| Radical Islamism & Jihad | |
| 15 Nov 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com | |
| Salafism: Theory and Practice - A comprehensive look | |
Today the democratic countries have launched a new world war. They are attacking the Muslims in order to impose on them the laws of democracy, to impose the ways and customs they themselves have devised. We say: "We don't want that, leave us alone!" But they don't leave us, and they don't leave us alone. The question is put this way: "Some people don't want to." Well, if they don't, so what? We – who are a part of the people, a part of the population, a part of the nations of the Caucasus – have taken up arms to establish those laws which are natural for this territory, says Movladi Udugov, head of the Informational-Analytical Service of the Caucasus Emirate in an interview with Prague Watchdog.
Also: in Salafism: Theory and Practice Alexander Vasilyev writes: "The doctrine (aqeeda) of the Wahhabi school of thought (its second name – Salafism – is derived from the concept of as-Salaf-as-Salih, and refers to a group of righteous associates of the Prophet Muhammad whom the Wahhabis claim to follow) was established in the Muslim world by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab on the basis of the writings of the fourteenth century theologian ibn Taymiya, who throughout his entire life was accused by his "professional colleagues" of anthropomorphism (tashbih) and, at the same time, of insisting on the absolute transcendence of the divine person. In the conception of ibn Taymiya and ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, God appears in relation to the world and his own creations as an indifferent being, an outside observer who lacks any personal presence not only in man (the "spark of God", or fitra, emphasized by the followers of Muslim mysticism), but also in the world of creatures." *****
November 13th 2008 · Prague Watchdog / Alexander Vasilyev Salafism: Theory and Practice We are publishing this article as a discussion paper because we believe that it contains a number of points that require additional supporting evidence (for example, the author's certainty that Dokka Umarov was behind the minibus explosion in Vladikavkaz appears to us somewhat – let us say – premature). Nevertheless, the subject of North Caucasus Salafism is highly topical, and we invite all those who would like to participate in the discussion to do so. The editors. By Alexander Vasilyev, special to Prague Watchdog When on June 22, 2006 Dokka Umarov assumed the post of President of "Independent Ichkeria" after the death of his predecessor, Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, he issued a public statement in which, among other things, he said: "I... will resolutely stop all attacks on civilian targets and persons". Bearing in mind this high-sounding phrase, which was coupled with references to "the norms of international law" in the building of relations between Russia and Chechnya (after the latter had acquired independence), against the backdrop of the recent terrorist act in Vladikavkaz it is reasonable to wonder how far it may be possible to compare the "theory" (the statement) and "practice" (the terrorist act) of contemporary Caucasian Salafism as represented by Umarov and his supporters in the "Caucasian Emirate" project. In order to do this, one needs to understand the degree to which the doctrinal base of modern Salafism is related to terrorist activity. In other words: can what happened in Vladikavkaz be regarded as an exceptional example of armed groups acting in disobedience to their commanders, or is it an organic part of the Salafist doctrine they profess and, indeed, an inevitable consequence of its practice? To answer this question we must address both the origins of the Salafist movement and its modern activists, such as Sheikh ibn Djibrin. The doctrine (akida) of the Wahhabi school of thought (its second name – Salafism – is derived from the concept of as-Salaf-as-Salih, and refers to a group of righteous associates of the Prophet Muhammad whom the Wahhabis claim to follow) was established in the Muslim world by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab on the basis of the writings of the fourteenth century theologian ibn Taymiya, who throughout his entire life was accused by his "professional colleagues" of anthropomorphism (tashbih) and, at the same time, of insisting on the absolute transcendence of the divine person. In the conception of ibn Taymiya and ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, God appears in relation to the world and his own creations as an indifferent being, an outside observer who lacks any personal presence not only in man (the "spark of God", or fitra, emphasized by the followers of Muslim mysticism), but also in the world of creatures. The call of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab found wide acceptance among the leaders of the Arabian Peninsula's disparate clans as a convenient ideology to unite the warring tribes against Turkish expansion, which had brought Sufi mysticism with it. The contrast-ridden imperatives of a world view lacking shades of grey and based on a division between black and white, on the separation of the forbidden (haram) and the permitted (halal), of Muslims and infidels (kafir), the "territory of Islam" (Dar al-Islam) and the "territory of war" (Dar al-Harb) served as a convenient cover for the robbery and looting to which neighbouring Muslim tribes and peoples – consanguineous Arabs, and also the Turks and Persians – were subjected. Because non-Muslim faiths and denominations were not popular in the region of the Arabian peninsula, and Wahhabi expansion was inconceivable without an armed seizure of new lands and resources, the only option was to register some Muslims as "deviationists" (ahl-al-bida, supporters of innovation), or "apostates" (murtad), whose crime (irtidad) is punishable by death under Sharia. Moreover, ordinary Muslims visiting the graves of their ancestors could be declared to be adherents of innovation. "Apostates" might be the advocates of any form of cooperation with non-Muslim rulers (including those who rejected violent methods of implanting Sharia law in countries with a non-Muslim majority). This is particularly mentioned in the writings of Ibn Djibrin, a modern preacher of Salafism, in the commentary to a fatwa condemning the activities of another theologian, Imam Halabi. Halabi represents the moderate tendency in Salafism which, with calls to follow the example of the righteous associates of the Prophet, defends non-violent methods of propaganda and refutes the accusation of kufr (unbelief) made against all who have not openly renounced Islam, regardless of the degree of their delusion. In the same fatwa Ibn Djibrin accuses Halabi of paying insufficient attention to the Koranic "ayat of intimidation". Thus, from a text clearly written in black and white we see that methods such as intimidation, violence, every form of moral and physical oppression and even robbery and murder have been inextricably intertwined with the history of Wahhabism/Salafism right from the time of its foundation to this very day. Another tenet expressed by ibn Taymiya and elaborated by ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, concerning the need for "submission to any Muslim ruler" (regardless of offences committed by the latter) intensifies the picture of a totalitarian Salafist society built on a rigid hierarchy of power with unquestioning obedience. An important role in the Wahhabi world order is played by the collective (jamaat), and the concept of justice in the relations between people and even in the salvation if their souls is to some extent "collectivized" in the sense that there are increasing references to "infidel communities", "infidel states", and the like. There seems to be a deliberate ignoring of the fact that fellow Muslims also live in these territories and that each person is an individual and requires a corresponding approach – something which, incidentally, is also expressed in the Koran: "A burdened soul cannot bear the burden of another soul." In the context of the quasi-atheistic conception of transcendentalism (the notion of "divine personal absence from the world") and a thoroughly maximalist approach to the tenets of Islamic law (fiqh) that is coupled with extreme pragmatism and rationalism, Salafist metaphysics harmonizes easily with the project of the Communist International, with its dialectical materialism and intent to "fan the global conflagration", regardless of the victims. And it is logical that without directly denying that each person is responsible only for their own sins, Salafist ideologists still tend to see North Ossetia, for example, as an "apostate tribe", a "tribe of collaborators" (with the current Russian government) – in other words, a "territory of war" (Dar al-Harb), in which all means of repression and intimidation are good and permitted. Thus, even if the Salafists' direct decrees (fatwa) cannot easily be reconciled with a few dozen "random" innocent victims who are slain out of tactical considerations, then at least Salafist ethics as such can fulfil that role. Against the backdrop of the ontological hatred for all who are "alien" (i.e non-Salafist), a hatred characteristic of the totalitarian sectarian mindset, little value can be placed on the references to "norms of international law", which are, of course, indispensable given the urgent need to find foreign allies. Such is the theory of Salafism, its doctrinal nature, thanks to which it appears before us more in the form of a political project akin to a new jihadist International than as a religious world view. What is more, in a country where Salafist slogans have made possible the merger of disparate tribes and the formation on a wave of Salafist-inspired of Arab nationalism within a central state (Saudi Arabia), Salafism has naturally become the state ideology and can now "afford" to take a more moderate form, without fearing rivals in either the spiritual or the political sphere. When it comes to the Salafist cells in foreign countries (including those of the Caucasus), the situation is rather different. There the very survival of those cells depends on the success of the "Islamic Call" (daavat) propaganda campaign, the main stages of which are the drawing to the ranks of new supporters, the maintenance of their numbers and the exporting of the Salafist ideology to neighbouring territories. At a time when the Caucasus has seen the development of tough competition in the religious sphere, in the form of the region's traditional Sufi ideology, when some Caucasian republics (North Ossetia, for example) are experiencing a strengthening of the position of the Orthodox Church, Salafism with its primitive ideology of "the absent God" really has no alternative but to emulate the Communist International in its organizational structure and methods of repression of the individual for the sake of the collective identity, and to copy the strategy and tactics of the leftist forces. It focuses on the building of an "earthly paradise" (for the Salafists this is replaced by the creation of the "ideal community of social justice for Muslims modelled on the community led by the Prophet Muhammad and his righteous associates" (salaf), at the same time making a clear demarcation on the principle of "us and them" ("Those who are not with us are against us," we should remember, was one of the first slogans of the young Soviet republic). Such an approach cannot fail to evoke a response among the lower social strata of the populace, who in the Caucasus of today form the majority. In the dreams of justice which the state has not yet been able to relay, people are being saturated not only with ideology, but also with an organically inherent hatred of the "other". Moreover, the destruction of those who are "against us" is now a necessity, for otherwise, seen from a political point of view, the Salafist structures would not differ much in the eyes of their ordinary followers from those of the Madkhalites and other kinds of Murdjiites and Sufis whom they regard as collaborationists. One is therefore forced to a single conclusion: that terror is a prerequisite for the survival of Salafism as a political structure. It does not matter what considerations may have guided Dokka Umarov when in 2006 he referred to the norms of international law. Whether he sincerely believed that he would be able to strike a compromise with the values of civilized society, or whether he was simply showing cunning, out of a desire to please potential allies, does not matter: historical necessity will sooner or later force all Salafists – wherever they do not constitute a majority and are not in a position of power – to take the path of terrorism. And for as long as Salafist cells exist all over the world, the terrorist attack in Vladikavkaz will be far from the last of its kind. (Translation by DM) Source: http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000015-000006-000046〈=1 **** September 12th 2008 · An Emirate lost between the unbelievers By Mansur Muratov, special to Prague Watchdog The unexpected war in Georgia has muddled the cards of the Chechen separatist leaders. While from the outset Ichkerian Prime Minister Akhmed Zakayev and his supporters had not a moment's doubt that they were strictly on the side of Tbilisi, the Caucasus Emirate supporters fell into a catalepsy for some period of time. For Zakayev and his comrades at arms it was all more simple. During a number of years before his exile in London, the former actor from the Chechen Drama Theatre and subsequently minister in the governments of Dudayev, Yandarbiyev and Maskhadov enjoyed the hospitality of his Georgian colleagues, thus maintaining links and spiritual attachment to the country that had once given him his first asylum abroad. But the crucial factor was something else. Zakayev knows that whatever events may occur in the world, his views on major issues must always coincide with the consolidated position of the West. And if no position has been worked out on a particular issue, the London exile is assisted by his knowledge that Russia will not be right on any of them. The situation with the Caucasus Emirate is a bit more complicated. The state that has been proclaimed on the territory of a single battle trench sees itself not as a mere geographic community, but primarily as a religious one that rejects the world of the unbelievers – the kufr – whose principal representatives are the United States, Russia and Israel. Therefore, in a war between the unbelievers – the Americans and the Russians – jihadists cannot and must not have any preferences or sympathies. A couple of articles on the web sites of the Chechen jihadists and a statement from the leaders of the Ingush Front appealed for a purely Islamist approach, in which the U.S. (which the Emirate's political analysts said had pushed Georgia into war) and Russia were deemed to be equal representatives of a civilization hostile to Muslims. One of the statements held that it was necessary "to distinguish between the people and the puppet rulers. In the case of the Georgian people we thank them for the benefits we and our ancestors have received from them. At the same time the Georgian people today, like all the other peoples of the Caucasus, are simply being used in the struggle between the U.S. and Rusnya [Russia]." In the middle of August, after a meeting with the Emirs ["amirs"] of the Emirate, the Kavkaz-Center web site published an appeal by Dokka Umarov in connection with the war in Georgia. Apparently without any co-ordination with the ideologists and propagandists abroad, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasus guerrillas overturned at a single stroke the whole of the ideological edifice that was being so carefully constructed by Movladi Udugov, Isa Umarov, and others of that ilk. Dokka Umarov's anti-Salafist démarche could hardly be viewed as a deliberate act of sabotage. The likelihood was that the Emir had simply not been able to resist the temptation of commenting on the unfolding global confrontation. True, in order to do this he had to abandon the positions of "pure Islam" and appeal once again to the ideals of the national liberation struggle in the Caucasus. Writing off the accursed, avowedly obsolete and pernicious ideology as scrap had proved to be a little premature, since it and not jihad had provided the language and terminology that gave Umarov the chance to formulate some approaches to Russia which could be shared with Georgia. Those who follow with hope the birth and growth in the North Caucasus of a jamaat of intransigent fighters for the enacting of God's designs upon earth must have experienced a sense of acute disappointment. Once again the leadership of the Chechen underground fell into the temptation of extreme pragmatism, consigning the path of Allah to oblivion. The ethno-geographical approach in Umarov's appeal left not the slightest room for that favourite tenet of Salafist ideology: "a plague on both your houses!" The Emirate's head recalled the brotherhood of the peoples of the Caucasus, whose duty was to drive Russia from the common Caucasian home. At the same time, with an ease remarkable for a neophyte, he slipped beneath the counter the imperatives of war with the world's unbelievers. Accusing Russia of aggression, the underground leadership more or less offered Georgia a political-military alliance. By combining forces, the various Caucasian peoples would gain the chance of "throwing the occupiers out of the Caucasus." "Occupiers", because the Islamic classification of enemies as kufr, murtad, and munafik is for internal use only. The calculation is obvious. If the armed North Caucasus underground really does succeed in establishing one or two contacts with the Georgian authorities, it may obtain an additional source of aid − military, financial and political. However, this plan has one serious shortcoming. It is fundamentally unworkable. By no stretch of the imagination do Georgians and their American patrons need "allies" of this sort, with their anti-Western rhetoric and militant Islamism. Mikheil Saakashvili has on many occasions made highly negative remarks on the activities of the Chechen underground. Not burdening himself too much with the search for considered, differentiated approaches, back in the days of Aslan Maskhadov he bundled all the Chechen guerrillas together under the category of "terrorist organizations". When Maskhadov in one of his video speeches wished Georgia success in the fight against Russia, Saakashvili issued a stern rebuke: "Most of the Chechen field commanders have the blood of Abkhazia's Georgian population on their hands. So these people are not our friends. From friends like those may God deliver us, and as for our enemies, we shall do the delivering ourselves." It is doubtful that after the proclamation of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus much will have changed to soften the judgments of Saakashvili and his Western allies. Rather the reverse. It should therefore be recognized that North Caucasus jihadism, with whose bestial grin the Kremlin is so fond of frightening Western leaders, in fact remains a paper tiger, a cardboard sword with the inscription "Fear me!" Being deprived of cultural and religious roots and a social base, Salafist ideology serves the militant Muslims of the Caucasus as a temporary and easily abandoned refuge. The value of sectarian doctrinalism lies in its use as a mobilizing force, in its ability to divide up the map into squares with directions that indicate who the enemy is, and why. And also – in its charting of a detailed route to salvation through death on the field of battle with the infidel. **** July 24th 2008 · Prague Watchdog We have taken up arms to establish laws (interview with Movladi Udugov, part I) Interview with Movladi Udugov, head of the Informational-Analytical Service of the Caucasus Emirate Part One Prague Watchdog: In the pages of the Kavkaz-Center web site you recently quoted a Chechen proverb which says "A man is not one who knows how to fight, but one who knows who his enemies are," or words to that effect. Let's start with a list of your enemies. Movladi Udugov: My personal enemies? PW: We can make a distinction between them. First, let's say, your personal enemies, then your enemies as a Muslim. MU: I see. I want to make it clear that this quotation is borrowed from Shamil [Basayev]. After his death an article was published where it said that he liked to repeat that saying. Regarding enemies: where personal ones are concerned, each of us knows very well who his enemy is, and our enemies know whether we are their enemy or not. So I shall leave my personal enemies out of it – we must deal with them ourselves. As for the concepts of "enemy" and "enmity" – if we are to judge them in terms of politics, inter-state relations or ideological struggle, then one doesn't need to spend too much time philosophizing. It's all in the palm of one's hand. There is powerful opposition at a global level, and we have no shortage of enemies, but we are divided. Naturally, the main enemy is Russia, Moscow, the Russian state, the empire, which for several centuries now has been trying every fifty years or so to destroy the Chechen people and the Muslims of the North Caucasus. And it's not just the Caucasus. People in all the Muslim-inhabited territories that were conquered by Russia are periodically subjected to genocide. So if we are to speak of the adversary as the source of a threat that involves violence, enemy number one is, as I said, Russia. With this enemy we are at war. There are casualties on both sides. And I don't think it will really be possible to solve this problem at a political level, as many would like. Aggression is inherent to Russia, and Russia will go on attacking us and trying to kill us for as long as it has the strength to do so. PW: If the problem can't be solved by political means, does that mean that one of the parties to the conflict must simply vanish from the face of the earth, be destroyed? Either the Chechens or the Russians? MU: Wiping things from the face of the earth is not the prerogative of any nation, state, group of persons or person. It is the prerogative of the Almighty. He disposes of the destinies of nations and decides whom to destroy, and whom to leave. That problem does not cause us concern. Another point along the way is to reflect on the prospects of coexistence with the enemy. There are many factors involved. But if we are to talk in terms of one side being bound to lose or, conversely, achieving victory, one often recalls the saying: "All wars end in negotiations." Yes, indeed, sooner or later negotiations are inevitable, but of the two contracting parties one is certain to be the loser. Or military action may cease because both sides run out of strength and resources and find it unprofitable to continue the conflict. So to present the matter in terms of one side being bound to destroy the other is the wrong approach. It would be more correct to say that one of the adversaries must either grow weaker or stronger. And then you get a situation where one side finds it unprofitable to wage war, while the other remains active and continues to exert pressure. The balance of force may be established in such a way that our enemy will be compelled to offer us peace and negotiations. In that case we shall see how far the proposed conditions correspond to our interests, the goals for which we are now fighting. We don't just keep fighting for fighting's sake, after all. This war must undermine Russia's power, depriving her of the ability to commit another aggression in the future. That is the main thing. PW: In the Koran, Allah says: "And fight them until there is no more persecution, and (all) religion belongs to Allah." The problem is that the Emirate doesn't simply base its priorities in the need to defend the Chechens and Muslims of the Caucasus and secure decent living conditions for them, but also in the establishment of the true faith. So if he is an unbeliever, must the enemy either be converted or destroyed? MU: It's not at all as easy as the question suggests. Today we are fighting a war with a specific enemy which is trying to kill us. He came to our land and occupied us. He is trying to foist his ways customs on us, impose his law. Today we are resisting the enemy. And what will our next steps be? All the steps, the actions, the logic are clearly stated in Sharia. In Islamic law there are precedents for defining the principles of coexistence with unbelievers. In his day the Prophet in his day concluded a treaty with the kufr, as is stated in the Koran. He concluded a truce. The question is not one of declaring war on the whole world. We must first solve the problem of how to survive. But if we start broaching questions of global confrontation, we shall go far astray from our theme. We are talking specifically about the Caucasus Emirate which was proclaimed on 25th Ramadan last autumn. PW: We should have phrased it more precisely. Does the reference to the practice of the Prophet mean that you will tolerate peaceful relations with the infidels and the possibility of living in conflict-free coexistence with them? MU: Of course. There are many such moments in the history of Islam. In the places where the authority of the Muslims was established there was no coercion in religion, as the Koran states. There are fixed conditions for the spreading of Islam and relations with the countries of the kufr. But if we are talking about our struggle, I can say that today the Muslims of the Caucasus are moving from a strategy of defence towards a strategy of war. That is quite a different approach. And in this context, I don't think that the war will stop for as long as Russia continues to have even the slightest opportunity of committing aggression. PW: It doesn't really matter how you assess the reasons, but because of either error or ignorance a considerable number of North Caucasus Muslims profess what is called traditional Islam, i.e. the kind of Islam that has incorporated pre-Islamic customs and beliefs. These people consider themselves citizens of Russia as a secular state, and are quite satisfied with the existing order and way of life. They are totally unwilling to live by the law which do you consider mandatory for all true believers. What is to be done with these people? MU: The formulation of the question is not correct. Russia came to a territory where people lived according to Islam, the true law. There was Sharia. The Russians came and killed, robbed, raped, destroyed millions of people, entire nations, in order to impose their authority ... PW: Stop, stop! Can we pause for a moment? There are not a few episodes in history where some nations conquered others. And, nations in general must have quite a few claims on one another. Two hundred, three hundred or even two thousand years ago, someone took something from someone, someone was killed, wars of conquest were fought, territory repeatedly changed hands. Must we now return to the conditions, customs and boundaries that prevailed in the kingdom of Urartu, or before? MU: I will explain my position once again. First, for nations to understand what they really want, they have to be free. PW: A referendum, Movladi? MU: No, not a referendum. I wish you wouldn't keep interrupting me. Once again I repeat: in order to understand what nations want, and to ensure that they have a precise grasp of the principles they want to live by, they need to achieve political independence. Today, these nations and their territories are occupied. So in order to conceive how events will unfold, how life in the North Caucasus will change, the Islamic lands must first of all be freed from occupation. With regard to the question "What is to be done with these people?" – first, let me remind you once again: in Islam there is no compulsion in matters of religion. A second point: the question of whether the type of Islam that's observed is traditional or not, of what version of Islam is followed – this is not a problem of Islam itself. It's a problem of political power and occupation. When people receive education they will see the real nature of Islam, which must be accepted and by which it is essential to live. No one is going to drive anyone into the mosques by force. PW: And who will offer the education and watch to see that it meets all the requirements of true faith? MU: Seventy years of Soviet rule and the subsequent years of democratic Russia have most tragically affected the Muslim consciousness. Attempts were made to destroy it every day, and this, of course, led to the most lamentable results. Today, the Caucasus has a huge number of non-Muslims. They are Muslims by birth, but they don't adhere to any of the tenets of Islam in their lives, and they don't even try to. And it's not that people don't want to accept Islam, but that their territories are occupied by an alien political system. They can't obtain a true picture of Islam. Today in Russia an unfortunate publisher was brought before a court for publishing a book called The Muslim Identity. I would not even call this absurd. It's a natural process, a demonstration of the fact that Muslims are deprived of any possibility of practising their religion under the rule of the occupier. In Russia today there is a natural process that involves the strengthening of colonial tendencies and the spread of a colonial war against Islam. Islam is primarily an ideology. Two ideologies can never get along peacefully on the same territory, not matter how much we would want them to. Today in Moscow that is well understood and known. There they see that a man who seems to be reading a harmless book about Muslim identity which describes the moral qualities of the believer – how he should arrange his relations with his parents and family, how he should behave towards other people – such a man is, by his very nature, becoming a danger to the authorities. And the proposal to take current reality as a basis for the future is in itself dishonest. To come and seize one's land and then say: "Well, what can you do now, that's just how it is!" That is wrong. First we'll restore what was de facto smashed, destroyed, corrupted, and then we will ask questions like what shall we do and how. PW: All right, let's switch to the subjunctive mood. Let's suppose that everything has been restored, and that Islamic education is widely practised. What if a significant number of people refuse to follow the norms of the true faith? Is it possible to coerce them into the true faith? After all, Sharia prescribes coercion of that kind. MU: Every country has its laws, its Constitution, established norms of behaviour, a system. Now the people who don't want to observe the laws of a particular state don't need to live in it – they can go away and live in another country. And those who want to live in this country must simply obey its laws. That is all. PW: But in most modern countries the laws are established by democratic procedures. They've been discussed, accepted, the nation itself has shaped the conditions for its own existence by various means. With you, the principle is totally different: the law is established from above, and its source is considered to be Allah. MU: Absolutely true. PW: So there is no provision for democratic procedures. Today's law for the North Caucasian peoples was worked out in the forest and the mountains. Let's suppose that, as a result of your victory, it's established in all the territories of the region. All those who don't want to obey it will have to be coerced into doing so, or else emigrate. Is that correct? MU: The question is understandable. For the nations of Europe, the "correct" procedure involves consulting the population, holding referendums or parliamentary elections. And Parliament must sit and devise some laws. For us Muslims, that position is totally absurd. We say that human beings are not capable of devising a just law. We believe that the law has been sent down to earth by the Almighty, by God. Nations, politicians and parliaments have no right to devise laws. The law is given by our Creator. For us the position of the democratic European societies is criminal and absurd, because you have falsely claimed for yourselves the prerogative of devising laws for human beings. You are trying to remove this prerogative from the Creator, who gave birth to the nations, settled them on the land, gave them laws and explained those laws to them with the help of the Prophets. Today the democratic countries have launched a new world war. They are attacking the Muslims in order to impose on them the laws of democracy, to impose the ways and customs they themselves have devised. We say: "We don't want that, leave us alone!" But they don't leave us, and they don't leave us alone. The question is put this way: "Some people don't want to." Well, if they don't, so what? We – who are a part of the people, a part of the population, a part of the nations of the Caucasus – have taken up arms to establish those laws which are natural for this territory. Kavkaz Centre archive photo (Translation by DM) Source: http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000015-000006-000041〈=1
*****
August 1st 2008 · Prague Watchdog
We have taken up arms to establish laws (interview with Movladi Udugov, part 2) This is the second part of Prague Watchdog's interview with Movladi Udugov. PW: Let's move on to military affairs. The second war has been going on since 1999, and yet there don't seem to be any grounds for saying that either the Chechen resistance or, after it, the Caucasus Emirate have achieved any major success. For many years now the leaders of the underground have been indefatigable in their claims that the Muslims of the entire Caucasus are rising up with weapons in their hands. Yet in reality the tactical parameters that have emerged suggest that the underground is weak, and there certainly don't seem to be any real prospects for a victorious march of true Muslims through the North Caucasus. MU: We have different appraisals of what has happened and what is happening just now. You see no distinction between the various periods of armed struggle. But we, on the other hand, assess the situation in quite a different way. I agree that at one time there was an emphasis on the military and tactical side of the issue. There was no clear strategy. When in 1991 we proclaimed the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, it was possible to glimpse elements of a strategy, however blurred, and everyone knew what direction we had to move in. It goes without saying that freedom, independence, political independence and sovereignty are a very important moral boost for a nation, a people, and those who feel themselves to be part of it. The self-esteem of an ethnic group is based on this. But the situation has begun to change rapidly, both in Chechnya and in the world at large. In the place of those who with absolute sincerity went to fight under the slogan of national liberation there has come a new generation of young people who believe in the promise of Allah and the saving force of jihad. In other words, independence has ceased to be something abstract. Previously, it was seen as the sole and ultimate goal. But independence is only one of the conditions for the victory of truth. The new generation of mojahedin has gone to war not for the sake of independence and freedom alone, but first and foremost in order to restore Sharia law to the liberated lands. It's not just the ideology that has changed – the people who were willing to sacrifice their lives have begun to interpret the world quite differently. The new generation of mojahedin has moved away from the perception of ethnicity as an absolute value, and has turned to God. As a result, a very serious contradiction has developed on our side. Some of those who took part in the war, who fought for independence and grew mortally weary from all the years of tension, have seen some sort of prospects for themselves on the other side. They have found an explanation for their betrayal, declaring that it may be possible to get at least part of the way towards the ideal of national independence under the banners of Kadyrov. Though the facts suggest this may be an illusion, merely making a move in a chosen direction has become their excuse. They have laid down their arms and have either gone over to the side of the enemy, left the country, or have given up the struggle and just aimed at surviving the bad times. That is precisely why the fighting generation has more or less changed completely, one hundred per cent. That is where the crisis erupted, because the new situation came into conflict with decrepit ideas and political and ideological structures which were only propped up by the force of inertia. I refer to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, its parliament, its president – all of its formal accessories. In this, a great danger lurked – the attempt to preserve a hybrid of old and new could have resulted in a real disaster. If military action on our side was still to be led by people who knew no truths other than Ichkerian independence, democracy, and international law, then a very powerful rupture could have occurred between them and the young people who had come out to die for Allah. The warring side might have collapsed into small, totally ungovernable groups that had no future at all. After the death of Maskhadov, when the armed struggle was headed by the educated religious leader Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, the sense of danger became more pronounced. So much depends on the leader. Our leaders – those who waged jihad – have done tremendous work. Shamil Basayev played an enormous role in uniting the Muslims. In 2003, 2004 and 2005 he visited all the regions of the Caucasus – from the Caspian to the Black Sea. That was a titanic manoeuvre. For the first time there was the activation of a fundamentally different set of military-tactical techniques specially adapted for the new strategy. This was the result of a huge amount of work and effort that had spanned many years. The military tactical picture will eventually be completely updated, though the full effects of that will not be visible this year. But we hope that sooner or later our efforts will produce results and that the accumulated potential will manifest itself in an explosive manner. It will lead to some very serious political, military and territorial changes. PW: And what are the strategic objectives that have been set? Why do they possess the kind of strength that can provide significant tactical successes? MU: In the first place, the leaders of the jihad, the mojahedin, have identified themselves by their goal and their flag. These are not merely symbols we have chosen – they are the driving belts of our struggle. They mobilize more and more forces, they provide motivation, and they indicate the precise direction of our movement. PW: By "goal and flag" you mean the introduction of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus? MU: Of course. And, as Dokka Umarov very accurately observed, this Islamic state does not yet have any borders. It's not correct to say that we want to build some sort of enclave on the territory of these North Caucasus republics. No, today many Muslims living in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Russians from the most widely differing regions of Russia who have accepted Islam, swear an oath of allegiance to Dokka Umarov as the legitimate leader of the Muslims. And wherever he is – in Moscow, Blagoveshchensk, Tyumen, Vladivostok – when a Muslim swears that oath, he becomes a fighting unit. Just because these people are not visible in their cities just now and are not active, that doesn't mean that they won't become active in the future. PW: So when the Emirate's leadership deems fit, it will sooner or later set them specific military objectives? MU: And the Russian authorities are perfectly aware of this. Therefore they try to use pre-emptive methods, preventive strikes to localize the situation. I may be wrong, but I have given it a lot of thought, have analyzed it thoroughly, and it seems to me that the processes that are underway not only the Caucasus but also around the world at a global level, put the Kremlin in the position of a chess-player forced into the so-called "zugzwang" situation, where any move means to lose the game. It's not a strategically adjusted sequence of steps, but rather a panic reaction, an instinctive fear of danger that pushes them into cruel and unwise actions which only increase the number of our supporters. PW: This summer there have been more attacks and raids on villages than there were last year. Yet all of these developments remain within the limits of traditional tactics, and even though there are more of them, their quality is much as before. All the operations are planned along the same lines that have been adopted ever since the first war. Will new formats be developed? MU: I think the question reflects a rather superficial approach. What is happening today is very different from the situation last year. There were similar operations in previous years: the events in Argun, the Nazran operation. But the current parameters of the fighting have changed completely. Today the fighters go into the villages – there's a different attitude between them and the villagers, and it works both ways. The fighters themselves are in a different position. Today when the mojahedin go into a village, they destroy the occupiers or their collaborators, but at the same time they carry out very serious ideological work with the local population. Nowadays they don't just arrive, strike, put the enemy to rout and withdraw. The fighters who enter a village and maintain permanent contact with the local residents require them to observe Sharia law. PW: How can that lead to any tactical military victories? MU: It's only the tip of an inner iceberg. I can't talk now about all the changes. But I can describe the situation that has developed in the mountains of Chechnya. On a ridge sit the Russians, below a village. A detachment of fighters enters the village under the eyes of the Russian troops who are keeping it under complete control, turns round and then leaves the place again in an orderly column, right under the Russians' noses. And the Russians don't shoot. Why? For the very simple reason which they quite unashamedly mention in their secret talks with the mohajedin. They say: "If you don't touch us, we won't touch you". The internals of the situation are changing. There are a great many points which I can't state openly. Our main strategy update took place last summer. There aren't yet that many changes in tactics, and they're not even very noticeable on the outside. PW: Is there any hope that with Medvedev's arrival the situation will improve? MU: The Russians have a saying: "Horseradish is no sweeter than ordinary radish". It's irrelevant who is going to be there in the Kremlin – Medvedev, Putin or whoever. In order to understand our position and how we see things, one needs to have an Islamic view of the world. PW: In military and tactical terms that probably means that successful combat operations by the mojahedin must sooner or later force Russia to the negotiating table? MU: That is only a part of what the Muslims have in mind. PW: When will victory come? MU: I don't know. When Allah wills it – that's when he'll grant us victory. PW: And when would you like to have won it? Yesterday? MU: Islamic scholars say that Allah grants the Muslims the conditions for victory once every hundred years. In this century we should like to take advantage of those conditions. We shall try to make it happen in our lifetime. Source: http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000015-000006-000042〈=1
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June 20th 2006 · Prague Watchdog / Ruslan Isayev · Dokka Umarov: A Hawk Flies to the Ichkerian Throne Ruslan Isayev, special to Prague Watchdog The death of the Chechen theologian Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, who was little-known in wider circles and who after the killing of Aslan Maskhadov succeeded him as President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, will hardly influence the situation in the republic. The guerrillas have long been prepared for such a twist of fate. The pictures of the half-naked body of slain Icherian President Sadullayev which were shown on Russian television channels testify once again to the impotent rage of the Russian military and the representatives of the Moscow-backed Chechen leadership about the fact that they could not manage to take him alive. Sadullayev is the fifth Chechen leader to die a violent death in the last 10 years. Local and Russian political analysts have never been in any doubt that his place will be taken by Ichkerian vice-president Dokka Umarov. According to the constitution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, he will be in his new post before the next presidential elections are held in the republic. The Ichkerian president's responsibilities include not only the securing of the normal functioning of the Ichkerian official bodies, but also the leadership of the entire armed resistance in the North Caucasus. Recipient of many Ichkerian awards 42-year-old Dokka Umarov, a native of the Shatoysky district village of Kharsenoy, is from the Mulkoy teip, or clan. Radical field commander Arbi Barayev and ex-foreign minister Ilyas Akhmadov are also members of this teip. Before the first Chechen war Dokka Umarov was unknown in the republic. According to some reports he engaged in semi-criminal activity in Russia's Tyumen Oblast. After the outbreak of war, he took part in it, serving under field commander Ruslan Gelayev, and after Gelayev's death in the mountains of Daghestan he began to lead the south-eastern front of the Chechen resistance. A recipient of many Ichkerian awards and medals, Dokka Umarov was constantly at the centre of scandalous rumours about his participation in hostage-taking in Chechnya during the inter-war period. In Maskhadov's government Umarov did not hold the post of the leader of the Chechen Security Council for long, and was forced to resign when that power ministry was disbanded. However, according to other information Umarov was sacked by Maskhadov precisely for his participation in kidnappings. Experienced guerrilla commander The guerrilla units under his control, which on his orders are divided into small groups of 10-12 men, chiefly operate in Chechnya's mountainous Shatoysky district, the Itum-Kalinsky district, and two foothill districts – the Urus-Martanovsky and the Achkhoy-Martanovsky. Armed clashes with numerous groups of the Russian special forces (spetsnaz) take place quite frequently in these regions, and are mainly of a random nature. Combat tactics and strategy in Chechnya changed a long time ago. In view of the enemy's superiority in manpower and technology, the armed underground does not place emphasis on close-contact fighting On the contrary, the fighters wage guerrilla warfare, while the federal forces in their turn have for several years been strengthening their network of agents, and it is precisely through this network that they try to catch guerrillas. That is what happened to Sadullayev. Many of Dokka Umarov's former companions-in-arms who have gone over to the side of the federal forces say that he has an innate ability to sense danger. He will not leave the forest unless absolutely necessary, and he endeavours to hold all meetings – even with people he knows very well – only after thorough preparation and checking. With his cunning, military inconsistency, and a rich store of practical experience, he is possibly second only to Shamil Basayev. Dokka Umarov was wounded several times during the second Chechen war. He sustained his most serious wound – to his face - in the winter of 2000, as he was leaving the surrounded capital, Grozny. He still bears the marks of his damaged lower jaw. His most recent injury occurred in May 2005, when he hit an antipersonnel mine. In recent years not a single serious military operation by the armed resistance has taken place without Umarov's participation. These have included numerous attacks in Grozny, Ingushetia, and Nalchik. The Russian federal Procurator General's office also considers him involved in the bombing of the bus carrying personnel from the Russian military airfield in Mozdok, and in the hostage-taking in Beslan, both North Ossetia. His relatives taken hostage Several attempts have been made to force him to surrender. A few years ago, law enforcement agents seized his brother, who has been missing ever since. During the Beslan crisis in 2004 Umarov's close relatives were abducted and held for several days at the Russian military base in Khankala. Shamil Basayev's male cousins and Maskhadov's sister with her numerous family were also there. A year ago Umarov's wife, along with their 6-month-old son and his aged father Khamad, were also abducted. Later only Umarov's wife and son were freed. Nothing is known about the fate of his father and brother. Dokka Umarov's sister was also abducted in Urus-Martan more than six months ago. However, she was released again a few days later after local residents held a protest rally demanding her return. The struggle must be carried on to the end It will be hard for Dokka Umarov to transform himself from the hawk with which he has always identified himself on the Ichkerian Olympus into a "dove" with whom it is possible to conduct negotiations. The leaders who are emerging now are of a kind that is very welcome to the Kremlin, helping to make sure that the West will not even mention peaceful negotiations. Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev, like any man of true religious belief, was gentle and inclined towards consensus. That cannot be said of his successor, Dokka Umarov, who considers that the struggle must be carried on to the end. However, one should not expect a sharp aggravation of the military situation in Chechnya or the North Caucasus. The situation is stable but restless, and there is at present a sense, founded on a simple analysis of the mobilization of law enforcement agencies throughout the entire North Caucasus, that the guerrillas really are planning something on the eve of the G8 summit in St Petersburg which is due to take place in mid-July. Of the veteran Ichkerian field commanders, only Dokka Umarov and Shamil Basayev remain. The day of other guerrillas who are younger, and true believers in the world Islamic revolution, has already arrived. They will part with their lives easily, confident that they will find eternal rest in the next world, and hoping that all who have perished in combat against them will be the steps that lead them to paradise. With such men it will indeed be impossible to conduct negotiations. (Translation by DM) Source: http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000004-000001-000188〈=1
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