An unending conflict: Chronicle of the resurgence of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and central Asia

War on Terror

10 Jul 2008, NewAgeIslam.Com

An unending conflict: Chronicle of the resurgence of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and central Asia

By CHINMAYA R. GHAREKHAN    DESCENT INTO CHAOS — How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia: Ahmed Rashid; Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 11, Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi-10017. Rs. 495.   This topical book by a well-known Pakistani journalist is a well-informed and intimate account of the events leading up to and after the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on September 9, 2001. Ahmed Rashid, whose earlier work Taliban, which was published before 9/11, earned him a well-deserved reputation as a keen observer and analyst of Afghanistan and of the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has written a racy and honest narrative of some of the momentous developments in south and central Asia, with repercussions going beyond what the author refers to as the "region". He was part of a small expert group which advised Lakhdar Brahimi during his stewardship of the negotiations relating to the Afghan issue and, as such, had a ringside view of the happenings and excellent contacts with all the principal players involved in what he has called "descent into chaos." The book has useful chapters on central Asia, but this review is confined to the situation in Afghanistan. Lost opportunity   Rashid's thesis is that since all the three external governmental players — the U.S., Pakistan and NATO — were following their own agendas, which were not in harmony with each other, and without any coordination among them, the experiment at nation building in Afghanistan has been a failure and the field has been left clear to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to regroup and reorganise themselves and to re-emerge as a potent force for destabilising the region. The Americans, who had abandoned Afghanistan once the Soviet Union was forced out of Afghanistan, and whose sole interest, after 9/11 was to capture Osama bin Laden and destroy his organisation, did practically nothing, at least until 2007, to check the growth of the Taliban. They systematically turned a blind eye, to put the matter charitably, to Musharraf and the ISI going to great lengths to protect the Taliban. At the battle of Kunduz in November 2001, hundreds of Pakistani military and ISI personnel were trapped. Musharraf made a personal plea to President Bush, following which nearly a thousand persons, including several hundred Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, were airlifted out of Kunduz into Pakistan. The Taliban were anxious to surrender to the Americans or to the U.N. or to the ICRC rather than to the Northern Alliance (NA). It seems that American General Tommy Franks could easily have deployed a few hundred men to accept the surrender of the non-Pakistanis, but refused, thus missing out a unique opportunity of capturing many key Al-Qaeda fighters. More Taliban and Al-Qaeda people escaped from Kunduz than from Tora Bora later. Pakistan had the measure of the Americans and drew the right conclusion that the Bush administration, particularly the Pentagon, desperately needed them on their side in their war on terrorism and that Pakistan could pretty much act as it pleased, so long as it satisfied the U.S. from time to time by capturing and handing over a few Al-Qaeda operatives. Taliban's comeback   For Pakistan, the priority was always India. The author asserts that Pakistan let go of a certain opportunity in 1988 to get the Durand line recognised by Afghanistan at the time of the agreement ending Soviet occupation, despite the U.N. prodding Pakistan to do so and mentions Yaqub Khan as stating that the military deliberately did not seek recognition in order to gain "strategic depth" against India. When the NA was poised for marching into Kabul, Musharraf prevailed upon the Pentagon to ask the NA not to take over Kabul, since it would be a great victory for India which, along with Iran and Russia, had consistently supported the NA. The NA, having promised not to take over Kabul, did just that, to the consternation not so of much the U.S. as of Pakistan. From then on, the ISI had only one interest—how to prevent India from consolidating its position in Afghanistan. In its bid to limit and eliminate what it regarded as India's growing influence in its backyard, the ISI systematically helped the Taliban by letting it establish itself on the Pakistan side of the border, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The ISI distrusted Karzai, a sentiment fully reciprocated by the latter. Shortly before 9/11, the ISI asked Karzai to leave Pakistan, where he had been living since 1983, to oblige the Taliban which had assassinated Karzai's father. Initially Karzai had been a supporter of the Taliban, and according to the author, had given them a sum of $ 50,000 and handed over a cache of arms which he had hidden near Kandahar. The ISI actively protected the Taliban, knowing fully well the nexus between them and the Al-Qaeda. Washington, which poured in $10 billion of aid between 2002 and 2006, refused to use its clout with Islamabad to weaken the Taliban, anxious as it was not to upset Musharraf at any cost. Diminishing support   The author maintains that once the Bush administration declined NATO's offer to collectively fight the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the members of the latter never got over their dislike of Washington's arrogant attitude. The European governments also have had to deal with a more sceptical public opinion which remains indifferent and even hostile to the idea of putting their citizens in harm's way in faraway Afghanistan. The number of caveats — 71 until 2007 — practically rendered their participation meaningless since they are tantamount to declining to serve in the south where all the fighting has to be done. The diminishing public support, coupled with the fact that those contingents that are deployed in the danger zones, such as Canada, are suffering significant casualties, has raised serious doubts about the possibility of the NATO members sustaining their engagement over the long term.   As for Karzai, the author basically admires him, especially for his courage in the early days of his taking on the Taliban. However, the author frequently expresses his disappointment with Karzai for his indecisiveness, his inclination to take the easy way out instead of squarely confronting the challenges and his failure to tackle corruption. He is particularly critical of Karzai for his compromises with the warlords to the point of sacrificing the authority of, and hence weakening the central government. State of affairs in FATA   Rashid is objective in his references to India, which are not too many. He is open about ISI's support to the cross border terrorist attacks being launched from territory under Pakistan's control. He believes that Indian intelligence has been active in supporting anti-Pakistan dissident and insurgent activities in Pakistan, just as Pakistani intelligence agencies have been in India, he adds. He regards highly India's aid effort in Afghanistan. In his words: "India's success had stirred up a hornet's nest in Islamabad, which soon came to believe that India was 'taking over Afghanistan'. India had implemented a $500 million reconstruction strategy that was one of the best planned from any country. It was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with the Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage, and of course undercut Pakistan's influence." But, he adds: "Excessive Indian arrogance provided the complaints that Musharraf used with Western leaders to explain away his reluctance to befriend Karzai. The ISI generated enormous misinformation about India's role…"   Rashid's description of the state of affairs in FATA leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Taliban have complete control over them and, in effect, is a state within a state, more than the PLO ever was in south Lebanon in the 1970s. It is strange and ironical that the same Baitulla Mehsud, with whom the Musharraf regime signed a truce a little while before Benazir's assassination, was held responsible for it by the regime. So long as the Taliban's hold over FATA continues — and this is likely to continue for a long period — the West's fight against Al-Qaeda will not be won. A frightening prospect not just for the U.S., western countries, the world at large and India, but most importantly for Pakistan.   http://www.hindu.com/br/2008/07/08/stories/2008070850021400.htm