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Rise in Sunni–Shi'ite Tension: Hacker War on the Internet, problems in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qardawi’s stance

The War within Islam
17 Dec 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com

Rise in Sunni–Shi'ite Tension: Hacker War on the Internet, problems in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qardawi's stance

The conflict between Iran and Sunni countries - especially Saudi and Arabia Egypt - has escalated the tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Muslim world. This escalation has had several manifestations. Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, made harsh anti-Shi'ite and anti-Iran statements in the Egyptian and Saudi press. He warned against the danger posed by the spread of the Shi'a in Sunni countries, characterizing it as part of Iran's campaign for regional hegemony. He added that there was no possibility of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi'ites, since there were fundamental principles of the Shi'ite faith that the Sunna could not accept.

 

The sectarian tension is also mirrored on the Internet. Hundreds of websites associated with either the Sunna or the Shi'a - including sites of clerics, papers and government ministries - have been hacked, and defaced with offensive messages and images.

The Arab press reports that the Saudi authorities have been discriminating against Shi'ites in the country, e.g., by preventing Shi'ite representatives from participating in the June 2008 Interfaith Dialogue Conference in Mecca, closing Shi'ite mosques, arresting senior Shi'ite clerics, and persecuting Shi'ite pilgrims from Iran. -- L. Azouri, a research fellow at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)

URL of this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1058

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Recent Rise in Sunni–Shi'ite Tension (Part I): Sunni – Shi'ite Hacker War on the Internet

By: L. Azouri, December 16, 2008

 

Photo caption: Sheikh Al-Qaradawi, a prominent contemporary Muslim scholar

 

Introduction

The conflict between Iran and Sunni countries - especially Saudi and Arabia Egypt - has escalated the tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Muslim world. This escalation has had several manifestations:

 

I. Anti-Shi'ite Statements by Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi

Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, made harsh anti-Shi'ite and anti-Iran statements in the Egyptian and Saudi press. He warned against the danger posed by the spread of the Shi'a in Sunni countries, characterizing it as part of Iran's campaign for regional hegemony. He added that there was no possibility of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi'ites, since there were fundamental principles of the Shi'ite faith that the Sunna could not accept. Despite strong criticism of his statements by Iranians and Shi'ites in the Gulf, Qaradhawi only reiterated them, refusing to either retract them or apologize.

 

II. Cyber war between Sunni and Shi'ite Hackers

The sectarian tension is also mirrored on the Internet. Hundreds of websites associated with either the Sunna or the Shi'a - including sites of clerics, papers and government ministries - have been hacked, and defaced with offensive messages and images. Among the prominent Sunni websites that have been attacked are the Saudi Al-Arabiya website, the website of former Saudi mufti 'Abd Al-'Aziz bin Baz, the website of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious Endowments, and a website of the Saudi Higher Education Ministry. The Shi'ite websites that have been targeted include those of the supreme Shi'ite religious authority in Iraq, Ayatollah 'Ali Hussein Al-Sistani, a website of the Shi'ite community in Egypt, and many others.

 

III. Sunni-Shi'ite Tension in Saudi Arabia

The Arab press reports that the Saudi authorities have been discriminating against Shi'ites in the country, e.g., by preventing Shi'ite representatives from participating in the June 2008 Interfaith Dialogue Conference in Mecca, closing Shi'ite mosques, arresting senior Shi'ite clerics, and persecuting Shi'ite pilgrims from Iran. In addition, Saudi Sunni clerics have made anti-Shi'ite statements, accusing the Shi'ites of heresy and of trying to take over the Muslim world. Some clerics have even condemned initiatives for Sunni-Shi'ite rapprochement aimed at easing the tension between the two sects.

 

The following report deals with the Sunni-Shi'ite cyber war. Reports about the other two manifestations of Sunni-Shi'ite tension will be published in the next few days.

 

Sunni and Shi'ite Hackers Wage War in Cyberspace

 

The Sunni-Shi'ite cyberwar started in 2007 when a group of Sunni hackers calling itself "XP Group" threatened to attack all Shi'ite websites on the Internet, and proceeded to hack some 120 Shi'ite sites. At this point, representatives of the targeted sites, headed by Shi'ite sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar, filed a lawsuit in Saudi Arabia against a member of the XP Group named Na'if Al-Ghamdi. According to recent reports on Sunni forums, Al-Ghamdi has been arrested, and has disclosed the names of 17 other hackers operating in Arab countries. [1]

However, XP Group is not the only player in the arena. In May 2008, a group of Iranian hackers called "Ashiyane Digital Security Team" attacked the website of the UAE daily Al-Khaleej. Users who accessed the homepage found the image below:

The image is a map of Iran, with the Gulf labeled "Persian Gulf," rather than "Arabian Gulf" as it is called in the Arab world. Above the map is a message in English, saying: "The correct name is 'the Persian Gulf,' which always has been, and will always remain, Persian."

Another message planted on the site proclaimed that the attack had been carried out by Mazhar Fashist, a member of Mafia Hacking Team Iran. [2]

Sunni Hackers: Electronic Jihad against the Shi'a Brings One Closer to Allah

In response to this incident, a number of Sunni hacker groups pledged to retaliate against Shi'ite sites. Among them were two groups called Shabab Al-Salafiyin and Al-Ayyoubiyoun. The latter declared on various forums that the war against Shi'ite sites was a form of jihad that brought one closer to Allah. The threats were realized in August 2008, when a group of Egyptian and Saudi hackers attacked the Shi'ite sites Fatimid Egypt, Egyptian Shi'a, and others. This prompted a Shi'ite group, Shabab Al-Shi'a, to threaten further attacks against Sunni sites. [3]

 

Shi'ite Cleric: The Hackers Will Not Silence the Shi'ite Voice

The cyber war between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites intensified following statements by prominent Sunni sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi in September 2008 against the spread of the Shi'a in Arab countries and against the Iranian regime, whom he accused of being behind this phenomenon. [4] The Sunni XP Group now hacked some 300 Shi'ite sites, including those of Ayatollah 'Ali Al-Sistani, the leading Shi'ite cleric in Iraq; prominent Saudi sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar; Ayatollah Muhammad 'Ali Taskhiri, secretary-general of the World Assembly for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought; and Ayatollah Sheikh Nasser Makarem Shirazi, one of the ayatollahs of Qom, Iran. The targeted sites were defaced with messages in Arabic maligning the Shi'ite faith and Shi'ite leaders. On Al-Sistani's site, the hackers also planted a satirical video deriding the sheikh.

 

Website of Ayatollah Al-Sistani after the hacker attack [5]

Ayatollah Shirazi condemned the attack on his site, saying that the perpetrators were extremists who wanted to keep the voice of the Shi'ite leaders from being heard around the world. The attacks, he added, only proved that the Shi'a was the right faith, and would cause more young Sunni Muslims to turn towards it. [6]

The Shi'ite hacker group Ashiyane Digital Security Team now launched a counter-attack on 77 Wahhabi websites, including those of prominent Sunni clerics such as former Saudi mufti Sheikh 'Abd Al-'Aziz bin Baz. They also hacked sites inciting against the Shi'a. The targeted sites were filled with colourful images of important figures in the Shi'ite faith, such as Hussein and 'Ali, along with a message saying "this is only the beginning [of the Shi'ite attack]," and the Koranic verse "One who attacked you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you... [Koran 2:194]." At the same time, members of Shi'ite forums called to form "bases" where experienced Shi'ite hackers would offer instruction in how to destroy Sunni sites. [7]

 

Shi'ite hackers also attacked the website of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious Endowments, replacing its homepage with the image below. [8]

 

Concurrently, a hacker calling himself "The Iranian Defense Force" hacked dozens of Wahhabi Sunni sites, including the site of Wahhabi sheikh 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Dimashqiyya; the popular Sunni forums Al-Sunna, Al-Sirdab, and Al-Burhan; the site of Sheikh Faleh Al-Saghir; and Islam Net, the website of Saudi preacher Sheikh 'Aidh Al-Qarni. Users who accessed them saw the following image:

 

The face has an Iranian flag superimposed on it. In the background is a torn Israeli flag and a map labeled "the Persian Gulf." Sheikh 'Aidh Al-Qarni stated in response to the attack that hacking websites was an aggressive and depraved act, at odds with Tehran's calls for cooperation and coexistence between Shi'ites and Sunnis. [9]

Shi'ite hackers also managed to bring down the site of the popular Saudi TV channel Al-Arabiya (www.alarabiya.net), planting the following image in its front page:

 

The image shows a burning Israeli flag, accompanied by a message in Arabic and English saying, "Serious warning: If attacks on Shi'ite websites continue, none of your websites will be safe." [10]

Also targeted was a site of the Saudi Higher Education Ministry dedicated to the teaching of Arabic. The website, founded by the minister and sponsored by the Saudi king, is a resource for students, teachers and researchers, with over 4,000 texts and a search engine. Its manager, Dr. Salah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Nassar, stressed that the site had nothing to do with sectarian strife. [11]

 

Egyptian Columnist: Hacking Websites Is No Less a Crime than Murder or Arson

 

Egyptian columnist Diana Muqallid wrote about the cyber war in the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "It seems that the groups inciting sectarian [hatred] in our countries do not only blow up mosques and Shi'ite places of worship, and send out suicide [bombers as part of their] extremist war. The reciprocal killing in Iraq, the clashes in Lebanon, and the suspicion prevailing in many of the countries where Sunnis and Shi'ites live [side by side] are not enough for them - they must also [find other ways to] express their extremist sentiments, which are fuelled by radical political views... Battles between Sunni and Shi'ite sites are being waged [on the Internet], with each side virtually killing and harming the other by targeting the websites of religious figures, political leaders, and media outlets such as www.alarabiya.net...

"Some still believe that hacking [sites] on the Internet is not a real or a serious [crime], but things are not so simple... Destroying a website or hacking it in order to keep people from entering it is [no less a crime than] murder, siege and arson. It is an act of negating the other. In our lifetimes, [we have seen] journalists murdered, incarcerated, tortured and exiled. Media outlets have been closed in our region or placed under supervision [and their premises] have been burned down. Electronic attacks convey the very same sentiment of wanting to negate the other..." [12]

 

L. Azouri is a research fellow at MEMRI.

 

[1] www.yahosein.com.

[2] www.elaph.com, May 21, 2208.

[3] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), August 10, 2008.

[4] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2080, "Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi in Interview with Egyptian Daily: Mubarak Should Step Down and Should Not Pass Presidency to Gamal; The Spread of the Shi'a Is A Danger," October 16, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP208008.

[5] www.naharainnet.net, September 24, 2008.

[6] www.alarabiya.net, September 20, 2008.

[7] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), September 27, 2008.

[8] Al-Jarida (Kuwait), October 3, 2008.

[9] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 29, 2008.

[10] www.alarabiya.net, October 10, 2008. Prior to the attack, the site was criticized by Shi'ites in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Syria, who accused it of anti-Shi'ite and anti-Iranian bias. A prominent Iranian Majlis member said that Al-Arabiya was an agent of the CIA, since it aired anti-Iranian content. Al-Arabiya, for its part, reports that Iran has expelled its correspondent from Tehran and declared him persona non grata (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, and October 12, 2008). In response to the hacking of its site, Al-Arabiya stated that it would continue its tradition of moderate, balanced, and objective reporting and of upholding professional ethics (Al-Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 11, 2008).

[11] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), October 15, 2008.

[12] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), October 16, 2008.

Source: http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA48008

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Recent Rise in Sunni–Shi'ite Tension (Part II): Anti-Shi'ite Statements by Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi

By: E. Glass, December 16, 2008

 

For several months now, Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS), has been attacking the Shi'ites and Iran. In an interview with the Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm, published September 8 and 9, 2008, he stressed the danger posed by the spread of the Shi'a in the Sunni countries. [1] Over the following weeks, he continued the campaign with additional interviews and communiqués in the Egyptian and Saudi press, in which he further condemned the Shi'a and also accused Iran of spreading it in order to realize its "imperialist aspirations."

Al-Qaradhawi's statements evoked numerous reactions in the Arab and Iranian press, most of them negative. Prominent Iranian and Shi'ite figures harshly criticized Al-Qaradhawi, and prominent Sunnis expressed only reserved support, tempered by concerns about possible exacerbation of the strife between Sunnis and Shi'ites. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was especially critical; although Al-Qaradhawi is regarded as one of its long-standing spiritual leaders, the movement leadership did not support his statements on the Shi'a and even explicitly renounced them.

Despite the criticism, and despite the fact that Iran offered to issue a formal apology for some of the harsh statements against him in response to his attacks, Al-Qaradhawi has refused to retract his statements against the Shi'a and Iran and to end the conflict with the Iranians. [2]

 

Al-Qaradhawi's Statements

Shi'ites Are Trying to Infiltrate Sunni Society

In his September 8-9, 2008 interview with Al-Masri Al-Yawm, Al-Qaradhawi was asked who posed a greater danger to Islam - the Wahhabis or the Shi'ites. He replied: "...The Shi'ites is Muslims, but they have strayed far [from the truth]. The danger they pose lies in their attempt to infiltrate Sunni society. They are [well] equipped for this [task], having great wealth, estimated in the billions [of dollars], as well as a legion of missionaries trained to spread the Shi'a in Sunni countries... I recently discovered to my sorrow [that there are] Shi'ite Egyptians. In past decades, the Shi'ites could not get even one Egyptian [to embrace the Shi'a]. From the days of Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyoubi [in the 12th century] to 20 years ago, there wasn't a single Shi'ite in Egypt. Today they write in the papers and appear on TV, and publicly profess their Shi'ism..." [3]

In response to criticism evoked by his statements, Al-Qaradhawi only reiterated his position. In a communiqué, he wrote: "I stand by my statements about the Shi'ite attempts to infiltrate Sunni societies. It is the duty [of the ulema] to come out against this - for if we fail to do so, we betray the role that has been entrusted to us and our obligation to the Muslim nation. My warnings about this invasion are intended to open the eyes of the nation to the dangers it is facing..." [4]

 

Sunni Society Must Wake Up to the Danger

In an interview with the Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Qaradhawi stated that rapprochement between the Shi'a and Sunna was impossible and that the spreading of Shi'a in a Sunni country was tantamount to an invasion of that country and its society. He said: "If a [Sunni] society notices [attempts to] spread the Shi'a within it, it will react with opposition and hostility." About Iran, he said that it had imperialist aspirations which went back to the ancient Persian era and the Sassanid period, and that it spent millions or even billions on spreading the Shi'a. Consequently, he said, anyone who embraced the Shi'a became loyal to Iran rather than to his own country, like the Shi'ites in Lebanon, who felt closer to Iran than to their Lebanese brothers.

Al-Qaradhawi added that he was willing to conduct a dialogue with members of any faith, including polytheist faiths such as Buddhism, but not with "the oppressive Zionists or the Shi'ites, who sought to infiltrate [Egypt]." As for his warnings about the danger posed by the Shi'a, he said that they were meant "to prevent greater fitna [internal strife] in the future," and were made "out of foresight and in preparation for the future." [5]

In an interview with Al-Watan, he reiterated that Shi'ite activities in Sunni countries were backed by "a country with strategic goals, which was enlisting the [Shi'ite] faith in order to realize its desire to expand and enlarge its sphere of influence..." He added: "I want to cry out and warn my people and nation about the raging fire they may face unless they wake from their drunken slumber... Anyone who doubts my words need only look at what is happening in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and in other Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, including even Palestine..." [6]

Iranian Reactions to Al-Qaradhawi's Statements

 

Iranian News Agency: Al-Qaradhawi is speaking Like a Jewish Rabbi

Iran retaliated by attacking Al-Qaradhawi, focusing on the religious aspect of the debate and disregarding the political angle. The Iranian news agency Mehr stated that Al-Qaradhawi's warnings about the spread of the Shi'a were akin to the talk of Jewish rabbis, and were aimed at creating a rift among the Muslims and igniting sectarian strife. Mehr added that Al-Qaradhawi must abandon his extremist attitudes towards the Shi'a. [7]

Al-Qaradhawi's statements were also condemned by Shi'ite scholars, such as Lebanese cleric Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadhlallah and Iranian Ayatollah Ali Taskhiri, deputy secretary-general of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, which Al-Qaradhawi heads. They objected to Al-Qaradhawi's use of the term 'missionary activity' to describe the spreading of the Shi'a in Sunni countries, since it is associated with Christian proselytism. Taskhiri contended that "Al-Qaradhawi's statements promoted strife and [therefore] contravened the aims of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, of which he is the head." [8] Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, said that Al-Qaradhawi had become a pawn in the hands of the Wahhabis, and called on him to repent and to retract his statements. [9]

 

The Iranian Apology, Subsequently Denied

In mid-October 2008, a high-ranking Iranian delegation attended a conference in Doha organized by the International Union for Muslim Scholars (which has both Shi'ite and Sunni members). According to a report in Al-Quds Al-'Arabi, the delegation, which included Khomeini's senior advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, submitted an official apology to Al-Qaradhawi, stating that "those who associate Al-Qaradhawi with Zionism are [only] the Zionists themselves." The delegation also explained to Al-Qaradhawi that Mehr's views did not represent those of official Iran. [10] Mehr, in turn, reported that the journalist who had attacked Al-Qaradhawi had been fired, and characterized his article - which, it claimed, had been posted without the knowledge of the management - as "contravening [the principle of] Islamic unity." [11]

Al-Qaradhawi rejected this attempt at appeasement, and refused to sign a joint statement with the Iranian delegation to the effect that the conflict between them had ended, unless the Iranians promised to cease spreading the Shi'a in the Sunni world and to eradicate the Shi'ite custom of cursing the Prophet's companions. [12] In response, the Iranian Embassy in Riyadh denied that an apology had ever been made, asserting that all reports to that effect were false. [13]

The International Union for Muslim Scholars concurred with Al-Qaradhawi's position regarding the spread of the Shi'a in Sunni countries, and required Tehran to apologize to him and to punish Mehr. The closing statement of the Doha conference stated, reflecting Al-Qaradhawi's position, that if a country followed a certain religious school of thought, it was forbidden to spread another in that country, for this jeopardized the unity of the [Muslim] nation. [14] This closing statement was adopted despite efforts by a minority group within the Council, headed by its secretary-general, Dr. Muhammad Salim Al-'Awa, to suggest a more moderate and less categorical phrasing. [15]

 

Shi'ites in Qatar Call to Revoke Al-Qaradhawi's Citizenship

Shi'ites in the Gulf States supported Iran's position. A group of Shi'ite lawyers even filed a lawsuit against Al-Qaradhawi in the Doha court, calling to revoke his Qatari citizenship and expel him from the country for instigating civil strife. [16]

Kuwait's most prominent Shi'ite cleric, Muhammad Al-Mahri, called Al-Qaradhawi various names implying that he was an apostate and an enemy of Ahl Al-Bayt. [17] Al-Mahri stated: "We openly announce that [Al-Qaradhawi] has become a nasibi [a term applied by Shi'ites to enemies of 'Ali bin 'Abu Talib and of Ahl Al-Bayt], and that we therefore demand that Al-Azhar divest him of his religious authority and prevent him from appearing in the media." [18]

 

Sunni Support for Al-Qaradhawi

Several Al-Azhar scholars expressed support for Al-Qaradhawi, characterizing Iran's statements against him as "foolish" and based on "blind extremism." However, some of these scholars also criticized Al-Qaradhawi, arguing that his position as head of the International Council of Muslim Clerics required him to promote unity in the Muslim world, rather than attack the Shi'a. [19]

The Egyptian organization Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya also supported Al-Qaradhawi in a communiqué that stated: "The Muslim ulema attained their exalted position only... by fulfilling their duty, which is to see dangers in advance and warn people [about them]..." [20]

 

A group of 5,000 Pakistani clerics likewise issued a communiqué expressing solidarity with Al-Qaradhawi and accusing Iran of "helping the imperialist powers to destroy Afghanistan and Iraq." The communiqué also accused Iran of "using the Shi'ite minorities in Sunni countries to promote its own national goals," and of "supporting - and even heading - murderous terrorist organizations that kill Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan." [21]

The Qatari organization "Supporters of the Sunna," as well as Salafi groups in Kuwait, also sided with Al-Qaradhawi, and condemned the Shi'ites in their countries and in Iran for attacking him. [22] Subsequently, a group of 29 Sunni ulama from several Arab countries demanded that Iran issue a formal apology to Al-Qaradhawi, warning that it would be responsible for any harm that might come to him as a result of the Shi'ite fatwas pronouncing it licit to kill him. [23]

 

The Muslim Brotherhood Renounces Al-Qaradhawi

Muslim Brotherhood Spiritual Guide Muhammad Mahdi 'Akef initially refused to comment directly on the Al-Qaradhawi's statements. In reference to the affair, he only denied accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned Al-Qaradhawi in his confrontation with the Shi'ite ulama, [24] and added: "[The Shi'ites] are Muslims [like us]. They have their own faith, but they worship Allah and follow the creed of the prophet Muhammad... [The conflict] between the Sunna and Shi'a, especially in Iraq and Lebanon, is nothing more than a political conflict which has nothing to do with Islam and its schools of thought... A guiding principle of the Muslim Brotherhood is rapprochement between [religious] streams..." [25] Later, sources in the Muslim Brotherhood leadership issued a more explicit response to Al-Qaradhawi's claims. They stated that the Office of the Supreme Guide renounced Al-Qaradhawi's views on Iran and the Shi'a. [26]

 

However, others in the Muslim Brotherhood movement - albeit not in the leadership - took a different view. A group of 40 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members, all of them from the media and academia, issued a communiqué titled "Statement to the Muslim Nation from Pupils of Imam Al-Qaradhawi and Ones Who Love Him," in which they expressed unreserved support for his views. [27]

 

Al-Qaradhawi's Son: I Am Proud to be Shi'ite

 

In the wake of Al-Qaradhawi's statements, there were reports in the media that his son, the poet 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Qaradhawi, had converted to the Shi'a, and that this was the motivation for the father's anti-Shi'ite campaign. These claims were denied by Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi as well as by Dr. Muhammad Salim Al-'Awa, deputy secretary-general of the Council of Muslim Clerics. In an Al-Masri Al-Yawm interview, Al-Qaradhawi said that these rumours were "nonsense aimed at diverting attention from the main issue..." He added: "My son is indeed a great admirer of [Hizbullah Secretary-General] Hassan Nasrallah, emblem of the resistance. He has frequently been invited to South [Lebanon], and has dedicated a book of poems to the resistance [i.e. to Hizbullah] - but all this does not mean that he has become a Shi'ite..." [28]

Al-'Awa told the Saudi daily Al-Watan that he had met with 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Qaradhawi, and that the latter had categorically denied the rumours about his conversion, and had even said that he planned to sue the news agencies that spread this rumour. [29]

 

However, according to the Iranian website Jahan News, 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Qaradhawi said at a conference in Lebanon that he was proud to be Shi'ite, and that the request he has recently received to convert back to the Sunna was nothing but an insult to Shi'ites. [30] Unlike previous reports, this report did not evoke a denial.

 

E. Glass is a research fellow at MEMRI

 

[1] For information on the interview, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2080, "Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi in Interview with Egyptian Daily: Mubarak Should Step Down and Should Not Pass Presidency to Gamal; The Spread of the Shi'a Is A Danger," October 16, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP208008.

[2] It should be noted that in late 2006, Qaradhawi made similar statements against the Shi'a, sparking a heated debate in Egypt. See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 311, "Debate over the Status of Shi'ites in Egypt," December 27, 2006, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA31106.

[3] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), September 8, 2008; September 9, 2008.

[4] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), September 18, 2008.

[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 25, 2008.

[6] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), October 10, 2008.

[7] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), September 13, 2008.

[8] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 19, 2008.

[9] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), September 22, 2008.

[10] Al-Quds Al-'Arabi (London), October 14, 2008.

[11] Mehr (Iran), October 15, 2008.

[12] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), October 15, 2008.

[13] www.rasid.com; Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), October 15, 2008.

[14] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), October 17, 2008.

[15] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), October 15, 2008.

[16] www.islamonline.net, September 23, 2008.

[17] Ahl Al-Bayt (the descendents of the Prophet Muhammad) are revered in Islam in general, but have a special status in the Shi'a, which regards them as the only legitimate heirs of the Prophet.

[18] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), October 11, 2008.

[19] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 19, 2008.

[20] www.egyig.com, September 20, 2008.

[21] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), October 13, 2008.

[22] Al-Quds Al-'Arabi (London), October 14, 2008.

[23] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), November 2, 2008.

[24] www.alarabiya.net, September 25, 2008.

[25] Al-Dustour (Egypt), September 25, 2008.

[26] Roz Al-Yousef (Egypt), October 4, 2008.

[27] Al-Misriyoun (Egypt), September 27, 2008.

[28] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), October 12, 2008.

[29] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), October 8, 2008

[30] Jahan News (Iran), November 22, 2008.

Source: http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48108

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Eminent Sheikh Youssuf Al Qaradawi

31/05/2004 12:00:00 AM GMT   

(muslimmedianetwork.com)

Sheikh Youssuf Abdullah Al-Qaradawi is one of the prominent contemporary Muslim scholars who has a huge amount of books published in different languages all over the world.

 

Sheikh Youssuf Abdullah Al-Qaradawi is one of the prominent contemporary Muslim scholars who has a huge amount of books published in different languages all over the world.

 

Sheikh Youssuf Al-Qaradawi was born in 1926 in a small village in Western Egypt. He memorized the Holy Qur'an at the age of 10.

 

In 1953 he graduated from the Department of Basics of Religion of the oldest and the most famous Islamic university Al-Azhar.

 

In 1954, Sheikh Al Qaradawi received his certificate on graduating from Arabic Language Department, when he won the first place among 500 students, after which he headed the Institute of Imams at the Waquf Ministry of Egypt (or Ministry of Religious Endowments). Afterwards Sheikh Al-Qaradawi worked at the Department of Islamic Culture at Al-Azhar University.

 

In 1961 Youssuf Al-Qaradawi headed Religious Institute in capital of Qatar, Doha. In 1973 he established the Department of Islamic Research at the University of Qatar and was in charge of that Department. In the same year he brilliantly defended his doctoral dissertation entitled "Role of Zakat in the Solution of Social Problems".

 

In 1989 Sheikh Youssuf found the Research Center of Sunnah and Biography of the Prophet at the University of Qatar, which he is in charge of up till now. After founding the European Council on Fatwa and Research, headquartered in Dublin, Sheikh Al-Qaradawi has been in charge of that body since 1997.

 

Sheikh Youssuf is a great orator, publicist, prominent writer, poet, lawyer, and professional expert in various areas of Islamic sciences. Sheikh Youssuf Al-Qaradawi is the author of over 80 fundamental monographs that are famous all around the world. Many of his books became real bestsellers of modern Islamic thought. They were published dozens of times and translated to many languages to reach out to the whole world.

 

Youssuf Al-Qaradawi has the reputation of an Eminent Islamic preacher and scholar, who does not accept any extremes. Sheikh Youssuf follows Prophet Mohammad's precept to stick to the principles of 'Ummah of the middle". In his views he combines the traditions and the modern times, while stressing on rational perception of goals and priorities of the Shariah (God's Commands) , which brings harmony between the invariability of Islam and changes that the modern era brings. Sheikh Al-Qaradawi draws inspiration from the history of Islam; he is coexisting with the present and looking into the future.

 

Sheikh Youssuf Al-Qaradawi was among the Islamic scholars who affirmed that the struggle in Chechnya is indeed a Jihad (Fighting for the sake of Islam). However, it is clear for Muslims of Chechnya and for Muslims all over the world that their fight against the Russian aggressors is legitimate and rightful. But no doubt Fatwa of Sheikh Youssuf Al-Qaradawi has huge psychological and political meaning. It is not only a reminder to the Muslim nations, oppressed by the Russian oppression, about their obligation, but it is also an alarm to the Muslims who are still looking for an excuse for their inaction and cowardice by futile debates on whether it is considered a Jihad in Chechnya or not.

 

However, Sheikh Al Qaradawi is against killing the innocents. He denounced the attacks against civilians in the U.S. during September 11th attacks, and called on Muslims all over the world to donate blood to the victims of the attack. He was quoted saying "Our hearts bleed for the attacks that has targeted the World Trade Centre [WTC], as well as other institutions in the United States despite our strong oppositions to the American biased policy towards Israel on the military, political and economic fronts.

 

Among his views is that everyone has the freedom of choice. Allah The Most High does not restrict anyone in freedom of choice, however, everyone is responsible for his choice.

 

Source: kavkaz.org.uk

URL of this page: http://www.newageislam.org/NewAgeIslamArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=1058

 

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Islam,Terrorism and Jihad
18 Dec 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com

Dismantle Jamaat ud-Dawa infrastructure

 

The JuD is arguably the best-organised political force in Punjab. Dismantling its infrastructure will prove a formidable challenge to Pakistan, even if the State does, indeed, decide it wishes to take that course. Failure to compel Pakistan to act, however, could have incalculable consequences, says senior Indian journalist Praveen Swami.

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 The Road to Maximum Terror

By PRAVEEN SWAMI

 

"The only language India understands", the Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) supreme Ameer (chief) told top functionaries of his organisation on October 19, 2008, "is that of force, and that is the language in which it must be talked to".

 

Less than six weeks later, around 9:00 pm on the night of November 26, a woman in the koliwada — or fishing village — off south Mumbai's upmarket Budhwar Park area saw an inflatable dinghy nudge up against the beach. She, and a few fishermen who were drinking near the beach, watched as ten men got off the boat, and made their way towards the road behind the slum. "Don't bother us", growled one of the men, in response to a friendly query. The villagers, wisely, kept their peace.

 

Much of what we know about what happened next comes from the testimony of the dark young man who, dressed in a knock-off Versace T-shirt and grey cargo pants, was caught on closed-circuit camera just minutes before he opened fire at commuters at Mumbai's crowded Chattrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) railway station.

 

Mohammad Ajmal Amir has told the Mumbai Police he was part of group of ten men who spent months training in guerrilla warfare, marine commando techniques and navigation skills at Lashkar camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Punjab.

 

Lashkar military commander Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, Amir has told investigators, showed the group Google Earth maps of South Mumbai, and films of the targets each of the five two-man units had been tasked to hit. Iman, along with his partner 'Abu Umar' — whose name, he learned, was in fact Mohammad Ismail Khan — were tasked with attacking the CST. Once they had reached their destinations, the men were told to kill, take hostages, and then — holed out on the roofs of their targets — phone Indian television stations. Once the inevitable rescue operation began, the men were to slaughter the hostages.

 

Amir's journey to Mumbai began on September 15, 2008, when the five groups of fidayeen (suicide squad) were ordered to travel to Karachi after leaving Muridke, home of the Lashkar's parent-political group, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). The group reassembled near Karachi, where the fidayeen were told that they would leave for Mumbai on September 27. For reasons that are unclear, the departure was delayed and fresh orders did not come in until November 22.

 

Lakhvi, Amir has said, personally saw off the group when it finally pushed off the Karachi coast at 4:00 AM on November 23. Amir and Khan rowed out to the Pakistan-flagged merchant ship al Hussaini along with men they knew as Abu Akasha and Abu Umar; 'Bada' ['elder' or 'big'] Abdul Rehman and Abu Ali; 'Chhota' ['younger' or 'small'] Abdul Rehman and Fahadullah; Shoaib and Umar — all Pakistani nationals who spoke Punjabi.

 

Each man carried a Kalashnikov rifle, 200 rounds of ammunition and grenades. Five men had larger bags, packed with integrated circuit-controlled improvised explosive devices. The group also had at least one state-of-the art Garmin Global Positioning System set, and several mobile phones fitted with Indian SIM cards.

 

Near Indian coastal waters, the men hijacked a fishing boat, the Gujarat-registered Kuber, which had strayed away from the main fishing fleet in bad weather. Four of the five-man crew on the Kuber were taken aboard the al Husaini, where they are believed to have been executed. The fifth crew member, Amar Narayan Singh — a 45 year old father of three — guided the fidayeen unit to the Sassoon Docks in Mumbai. Once there, the men slit Singh's throat, and reached Budhwar Park in their inflatable dinghy.

 

From Budhwar Park, the men travelled on to their targets by the simplest means possible: they hailed taxis or, in three cases, simply walked the few hundred metres to their targets, all clustered in south Mumbai.

 

Bombs later went off in two taxis in Mumbai's suburbs, which are thought to have been planted there by two of the teams. Once at their targets, the men began opening fire. The operation went almost precisely as planned, bar two factors: against impossible odds, a few ill-equipped Mumbai Police officers put up an unexpected fighting, derailing the hostage-taking plans — and Amir, when halted by one police team, took two bullets in his arm, and lived.

Amir's account — disputed by Pakistan's State apparatus and media, until a welter of western reports confirmed that the terrorist was indeed a resident of the village of Faridkot, in Pakistan's Okara District — isn't however the sole piece of evidence on the Mumbai massacre's planning and authorship.

 

Evidence on the route used by the fidayeen to reach Mumbai has been recorded in detail on the GPS system used by the terrorists, which maps their journey from Karachi in minute detail. In addition, a satellite phone used by the terrorists to make calls from the Kuber has five Pakistani numbers in its call records.

 

US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detectives have also determined that the IEDs used in Mumbai closely resemble, in their fabrication, devices used by Pakistan-linked terrorist groups operating in Pakistan.

 

Moreover, the Mumbai Police and India's intelligence services were able to intercept several phone calls made by the terrorists from their mobile phones, during the attack, to their controllers in Pakistan. The calls were made to virtual phone numbers in New Jersey and Vienna, purchased from the voice-over-internet service provider Vox Phone, paid for through a Western Union branch in Karachi.

 

The intelligence harvest also appears to bear out Amir's account. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), notably, delivered two warnings to India of possible attack on Mumbai. The first, couched in general terms, was delivered to India through the Research and Analysis Wing on September 18. In response to an Indian request, the CIA delivered further details on September 24, warning expressly that the Lashkar was planning to hit targets with large numbers of foreigners, including the Taj Mahal Hotel. Read against Amir's testimony to the Mumbai Police, it would appear that the CIA had picked up the movement of the Lashkar fidayeen from Muridke to Karachi.

 

The CIA's warnings corroborated information generated by India's Intelligence Bureau (IB), which, in September, warned that the Lashkar had conducted reconnaissance operations in several parts of Mumbai, in particular around hotels in south Mumbai as well as the suburbs. The IB's warnings had led the Mumbai Police to step up security around south Mumbai. Pamphlets were distributed to store owners, asking them to report suspicious movement. Top management at the Taj Mahal Hotel and Oberoi Hotel were also briefed on the threat.

 

Bar imposing parking restrictions for a brief period, neither hotel acted. The chronically understaffed Mumbai Police, too, was forced to move out the additional police force deployed around the hotels in October, to deal with persistent law-and-order problems related to a local ethnic-chauvinist mobilisation. In any case, it is unclear that the additional Police presence in Mumbai would have altered the course of events: some officers had not trained with firearms for a decade, and even the elite Anti-Terrorism Squad's Quick Reaction Teams had not used their assault rifles for a year, because of an ammunition shortage.

 

On November 18, RAW itself intercepted a satellite phone conversation from the al Husaini, which suggested that an unspecified 'consignment' was on its way to Mumbai.

 

RAW analysts, who determined that the satellite phone call was made to a number known to be used by Lakhvi and his subordinates, notified the Indian Coast Guard of a potential threat.

 

Late on the night of November 20, coast Guard authorities, in turn, launched a day-long hunt for the al-Hussaini, based on the GPS coordinates provided by RAW. The search, however, proved unsuccessful — not surprisingly, since from Amir's testimony, we learn that the Lashkar group was yet to board the al Husaini. Coast Guard patrols kept an eye out for the ship in coming days, but not the Indian fishing boat on which the terrorists were eventually to arrive.

 

Without full cooperation from Pakistani investigators, though, it is unclear how much of the technical evidence can be turned into material that will facilitate the criminal prosecution of the command-level perpetrators.

 

From the available evidence, however, it is clear that the Lashkar had long been planning attacks using sea routes across the Indian Ocean. From as early as 2002, Indian intelligence assets reported that Lashkar elements were receiving some basic marine-skills training at the Mangla Dam reservoir in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and at the organisation's private lake in Murikde.

 

American journalist Steve Coll provided independent corroboration for these reports in a recent article, noting that it "has long been an open secret, and a source of some hilarity among foreign correspondents, that under the guise of 'humanitarian relief operations', Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore".

 

Faisal Haroun, a top Lashkar operative who commanded the terror group's India-focussed operations out of Bangladesh, helped concentrate India's intelligence concerns on the issue sharply. In September 2006, Haroun was briefly held by Bangladesh authorities before being quietly deported. But a west European covert service obtained transcripts of his questioning by Bangladesh's Directorate-General of Field Intelligence. Haroun, it turned out, had been using a complex shipping network, using merchant ships and small fishing boats, to move explosives to Lashkar units operating in India. Among the end-users of these supplies was Ghulam Yazdani, a Hyderabad resident who commanded a series of attacks, including the assassination of Gujarat pogrom-complicit former Home Minister, Haren Pandya and the June 2005 bombing of the Delhi-Patna Shramjeevi Express. Investigators probing the Haroun story determined his network had helped land a giant consignment of explosives and assault rifles on the Maharashtra coast for an abortive 2006 Lashkar-led attempt to bomb Gujarat.

 

India's intelligence services determined that Haroun had been attempting to set up an Indian Ocean base for the Lashkar. Along with a Male-based Maldives resident, Ali Assham, Haroun had studied the prospect of using a deserted Indian Ocean island for building a Lashkar storehouse, from where weapons and explosives could be moved to Kerala and then on to the rest of India. In 2007, when evidence emerged of heightened Islamist activity in the Maldives — including the bombing of tourists in Male's Sultan Park, and the setting up of a Sharia-run mini-state on the Island of Himandhoo — the seriousness of the threat to India's western seaboard became even more evident.

 

Former Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil was shaken up enough by the flow of information to make a special reference, in a 2006 speech, to the emerging maritime terror threat. Patil's Ministry moved, its Annual Report for 2007-2008 records, to strengthen "coastal security arrangements [and], to check infiltration".

 

n liaison with the nine coastal States and Union Territories, the Report discloses, funds had been earmarked to set up "73 Coastal Police Stations which will be equipped with 204 boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motor cycles for mobility on coast and in close coastal waters. The Coastal Police Stations will also have a Marine Police with personnel trained in maritime activities". While about two-thirds of these Police Stations have, indeed, been built, there is no Marine Police in place, since there are no locations of facilities for their training.

Meanwhile, the Lashkar was closing in. India first learned of the Lashkar's efforts to use the Mumbai-Karachi sea route in 2007, when the IB successfully penetrated a plot to land eight Lashkar fidayeen. Travelling in a boat investigators believe was hired through the Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar organised crime syndicate, captained by a man who spoke Mumbai-accented Hindi, the eight fidayeen landed off the Mumbai coast on March 3, 2007.

 

Later, the group spent time at a safehouse provided by a Mumbai-based Lashkar operative in the city's suburbs, before travelling by train to join Lashkar units operating in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Two of the fidayeen, Pakistani nationals Jamil Ahmad Awan and Abdul Majid Araiyan, were arrested and are now held at the Kot Bhalwal jail in Jammu; the rest are believed to have been killed in follow-up counter-terrorism raids.

 

In February 2008, the IB hit on yet more evidence that Mumbai was being prepared for assault. Investigators probing a New Year's Eve attack on a Central Reserve Police Force camp in Rampur found that the Lashkar unit responsible for the attack also had plans to hit the Mumbai stock exchange and the Taj Mahal Hotel. Uttar Pradesh resident Fahim Ahmed Ansari, who was recruited by the Lashkar while working in Dubai in 2005, and then trained at its camps in Pakistan, was arrested along with Pakistani fidayeen, Imran Shehzad from Bhimber in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Mohammad Farooq Bhatti from Gujranwala in Punjab. Ansari provided investigators with a graphic account of his training, as well as the abortive plans to stage a fidayeen attack in Mumbai.

 

All three men carried legitimate Pakistani passports, presumably intended to secure their escape through Nepal. Shehzad held passport number EK5149331, issued on March 14, 2007, while Bhatti used passport number AW3177021, issued a day earlier. Ansari's Pakistani passport, BM 6809341, issued on November 1, 2007, bears the pseudonym Hammad Hassan.

 

Saeed and other top Lashkar functionaries have also become increasingly aggressive in their recent public proclamations. In his October 19, 2008, speech, which was delivered before an audience of key Lashkar leaders like Maulana Amir Hamza, Qari Muhammad Yaqoob Sheikh and Muhammad Yahya Mujahid at the organisation's headquarters in Muridke, the Lashkar chief made clear he saw India as an existential threat. India, he claimed, was building dams in J&K to choke Pakistan's water supplies and cripple its agriculture. Earlier, in an October 6 speech, Saeed claimed India had "made a deal with the United States to send 150,000 Indian troop to Afghanistan". He claimed India had agreed to support the US in an existential war against Islam.

 

Finally, in a sermon to a religious congregation at the Jamia Masjid al-Qudsia in Lahore at the end of October, Saeed proclaimed that there was an "ongoing war in the world between Islam and its enemies" and that "crusaders of the east and west have united in a cohesive onslaught against Muslims".

 

It takes little to see that Saeed's pronouncements were, in fact, a manifesto for Mumbai's night of maximum terror.

 

Where might things go from here? For one, it is clear that further progress in the investigation will, in no small part, be contingent on support from the Pakistani State. While the mass of electronic evidence, as well as Amir's testimony, point unequivocally to the fact that the authors of the attack were in Karachi and Lahore, demonstrating who they were — and proving their identities in a court of law — will need investigation on Pakistani soil.

 

Pakistan, as things stand, appears to have little incentive to back such an enterprise. For one, a full investigation of the Mumbai massacre will lead, without dispute, to embarrassing revelations on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate's relationship with the Lashkar — a relationship ably documented not just by scholars like Hassan Abbas, but by Islamabad's envoy to Washington D.C., Husain Haqqani. More important, mired as it is in multiple confrontations with jihadis in the North West Frontier Province and Federally-Administered Tribal Areas, the Pakistani state cannot but wish to avert another conflict – this time, in the country's heartland Punjab province.

 

Given its enormous financial resources and a wide popular reach that extends into the ranks of the Armed Forces, the JuD is arguably the best-organised political force in Punjab. Dismantling its infrastructure will prove a formidable challenge to Pakistan, even if the State does, indeed, decide it wishes to take that course.

Failure to compel Pakistan to act, however, could have incalculable consequences. If the "crusaders of the east" were the Lashkar's main target till now, the Mumbai massacre demonstrates their western counterparts are no longer guaranteed immunity from its guns. The Pakistan State itself will come under increasing threat from a group that will, without doubt, be emboldened by its ability to survive the fallout from Mumbai. India and the world will have to act — or confront immeasurably larger horrors in the only-too-foreseeable future.

 

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor, The Hindu. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal

 DEC 15, 2008

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