm twist Gen Musharraf, when the Pak leader had entered into a series of agreements with tribal elders in Shakai, Sarogha and Miramshah. He did not. It is one of those enigmatic Bush mysteries, to put it mildly. Because these agreements for the first time had showed that all was not well in the US-Pak alliance. No doubt the Americans used 'Predator' diplomacy to literally nullify these peace accords but that was neither here nor there. There is an argument that by launching direct operations against the Pak based militants the United States is undermining nascent democracy in Pakistan. This talking point is valid for the seminar circuit. It ignores the reality that Washington (like Beijing) is always comfortable with tyrants, and its concern to democracy is limited to Oval Office interactions, White House Press Briefing Room and occasionally to the Rose Garden tours. Anyhow, Pakistan's new helmsman, Asif Ali Zardari is a US-backed President much like his predecessor, Musharraf, who was a US-backed dictator. This is notwithstanding the British claim that London too played a major role in ushering in the Zardari presidency by turning the screws on UK-based Pak leaders like MQM chief to make them fall in-line. The Americans opted for Zardari because as a known Mr 10 per cent he appeared more amenable than Nawaz Sharif, who is completely in the Saudi camp. Fact of the matter is that Zardari is only a stop-gap President. He refuses to acknowledge the home truth though. That was why he dared to declare with great gusto that he wound pursue of a policy of negotiations rather than confrontation to win over the tribal militant leadership. And immediately burnt his bridges with the United States. In contrast, his wily army chief, Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani keeps himself on board the US plans while letting the myth that he had ordered the troops to shoot US raiders gains wide currency. MYTH- GOOD WORD Washington and the American media are playing no mean role in spreading the 'good word' that Pakistan army is 'determined' to 'defend the sovereignty of the nation'. Interestingly, however, the Kayani myth was shattered by a report tucked in the inside pages of 'The Dawn' on Sept 17. The headline itself was a giveaway. It read: "ISPR chief (army spokesman) downplays report about orders given to forces." The report by Iftikhar A Khan said, "Talking to Dawn, Maj-Gen Athar Abbas (army spokesman) downplayed the AP report (on orders to troops to fire at the Americans…) and said there was nothing new about it. He said he had been quoted out of context by AP. He said he had been asked how would Pakistan retaliate. The answer was that it would be done by engaging those who violated the sovereignty of the country. He did not say when the orders to fire on US troops were issued. He also did not say whether the Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani personally took the decision. The ISPR spokesman also played down suggestions that the instructions had been put into operation". The point is Gen Kayani has hitched himself on to anti-American band wagon with effortless ease. It helps him (and this suits the Americans) to emerge from the shadows as the darling of the masses and soldiers alike. Look at his tour diary if you are not convinced still. Last week, when anti-American sentiment was at its peak, tribal elders and religious scholars of FATA and NWFP were backing the 'bold stance of the Army chief', and the political class was hailing 'no –nonsense statements of the army chief' and was poking fun at 'the wimpish political leadership', (The News, Sept 17), he was neither in Wana nor Miranshah, not even Bajaur, but at the forward posts on the Line of Actual Contact and Line of Control in Northern Areas. He patted his troops on Siachen (Pak controlled). The General spoke of 'national consensuses' on Kashmir and declared 'Odds can't deter Pak army from defending the nation'. Next week he is going to China on a five-day visit, his first since he assumed the command of the Pak army. The Kayani postures serve a purpose. More since he is in regular contact with Admiral Michael Mullen who keeps hoping into Islamabad on unscheduled visits often ( the latest visit was last week). Whatever may be his dilemma, the Kayani rhetoric helps to divert public attention towards the core issue of Kashmir and the traditional enemy 'Hindustan'. Undoubtedly this is bad news for Manmohan Singh government as it has already burnt its fingers badly with its Amarnath follies and the ineptitude and indifference of Home Minister Shivraj Patil. But it gives the badly needed breathing space for Kayani and his colleagues in dealing with the US. Anyhow Islamabad cannot risk (even dream of) a major confrontation with Washington because of its pathetic dependence on the monthly American and IMF doles. On its part, the Bush administration is not going to get sucked into Pakistan tribal belt. It has learnt its lessons well from Vietnam to Iraq and the bloody nose the Soviet Union had suffered in Afghanistan. It has a limited goal and limited time frame to operate. Firstly, it wants to replicate the narrow strategy pioneered in Iraq, namely bump off the militant leaders one–by-one and help create infrastructure to facilitate future operations. Secondly, in fact, most importantly, diminish, if not end completely, the powerful role of the ISI, reform the army and rework the skewed policy with a set of new managers like Kayani. A high risk policy it is but President Bush is known for such gambles. The writer is India Editor of Asian Tribune Source: ASIAN TRIBUNE- http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/13337