By Grace Mubashir, New Age Islam
16 December2023
Radical Preachers Have Used Erroneous Islamic Political Ideas To Rise Against The Government And Sow The Seeds Of Anarchy. Still, Islamic Organizations And Jihadi Preachers Often Exhort The People To Revolt Against The Ruling Powers. Al Qaeda, Hizbul Mujahedeen, ISIS And Others Have Used The Same Call. This Article Refutes Such Political Ideas From The Perspective Of Both Classical And Modern Scholars.
Main Points:
1. Fazlur Rahman, aligning with prevalent scholarly views, contends that Islam does not have a law of rebellion
2. During the Arab Spring, the jurisprudence of violence against the state was reviewed in the wake of changing political and social conditions. during the period most Sunni scholars argued against rising violently against the state if it caused anarchy and chaos
3. The Islamic law governing armed violence against states and governments has evolved through historical precedents, texts, and interpretations by Muslim scholars across different periods
4. This is crucial to prevent the misuse of these Islamic rules by terrorists, who invoke the works of classical Muslim jurists to justify the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians
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The modern world is quite different from the pre-modern one. This is evident from personal life to governance. The changes made in Muslim life by the formation of a modern nation-state, the absence of a centralized caliphate, and the concepts of secularism are not insignificant. As Fiqh evolves, pre-modern Fiqh will likewise never be appropriate in the modern world. To some extent, even the views of the colonial context may not be appropriate in the New World. However, past Muslim scholarly discourses leave many lessons to be learned.
Fazlur Rahman, a modernist scholar and Islamic philosopher from Pakistan, aligning with prevalent scholarly views, contends that Islam does not have a law of rebellion. Any early activist inclinations in Islam are believed to have faded with the widespread adoption of the Murji'a's quietist doctrine, emphasizing non-judgment in political affairs. According to Rahman, Muslim jurists rationalized and prohibited rebellions against established rulers in response to various political realities. In contrast, Bernard Lewis asserts that both quietist and rebellious traditions have deep roots in Islam, coexisting and competing throughout early Islamic history. He suggests that the struggle between quietist-authoritarian and activist-rebellious tendencies persisted, with Muslim jurists reluctantly accepting the need for obedience to tyranny, ultimately leaning towards complete quietism.
At the core of the quietism thesis lies the assertion that throughout Islamic history, there was a divergence between temporal and religious authority. The Sunni caliph reportedly ceded his religious authority to jurists while surrendering political authority to the Sultans. This division implies that Muslim jurists focused on overseeing religious law administration, leaving secular matters to those in positions of political power. Consequently, as long as the jurists retained their role as guardians of religious law, they were willing to overlook concerns related to political justice and, at times, even support rulers perceived as unjust. Patricia Crone aptly phrases it, stating that "Intellectually, it is the very totality of the disjunction between the exponents of state and religion that explains why the relationship between the two could come to be seen even by the medieval Muslims as a symbiosis: once the divorce was finalized, there was nothing to obstruct an improvement in the relationship between the divorcees."
Recently, Muhammad Zaman, Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Religion at Princeton University, has contested the simplistic division between the religious authority held by jurists and the political authority wielded by rulers. Zaman proposes that the ulamā (jurists) were engaged in a collaborative relationship where both religious and political authority were shared. This cooperative dynamic existed before the implementation of the 'Mihna' (inquisition) in 218/833 under the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun. According to Zaman, the 'Mihna' represented an effort by rulers to contest the authority of the Ulama and assert a certain level of religious competence. However, this challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful. Following the 'Mihna', a certain level of tension and conflict persisted between the Ulama and the authorities. However, what characterized their relationship was predominantly cooperation, patronage, and the shared exercise of religious and political authority. Essentially, during the early Abbasid period, there was no distinct separation between politics and religion. The Ulama, for the most part, aligned themselves with the rulers, and reciprocally, rulers were inclined to bestow political privileges upon the Ulama. This patronage and, in some cases, political repression led the Ulama, from the early Abbasid period, to adopt a stance of political quietism, unequivocally rejecting the option of rebellion against rulers.
Aziz al-Azmeh, eminent scholar in the field of Islamic law and professor at European Union University, has recently issued a compelling challenge to the prevailing framework for approaching the issues of authority and legitimacy in Islamic history. Al-Azmeh contends that much of the contemporary discourse on premodern Islamic thought tends to be ahistorical. He argues that Muslim juristic discussions on the imāma cannot be accurately understood through the lenses of realism or idealism; instead, Muslim jurists were profoundly legalistic. According to al-Azmeh, they operated under a historical absolutist imperative, shaped by the conceptions of power of their era. This imperative led to the perception and discourse of caliphs as quasi-divine figures, beyond moral evaluation. Early writings emphasized order and the imperative to obey the ruler, often portraying the ruler as a shepherd caring for his flock. Al-Azmeh asserts that politics never truly became secular and detached from religious influence. Instead, with figures like al-Māwardī, there was an attempt to establish a reliance on the Ulama as a collective group.
The Debate During The Arab Spring
During the Arab Spring, the jurisprudence of violence against the state was reviewed in the wake of changing political and social conditions. during the period most Sunni scholars argued against rising violently against the state if it caused anarchy and chaos.
The Islamists supported by the Muslim Brotherhood supported armed insurgence and they quoted classical Islamic texts in support of violence. Yusuful Qaradawi became a poster scholar of this movement. borrowing from the works of Mawardi and Maududi, he denigrated the military autocracy in Egypt as illegitimate (Qabeeh) and demanded popular protest to weed out the un-Islamic government. In that sense, she was imparting the medieval scholarship of the global binary of Muslim lands and non-Islamic lands.
Instead, the patriarch of Syria, Sheikh Ramadan Bouti, denounced the violence in Syria, as it endangered the peace and caused a trail of destruction. The scholar was assassinated by the radicals while performing prayer at the Masjid. He argued that in the current political arrangement of democracy and election, armed rebellions are against the teachings of Islam. He instead demanded the aggrieved to see redressal within the remaining structures of governance. According to him, classical Islam's political ideas are obsolete in the modern nation-state reality. He developed neo-traditional Fiqh incorporating modern political and social realities.
Similarly, the leader of the Tunisian mass protest, Rashidul Gannouchi, banned the people from using violence. they adopted Gandhian methods within Islamic engagement and ensured a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy. Tunisia is the sole state to emerge from the chaos of Arab Spring democratic and Arabic-secular. he also battled the radicals demanding the implementation of Sharia and was successful in averting political dissonance in the country.
the aftermath of the Arab Spring gives the message of the hollowness of following classical Islamic jurisprudence to address the political problems of modernity. scholars of Al-Azhar (Egypt) and Muslim intelligentsia in the West have modified Islamic laws to suit the changes in the modern world.
Major Strands Of Thought
the various strands of modern scholars on violence and rebellion against the state could be briefed as follows.
1) Islam's prohibitions on struggle (احمك البغاة) provide an alternative to democratic-secular concepts in which the state adopts violence as its policy and is justified in violently dealing with those who speak out against it. In a modern world where those who oppose state ideals are portrayed as extremists and terrorists, Fuqaha who speak out about the rights of state dissidents represent a high moral standard. thereby curbing state power and preventing the violent handling of dissidents. By treating thugs and insurgents as two, they ethically question the notion that 'insurgents are terrorists'. The Fuqahahs look at those who fight the state with exact justice (تاويل) unlike ordinary criminals. Therefore, they have recorded special legal guidelines while dealing with them. They are not to be killed or maimed after the battle, no compensation can be exacted from them for the damage done during the battle, no lethal weapons can be used against the insurgents without a valid reason, and if they stop fighting and surrender, it cannot be continued. 43)
2) Strikes are a creative symbol of challenge to state violence in the modern world. Today the streets are the final refuge for the neglected to seek justice. Although many countries, including India, recognize the right to dissent and protest, governments try to silence those who dissent, often through violence. Here we have to adopt the same methodology adopted by the ancient scholars. Just because the methodology is the same, the final verdict is not necessarily the same. Such struggles must be evaluated in light of Islamic precepts (علم الواجب) and the context in which they exist (علم الوقعد), Fiqh al-Maqasid, and Fiqh al-Maalaat. However, how to determine ma'alat (the outcome of a matter) is a serious matter. Social issues are not like adding nothing to math and getting two. It is full of contradictions and complications. Therefore, only mujtahids who have deep knowledge of Islamic precepts and the prevailing social environment can arrive at the right position.
3) The most discussed approach to governance in Islam in the 21st century was during the Arab Spring. If we look at the debates and discussions that took place between scholars of different schools at that time, we can see the complex, diverse and rich discourse of Fiqh. Preference for obedience to the state was given. But some, including Ali Jumu'a, went beyond the limit and took up absolute statism. He issued a fatwa that those protesting in the streets of Egypt were Khawarij and that shedding their blood was permissible. Khalid Abu Fadl says: "I have never once thought that a scholar would issue a fatwa to label so many innocent people as Khawarij and massacre them for protesting against the government. Even he knows that what he has said is wrong.” Such statesmanship is not only quietism but is precisely politically motivated. Owamir Anjum asserts that this has no basis in Islam. Imam Tawahawi says: "We love the faithful and the righteous, and we hate the violent and the treacherous." It is against Islamic teachings to side with the aggressor and to join in all evil deeds to appease him. That is why Ustad Raisuni, while mentioning the five types of fitnah forbidden by the Sharia, adds a second one – the fitnah that originates from violent and disorderly rulers and the court scholars who accompany them.
The Islamic law governing armed violence against states and governments has evolved through historical precedents, texts, and interpretations by Muslim scholars across different periods. This ongoing interpretative process, coupled with changes in the world and warfare dynamics, has resulted in diverse justifications for engaging in armed violence and, notably, conflicting rules dictating the conduct of Muslim soldiers during the unrest. Despite these contradictions arising from varying interpretations of texts, a brief exploration of the justifications and regulations for armed violence reveals that classical Muslim jurists successfully developed a tradition of just war, significantly humanizing the primitive conditions of protest in their time.
However, certain opinions expressed by individual classical jurists, such as permitting the use of human shields and night attacks on the enemy, need addressing and clarification by contemporary Muslim legal bodies. This is crucial to prevent the misuse of these Islamic rules by terrorists, who invoke the works of classical Muslim jurists to justify the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. The fact that Muslim perpetrators of violence draw on writings from centuries ago underscores the enduring influence of Islamic law in the lives of many Muslims today. Given that Islamic law is, in many aspects, a self-binding legal system, it becomes both a scholarly and urgent necessity to revisit and develop rules regulating the use of force in today's global conflicts.
As an illustration, the engagement of Muslim states in international military interventions to rescue oppressed religious or ethnic minorities or to halt massacres, crimes against humanity, and genocides is deemed a religious obligation according to Qur’anic texts (4:75–76). In conclusion, the re-examination and enhancement of Islamic rules pertaining to the use of force in contemporary politics are not only a scholarly imperative but also an urgent necessity for global peace and security, especially considering that Muslims constitute a significant portion of the world's population, and many conflicts today involve Muslim communities.
Help each other in virtue and godliness. Be not one another's helpers in sin and might. Be careful of Allah. Allah is severe in punishment. (Al Maida: 2)
References
Quranic Verses
1. Surah Anisaa: 58,59,
2. Surah Hujarat: 9
3. Alu Imran : 110
Hadeeth
1. Sahih Muslim: 1851, 1478
2. Bukhari (2957), Muslim (1835)
3. Abu Dawud: 394, Volume:6
4. Ibn Majah: 2426
Al-Iqtisad fi Al-Iqidan by Imam Al-Ghazali,
Ghayyat al-Ummam by Imam al-Juwayni
The Beginning and the End by Ibn Kathir, History of Al-Dhahabi
Explanation of Psychological Doctrines by Imam Al-Taftazani,
Tahdheeb al-Tahdheeb by Imam Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani,
The Natures of Tyranny by Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi,
Explanation of Psychological Doctrines by Imam Al-Taftazani,
The Tahawi Creed by Imam al-Tahawi,
A brief rule regarding the obligation of obeying God, His Messenger, and those in charge of affairs, by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah
Rebellion and Violence, Khalid Abou Fadl,
Revival of Religious Sciences by Imam Al-Ghazali,
I’lam al-Muqayyin by Ibn al-Qayyim
The Constitutional Crisis by Mukhtar Al-Shanqeeti
Hisba in Islam by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah,
Minhaj al-Sunnah by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah,
The Caliph and the King by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah,
Islam and Arab Revolution, Usaama Al-Azami
Ethics of Rebellion, Khalid Abou Fadl
Rebellion in Islam, Prof. Ovamir Anjum
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Part One of the Article: The Islamic Tradition Prohibits Revolt Even Against Despotic States
A regular columnist for NewAgeIslam.com, Mubashir V.P is a PhD scholar in Islamic Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia and freelance journalist.
URL: https://newageislam.com/debating-islam/islamic-tradition-revolt-despotic-states-second-part/d/131319
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